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ABSTRACT 
Kim Engie:	  Adaptation and Shifting Livelihoods in the Small-Scale Fisheries of the Galápagos 
Marine Reserve, Ecuador 
(Under the direction of Stephen J. Walsh) 
 
In many areas, finding alternate livelihoods for fishers has been promoted to alleviate 
environmental strain but encountered difficulty because of often understudied, multiple roles that 
fishing fulfills, making job market dynamics easily misunderstood. I use the concept of social 
adaptation to study both individual adaptive capacities to find alternate work, and the social-
structural creation of vulnerability to declining incomes and limited work options outside of 
fishing in the Galápagos Marine Reserve. Sub-analyses draw from (a) a formal household survey 
(N=167), (b) open-ended interviews (N=127), (c) participant observation, (d) government 
surveys and documents (e) and historical narratives.  
A livelihoods-based analysis of labor mobility shows that those most able to move 
through fishing were a small minority with tertiary degrees, vertical social ties, or large family 
and social networks.  For the vast majority of active fishers, the ability to leave fishing is 
weakly explained by individual differences and is more contingent on the changing nature 
of alternate opportunities. Although people have always transitioned from fishing to tourism, 
the highest-returning options have clearly constricted with privatization of tour operator 
rights over time. Combined with increasingly strict conservation governance regimes, today’s 
fisher social vulnerability is situated in a particular Galápagos context of narrowing adaptive 
coping strategies and prospects for upward mobility, all the while remaining elevated 
in economic security above other Ecuadorian regions.  
	  iv	  
Regulatory changes have left a newly created alternate, recreational fishing, out of 
reach for most fishers. Analysis of these changes shows the intertwined influences between 
fishing and other industries as fishers negotiate with non-fishing actors for livelihood options. I 
suggest using regulatory debates to represent an explicitly social feedback loop to more strongly 
articulate the unclear ways that resilience and complexity frameworks, increasingly applied to 
Galápagos contexts, conceptualize the development of “alternate stable states”. While some 
scholars argue that despite tighter controls a more restricted “race for fish” among registered 
fishers continues to degrade resources, I argue that collectively, the desire and 
demonstrated multi-year efforts to find other jobs make a lack of alternate work the real culprit 
behind any race for fish – and its best cure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 	  
 
I.  “The	  term	  ‘fisheries	  management’	  has	  been	  much	  in	  vogue	  in	  recent	  years,	  being	  taken	  	  to	  express	  a	  more	  subtle	  approach	  to	  the	  fisheries	  problem	  than	  the	  older	  terms	  “depletion”	  and	  “conservation”.	  Briefly,	  it	  focuses	  attention	  on	  the	  quantity	  of	  fish	  caught,	  taking	  as	  the	  human	  objective	  of	  commercial	  fishing	  the	  derivation	  of	  the	  largest	  sustainable	  catch.”	  	  
- H.S.	  Gordon	  1954:	  128	  	  
- 	  
In 2008 a competition was held in the Galápagos Marine Reserve (GMR) to allow a 
limited number of fishermen and women (henceforth referred to as “fishers” and “fishermen” 
interchangeably) to convert their vessels into tour boats. Managers at the Galápagos National 
Park (GNP) received a flood of applications1 but awarded only 16 permits, or “cupos”. Fitting 
long-term institutional goals to reduce the fishing footprint in the GMR, competition outcomes 
did not cleanly do so. A rule that did not allow more than one cupo in a family to the fourth 
degree of kinship was announced after many fishers had submitted applications that took up to 
$8000USD to prepare, disqualifying them. Justified to promote equitable access to the wealthy 
tourism industry2, certain families that were awarded several cupos also had relatives in 
government, raising ire. One fisher decided to annul a 17-year marriage so his brother-in-law’s 
tourism cupo would not disqualify him (El Universo 2009). In the end dozens of fishing families 
who had invested in embracing the “greener” tourism industry were told, in effect, to keep 
fishing.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  77 applications were submitted (GNP 2009). 2	  Cupos are highly valuable; one is known to have sold for US$320,000 in 2005 (Epler 2007). 
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This competition and its aftermath highlight the many tensions, political negotiations, and 
uneven outcomes connected to changing resource use trends within a society, even when trends 
are widely considered beneficial. The entirely small-scale fishing fleet of the Galápagos Islands 
exists within the fourth largest marine reserve in the world, a United Nations World Heritage Site 
renown for its biological abundance and endemism. Shrinking the fishing footprint has 
widespread stakeholder support and aligns with both social and conservation goals. 
 
Figure 1.1 Catch, inactive and active participants in the two major fisheries of sea cucumber and lobster 
in the Galápagos Marine Reserve from 1997 – 2012.  
 
After decades of erratic markets, declining abundance and increasingly stringent 
regulations, Galápagos fisheries have undergone a metamorphosis of remarkable proportions, 
declining in active participants and catch (Fig 1.1). However, not only the fact that people are 
leaving fishing but how and why they do so critically shapes future impacts on marine 
ecosystems and on social equity. Open debates around the expansion of sport fishing, land-based 
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and sea-based tourism, and niche marketing for Galápagos seafood all have diverse implications 
for conservation. Lack of data on this rapidly changing sector makes ecosystem impacts, social 
impediments and even transitional directions extremely difficult to assess, while future choices 
ahead for Galápagos society are “frightening, uncertain, and partially undesirable” (Ospina 2006) 
because individual and societal trade-offs in development for conservation are inevitable. In the 
end, Galápagos fishers and citizens find themselves at a crossroads.  
This dissertation studies the decline and ongoing reorganization of fisheries in the 
Galápagos Marine Reserve – through its work force, politics, social connections, and most 
specifically, the occupational change of registered fishers. The analyses presented here study the 
politics and the socioeconomic realities of finding alternate livelihoods as inextricably 
intertwined and co-produced. 
This project is centered around two themes. The first is one of outwardness regarding the 
social dimensions of fishing.  In 1954 Gordon noted that the term “fisheries management” was 
focused heavily on the quantity of fish caught, influenced by managers who were trained 
predominantly in biology and concerned with the human effects on the production side of a 
fishing system, or its fish stocks – an observation that is largely still applicable today. This focus 
on optimizing harvests has slowly driven conventional governance to an ever-more detailed 
accounting of gear types, vessels and humans and led to a narrow sector-based perspective that 
disengages potentially important relationships outside the fisheries sector (Holling and Meffe 
1996; St. Martin 2001). The literature on fisher behavior in the quantitative social sciences, 
although calling for branching out beyond the historically biological focus of fisheries 
management (e.g., Hilborn 1989; Salas and Gaertner 2004), remains sector-based by focusing 
predominantly on the proximal dynamics of catching fish.  Hilborn (1989) for instance, called for 
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analyzing the "dynamic behavior of fishing fleets" through fleet investment, movement, catching 
power, and discarding.  
Acknowledging the dynamic nature of the label, “fisherman” is part of the outward 
orientation of these analyses. There are two elements of understanding “fisherman” as dynamic. 
First, because many former fishers are now working in tourism and others have second or third 
jobs, econometrically understanding the ‘fishing sector’ beyond active fishermen more 
realistically incorporates how changing environmental impacts relate to how people move 
through fishing over time. Secondly, St. Martin (2001) notes that conventional bioeconomic 
approaches to fisheries management, described above, treat fishers as points of degradation that 
behave atomistically to maximize profit. Instead, social scientists have shown that fishers are 
also knowing, active, participants, holding the key to solutions and not just potential degraders of 
ecosystems, and embedded in broader communal spaces (Berkes 2003; Mansfield 2004; St. 
Martin 2007).  
How can one study fishing while not obscuring its tight connections to the broader 
economy and society? My approach is to trace material benefits to individual fishers from other 
sectors through the main avenue of work. In the Galápagos as elsewhere, the effect of the 
tourism industry on fishing via alternate jobs is of enormous importance (e.g., Young 2003; 
Fabinyi 2010), yet remains almost entirely unstudied. The following chapters show that the 
distribution of tourism benefits via work is highly differentiated among registered fishers since 
the demand for job opportunities is higher than the supply. Documenting these relationships 
analyzes how other sectors affect fishing activity rather than analyzing fishing activity itself, in 
this way going beyond traditional sector analyses. 
The second theme of this project is that of social adaptation. I take as a starting point the 
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fallacy of controllability of fisheries systems (Wilson 2006; Mahon et al. 2008), in other words 
agreeing that perfect knowledge of fishing resources and their fluctuations is unattainable. 
Fisheries science has long been focused on determining the “optimal” amount of fish to harvest 
and on gathering more information with which to perfect quantification. Given this fallacy of 
controllability however, some fisheries social scientists have noted that efforts are better served 
by asking how people adapt to changing circumstances in fishing rather than seeking to quantify 
the components of variability in fisheries change (Garcia and Charles 2008; Mahon et al. 2008). 
The overarching question of this project is, In what ways can we understand how Galápagos 
fishers are “adapting” to social-ecological change? By asking how people adapt rather than 
seeking objective “causes” of ecological change, this project recognizes that people occupying 
different social, economic, and political positions in society experience change differently. 
Various chapters ask after the motives for how Galápagos fishers are adapting to change, how 
adaptation manifests for different individuals, and about the role of inequality in shaping the 
adaptive capacity of individuals and households to direct their livelihoods and decisions. Three 
sub-questions are central to this study: 
1. In conditions of declining profitability and resource abundance, how have some individuals 
been able to (a) reduce their dependence on the local marine resource base while (b) 
maintaining their material standard of living? 
I investigate the role of inequality in shaping the adaptive capacity of individuals and 
households to direct their livelihoods and decisions. I analyze adaptation and 
vulnerability to changing circumstances from multiple social positions.  
2. How does job switching through fishing interface with conservation management policies? 
Living and working within spaces officially set aside for environmental conservation sets 
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apart fishers within the Galápagos Marine Reserve from many modern industrial 
fisheries.  I analyze how conservation policies interact with occupational change and 
occupational pluralism, a long-observed trait of many fishermen in the Galápagos, as well 
as changing harvest abundances and markets. 
3. What is the political economy of diversification from fishing?  
I pair fine-scale individual level analysis of fisheries change with a broader analysis of 
the Galápagos coastal tourism economy, asking, what are Galápagos fishers adapting to? 
The actions and options of fishermen must be understood as reactions to not only changes 
in marine resource abundance, but the structures of economic opportunity open to them – 
namely from tourism, the cash cow of the Galápagos economy. 
  
II. Project Approach & Conceptual Framework  
Scholarship on entry and exit from fishing is scattered across anthropology, labor 
economics, natural resource management, marine policy, fisheries science and resilience and 
complexity work. I apply a sustainable livelihoods interpretation to this broad and scattered 
literature to help synergize insights into a cohesive manner, interpreting entry and exit from 
fishing as livelihood change.  
Sustainable livelihoods, the specific area in which this project is framed, is part of 
broader political ecology scholarship. Political ecology studies ecological change as intertwined 
with its political, economic and social contexts, a basic tenet being that environmental 
governance actions “hold implications for the distribution and control of resources” (Robbins 
2004: 9), and are therefore political. There is always more than one option to react to 
environmental change, and studying decision-making processes and the (often) uneven effects of 
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policies is therefore vital.  
Like other strands of political ecology, a major emphasis of the	  sustainable rural 
livelihoods approach (SRL) has been to analyze social difference and how differences affect 
poverty and social outcomes and connect to governance. SRL uses as a central analytic focus a 
‘livelihood’, or the ways and means through which people go about making a living.  
I put livelihoods in conversation with other frameworks in this project for various 
reasons. First, broader political ecological scholarship on adaptation and vulnerability is 
incorporated to study the contexts of vulnerability with greater definition and robustness. This 
helps to address livelihood critiques over the years that include an undertheorization of various 
elements such as the “vulnerability” context where shocks, trends, and seasonality are broadly 
noted as affecting wellbeing (leftmost box in Fig 1.2; Prowse 2008). Second, I use livelihoods 
concepts to engage with and question resilience and complex adaptive systems framings of 
social-ecological adaptation, important given its rising influence on how change over time is 
understood and acted upon in governance, including in the Galápagos (e.g., Watkins 2008; 
Gonzalez et al. 2008; Denkinger and Vinueza 2014).  The following sections first review the 
sustainable livelihoods framework, and then the intersections made between SRL and other 
bodies of knowledge in this project. 
 
A. A Sustainable Livelihoods Approach to Fishing 
A1. Sustainable Rural Livelihoods  
The “livelihoods approach” has roots in rural development work where it evolved as a 
framework for poverty alleviation, and draws from a simple premise that misunderstanding how 
rural peoples get by has underlain many development failures (Bebbington 1999; Ellis 2000; 
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Angelsen et al. 2011). Prowse (2008) notes that until the 1970s conventional macroeconomic 
narratives of agrarian change considered informal, non-wage work as backwards and its 
reallocation to “modern” capitalist sectors a key to economic growth. Ellis (2000) and 
Bebbington (1999) point to an overarching focus on raising small farm productivity in rural 
development policies until the 1990s, thought to improve economic growth in all sectors. In short 
the ways that farmers made a living in informal, non-waged work were misunderstood, with a 
focus on different spheres of the economy (e.g., formal/informal, capitalist/non-capitalist, 
rural/urban) far greater than that placed on the connections and overlaps between them. Policy 
interventions could be out of touch with local goals and clashing with peoples’ abilities to earn a 
living. A prime example are policies that treated job diversity as a temporary phase between two 
stages and encouraged specialization, when many rural peoples use job diversity as long-term, 
permanent strategies for various monetary and non-monetary reasons (Ellis 2000; Carswell 
2002). 
While much livelihoods work has focused more on social rather than ecological 
dynamics, I also keep attention placed on how these dynamics connect to ecosystem impacts by 
noting that the “sustainability” in question in sustainable livelihoods is understood as the 
maintenance or improvement of people’s ability to make a living while not degrading the 
resource base (Scoones 1998; DfID 2000). 
Households and individuals often have differential access to resources and activities that 
enable some people to benefit more from government policies and market contexts over time and 
to better weather political and personal uncertainties. These markers of social difference have 
included land tenure (Adams and He 1995) and cattle ownership and off-farm skills (Dercon and 
Krishnan 1996), and often vary with gender (Carney 2004). Differential ownership of and access 
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to resources in turn intersects with different abilities “to be and to act” in the manner of one’s 
choosing (Bebbington 1999).  
Both micro- and macro-scale approaches have been taken to study social differences. On a 
micro-scale has been the prominent “assets-mediating processes-activities” framework (Fig 1.2), 
which begins with a focus on household asset bases, the portfolio of work activities they engage 
in, and the mediating processes that enable people to actually translate their assets into activities. 
Such accounting stems from the definition of a livelihood as: 
“…the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and 
the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together 
determine the living gained by the individual or household.” (Ellis 2000: 10)  
 
 
Figure 1.2. The sustainable livelihoods framework of understanding a livelihood as composed of assets, 
activities, and mediating processes. This project places focus on livelihood strategies, highlighted in blue. 
Adapted from the UK Department for international Development and Allison and Horemans 2006. 
 
Assets are distilled into various “capitals” and analyzed either conceptually or quantified 
with various survey procedures. Assets “owned, controlled, claimed, or in some other means 
accessed by the household” (Ibid., 31) are regarded as a foundation of understanding peoples’ 
options for adaptation and thus also their vulnerability to changes. Households are a common 
unit of analysis, since they are “a site in which particularly intense social and economic 
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interdependencies occur between a group of individuals” (Ellis 2000: 18). Ellis’ (2000) 
definition above inherited from Chambers and Conway’s (1992) earlier one, but added stress on 
access to resources and their mediation by institutions and social relations (see also Bebbington 
1999).  
While there is a danger of placing undue emphasis on econometric accounting in livelihood 
surveys, awareness of what resources people have available to them provides insight into how 
some may maneuver change in a more beneficial way than others (Scoones 1998; Scoones 
2009). Sustainable livelihood frameworks, while abandoned by some NGOs for the difficulty 
and time-consuming nature of operationalizing an entire livelihood framework (Prowse 2008; 
Scoones 2009), remains a valuable tool for micro-level research of understanding how people 
make a living in particular times and places, when research is focused and goals prioritized.  
  
Figure 1.3. Bebbington’s conceptualization of livelihood asset use and transformation, stressing their 
interactions within the market, state, and civil society, and change from the specific nature of household 
relationships with other actors. From Bebbington 1999.3 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This figure is reprinted with permission from Pergamon.	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On a more macro-scale of analysis, Bebbington (1999) suggested joining such accounting 
to multiple scales in a similar framework that emphasized and visualized how rural people 
intersect with regional and global state, market, and civil society forces. The ways households 
interact with such forces shape the nature of their opportunities and constraints in using, 
transforming, and defending their assets, and therefore hold the key to understanding how 
livelihood pathways shift over time (Fig 1.3). 
Livelihood studies can also emphasize broader political economic structures and 
foreground “mediating processes” over measuring household assets, an umbrella term for the 
myriad processes that sit between a set of concrete assets on the one hand and the portfolio of 
activities that households ultimately engage in (e.g., Bebbington 2001). Conditions such as social 
relationships, household dynamics, and market dynamics, and relations with institutions, 
organizations, and the state mediate differential outcomes between human societies and 
ecosystem processes (Frank et al. 2007).  Livelihoods work also explicitly recognizes that work 
and compensation have multiple forms, monetary and non-monetary, formal and informal (e.g., 
Allison and Ellis 2001)4. 
I note that livelihood scholarship crosses disciplines, epistemologies and ontologies to 
produce vastly different types of studies ranging from work that emphasizes struggles over 
meaning and identity or the co-production and interpretation of space (e.g., Batterbury 2001; 
Bebbington 2001; Perramond 2010; King 2011) to more positivist and post-positivist work that 
also measures asset bases and seeks to test various hypotheses about factors that affect livelihood 
changes (e.g., Lindenberg 2002; McSweeney 2004; Pender et al. 2004; Angelsen 2011), with 
many bleeding aspects of these elements together. This project is more based in the latter, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For the sake of simplicity, I use “occupation” and “job” interchangeably with “livelihoods” in this analysis. 
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this review reflects that basis.  
 
A2. The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach to Fishing   
Allison and Ellis (2000) were one of the first proponents of bringing livelihoods insights 
to the study of small-scale fisheries, which until then had made little use of it despite its decades 
old existence. They argued for the potential of many SRL insights to inform how the social 
dynamics of fisheries are understood, including occupational diversity and seasonality, linking 
household and individual activities to broader economies beyond fishing, considering fishing’s 
non-economic roles in people’s lives, foregrounding local and community perspectives, and 
introducing methodologies for studying differential abilities or desires to leave fishing.  
Fisheries policies arguably suffer from similar myopic views of the micro-scale ways that 
fishers earn a living and the large role job diversity often plays that spurred terrestrial livelihoods 
insights.  Guiding much fisheries management, classic economic theory is merged with biomass 
production models in “bioeconomics” (Gordon 1954). Fishers are simplified to rational actors 
that always act to maximize their economic profit (St Martin 2001) and are not trusted to self-
regulate under open access conditions, viewpoints still commonly circulated (May et al. 2008). 
Labor movements into and out of fishing are regarded as a matter of weighing opportunity costs 
of alternate jobs when fishing is no longer profitable (Gordon 1954; Smith 1981). However in 
the Galápagos as elsewhere, weighing socioeconomic alternates does not occur within a vacuum 
but involves negotiations with other stakeholders in broader political processes, the availability 
of alternate jobs, and uneven access to various types of work. As a result, leaving fishing is an 
inherently political process. 
With mounting dissatisfaction with the bioeconomic paradigm, arguably there has been a 
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similar movement in marine and fisheries policy paralleling that which took place in the 1990s in 
rural development, of a “major shift in the scope and nature …from the general to the particular, 
from seeking single solutions with widespread application to addressing specific problems in a 
limited context, from implementing solutions from above to permitting solutions to be generated 
from below” (Ellis 2000: 27). In the marine realm this has included calls for community-based 
management, ecosystem-based management, co-management and participatory governance (e.g., 
Christie et al. 1994; Pollnac et al. 2001; IUCN 2007; St. Martin et al. 2007; Charles and Wilson 
2009).  
I engage with livelihoods work and methods to study fisheries change as embodied. By 
this I mean that instead of studying how fishing is changing, I study how fishermen are changing 
and move away from the characterization of “fishing” change through anonymised, aggregate 
catch levels alone.  Livelihoods framings allow for a clearer delineation of how marine resource 
use practices fit into the lives of Galápagos residents, who is leaving, and who is not. I look to 
both Ellis’ (2000) and Bebbington’s (1999) framings of livelihoods to analyze how individual 
social difference as well as broader state, market, and civic society forces have affected 
Galápagos fishers, respectively. 
Speaking to the narrowly sector-based character of much of fisheries research, insight 
that rural livelihoods may be cyclically complex and diverse leads to views that any one 
employment option should not be overly emphasized without study of the role it plays in the 
greater coastal economy (Allison and Ellis 2000). I consider fisheries jobs in terms of 
exchangeability with others in the greater economy in the Galápagos, rather than in isolation, just 
one part of a portfolio of assets that fishermen may draw from, and bottom-up job changes 
through micro-scale capital transformation and substitution capabilities (Scoones 1998; Ellis 
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2000). I ask how different individual livelihood strategies intersect with job diversification, 
understood as part of a larger process through which people seek to secure desired life strategies 
(Owusu 2009). While many livelihoods scholars in anthropology and geography argue that 
livelihood struggles over meaning are underemphasized in relation to the economic earning 
potential of various occupations, in the Galápagos the socioeconomic element of fisheries 
livelihoods are less studied, and emphasized here.  
 
B. The Political Ecology and Economy of Adaptation 
Sustainable rural livelihoods approaches were taken up enthusiastically in the rural 
development field in the 1990s, including Britain’s Department for International Development 
(DfID) where it was a popular policy and planning tool (DfID 2000; Prowse 2008; Scoones 
2009). Rural development is not a discipline but “an organizing principle for anti-poverty 
policies in rural areas of low income countries” (Ellis 2000: 25). While SRL “provided a 
common language for different sectors and academic disciplines” (Prowse 2008: 17) and a firm 
dedication to poverty alleviation, the focus on application may have contributed to critiques of an 
undertheorization of various element such as the “vulnerability context”. The broader literature 
on the political ecology of adaptation brings in greater precision here. 
Political ecological insights into social change and adaptation are inherited from the 
major intellectual roots of both cultural ecology and political economy (Robbins 2004). Cultural 
ecologists analyze societies’ relations to nature through their material needs (i.e., food, shelter), 
and consider changes in natural resource use as dictated by cultural preferences and practices 
(i.e., Nietschmann 1973; Denevan 1983). Denevan (1983) importantly linked adaptation to the 
question of why an idea gets adopted.  He argued that resource practices and technology do not 
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evolve in any inevitable way, and are not simply contingent upon the availability or invention of 
new options and their diffusion. Rather a range of options, in agricultural or fishing practices for 
instance, likely exist in any given time, and their uptake is a negotiated process couched within 
needs, culture, and politics. In early Mesoamerica for example, domesticated crops appeared 
6000 years before agriculture provided even 50% of the diet (Denevan 1983).  
Political ecology scholars have also placed intense focus on the broader political 
economy of adaptation, emphasizing the social-structural creation of vulnerability. Rather than 
conceptualizing risk as external to human societies and lodged within a biophysical hazard such 
as a hurricane or drought, scholars such as Watts (1983) “highlighted the social nature of so-
called ‘natural disasters’ ” (Bassett and Fogelman 2013: 44). In studying Nigerian famines, 
Watts concluded that rural Hausa communities were “conceptually prepared” to cope with 
drought, but undermined in their ability to do so by a colonial system that had transformed the 
structure of their society and traditional systems of food production and coping. Therefore, their 
weak adaptive capacity was shaped not by poor individual decision-making but structurally by 
broader political economic dynamics (Watts 1983). Although risk lies within biophysical (lack of 
rain) as well as social (introduction of a colonial capitalist system) phenomena, exclusive focus 
on the biophysical leads to a lack of attention on the (at least) equally influential social, 
economic, and political processes that create uneven exposure to risk.  
Adaptive capacity is therefore a social process, determined by “…political-economic 
dynamics and social relations” (Bassett and Fogelman 2013: 45). Adaptation studies that focus 
exclusively on only individual actions reveal only proximate factors of risk and vulnerability, 
and tend to characterize adaptation as the need for small, “purposeful” adjustments, downplaying 
actions that are transformative, socially and politically. Bassett and Fogelman (2013) contrast the 
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different conceptualizations of risk and question framing in a political economic and a classic 
hazards analysis of adaptation and risk:  
“The hazards school asks, How do people choose the degree of risk they will bear and the 
adjustment they will make? In contrast, political economists ask, How is vulnerability 
shaped by political economic processes and the social relations of production in which 
constraint rather than choice limits adaptive capabilities? (45)”  
 
Vulnerability, or one’s exposure to a risk or susceptibility to harm (Leach et al. 2008) is a 
key concept with important contrasts with resilience. Scholars such as Adger (2006) have noted 
that resilience can be either desirable or undesirable; it has been described as having “…no 
normative element in theory since it is based on the observation of SES’s [social-ecological 
systems] – observing that some are stable and persistent and others are not” (Leach et al. 2008: 
5). In contrast vulnerability is explicitly normative; its minimization is regarded as a social 
benefit where “some risks are unacceptable and should be avoided at all costs” (Leach et al. 
2008:5, italics in original). A vulnerability approach to social adaptation therefore includes 
explicit analysis of political decisions.  
In short, scholarship across cultural ecology and the political economy of adaptation note 
that exposure to disasters and one’s ability to cope with them is often uneven, and help an SRL 
analysis foreground how vulnerability and coping must be studied within the context of not only 
ecological or biophysical dynamics, but also the broader societal structures in which people live. 
I look to these geographical concepts of adaptation to sharpen and at the same time 
broaden the scope of how fisheries livelihood changes are conceptualized. First, I emphasize the 
indeterminacy of adaptive pathways and retaining a sense of openness to development options 
from this literature to avoid “…directionality and ideas of ‘progress’ in development” in 
livelihoods framings (Scoones 2009: 184). Scoones (2009) notes that questions around how 
livelihoods analyses frame “good” or “bad” options and the question of “what needs 
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transformation through the disciplining practice of ‘development’?” is often unquestioned in 
livelihood analyses, even though many have an explicitly normative policy purpose (184).  It is 
easy to assume that fewer active fishermen is always better than more for environmental 
robustness for instance, and therefore moving as many people out of fishing as possible is 
beneficial. However, the analyses in this project do not presuppose any occupational change as 
“better” than others in particular directions. In the Galápagos the choice to diversify out of 
fishing and remain in it may both be acceptable “goals” within a wide envelope of environmental 
sustainability. Arguably and propitiously, the choices that fishers face are exceptionally open 
compared to other areas where there is often little option but to leave stagnating industries or 
suffer both environmental degradation and worsening incomes(Allison and Ellis 2001; Cinner et 
al. 2009; Fulanda et al. 2009). The GMR therefore provides an important vantage point from 
which to theorize social adaptation outside of these crisis-driven situations, thanks to marine 
ecosystems’ relative health compared to many other places from what is discernible from sparse 
data accounts.  
By maintaining this openness this project seeks to help sharpen the definition of adaptive 
capacity as empirically applied to all fishing communities. Nelson et al.’s (2007) definition of 
adaptive capacity5 importantly encompasses “maintaining the option to develop” as well as 
maintaining the functions and structural identity of a system in the face of change and shocks 
(397). The adaptive capacity of a fishing community as conceptualized here is not only the 
ability to maintain fishing livelihoods, but the capacity to change in the manner of one’s 
choosing, whether that be leaving or remaining in fishing. This analytic stance encapsulates the 
theme of outwardness that runs throughout the project. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Adaptive capacity as defined by Nelson et al. (2007) in the climate change literature is “the preconditions 
necessary to enable adaptation, including social and physical elements, and the ability to mobilize these elements” 
(397).	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Countering directionality comes into play in terms of not only a normative judgment of 
livelihood choices as described above, but in terms of refuting an assumption of a simple 
relationship between availability and uptake of adaptive strategies, as cultural ecologists like 
William Denevan noted:  
“A simplistic example of such [neo-environmental-deterministic] reasoning is as follows: 
the climate became drier, migration occurred to a wetter climate; ergo, the drought 
caused the migration. The reasoning instead should be: the climate became drier, a new 
adaptation became necessary; the option chosen was migration to a wetter climate” 
(1983: 405). 
  
In observing the transitioning Galápagos fishing industry, one causal chain might go: 
there was a fish stock collapse, fishermen expanded into previously unexploited species that are 
now also declining, therefore the stock collapse caused environmental degradation to spread. 
Reasoning should instead proceed as: there was a fish stock collapse, what were the options for 
adapting to a stock collapse, and why did expansion into new species occur? 
Finally, I stress the policy implications of adaptive strategies as social processes on 
multiple scales, adopting a “reformist” adaptation approach that asks after both small, 
incremental adjustments and larger, systemic transformation (Bassett and Fogelman 2013).  
 
C. Sustainable Livelihoods Perspectives on Complex Social-Ecological Systems  
The contemporary momentum, academic and political currency of the overlapping and 
connected concepts of resilience and complex adaptive systems (CAS) makes them an important 
and highly influential aspect of fisheries governance and one of the rising frameworks to stress 
dynamic change, albeit in very different ways from livelihoods and political ecology. While 
resilience and complex systems concepts of change have drawn strong reactions across academic 
spheres, of uptake and embrace but also alarm (e.g., Folke 2006, Walker and Salt 2006; Walker 
and Cooper 2013), political ecologists have begun asking how more fruitful engagements 
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between resilience, political ecology, and other traditions like development studies can develop 
(e.g., Leach et al. 2008). As Thrift put it, “[complexity] does have interesting and even important 
things to say. But … in an increasingly mediatized world, complexity theory is, to an extent, just 
another business opportunity. It is up for sale and it is being sold” (1999:33). 
Heeding these calls, I engage with complex systems scholarship in this project to ask how 
livelihoods scholarship can contribute to making fisheries applications of complex systems more 
sensitive to issues of social equity, fairness, and the political dynamics of governance decisions 
and structures, issues it currently lacks – particularly given it’s rising use in Galápagos contexts 
(e.g., Watkins 2008; Gonzalez et al. 2008; Denkinger and Vinueza 2014). Nelson et al. (2007) 
note that equity is historically not treated deeply in the adaptation and resilience literature. 
Mahon et al. (2008: 106) point out that, “the capacity to self-organize and adapt does not 
necessarily result in sustainable or fair resource use systems”, which “…will depend on the 
balance of power among stakeholders and their appreciation for these issues”. 
In many ways complex systems science is an ecological corollary to livelihoods work, the 
former contrasting itself against reductionist science, and the latter against neoclassical 
economics. In parallel with this project’s application of livelihoods, complexity also stresses the 
indeterminacy of adaptive pathways and refutes claims to any linear or ‘natural’ stage of 
progression in development. Both can be considered network analytic approaches, placing 
greater focus on studying relations between entities (or entities as relations) than on the static 
properties of entities (both human and non-human) themselves. And while seemingly disparate, 
Holling’s (2001) “Adaptive Renewal Cycles” (ARCs), Denevan’s (1983) adaptive strategies and 
the political economy of adaptation are all ways of conceptualizing both incremental and 
transformative changes within a system. They dovetail in criticisms of “top-down” governance, 
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although conclusions differ:  rethinking how stability is characterized and managed in 
ecosystems (Holling and Meffe 1996), and the reworking rather than diminishment of 
quantitative methods around social dynamics (Manson 2001). 
These frameworks have gained strong resonance among the fisheries science community 
(e.g., Allen and McGlade 1987; Holling and Meffe 1996; Wilson 2006; Garcia and Charles 
2008) and are compelling because they explain the loss of global marine ecosystem variability, 
encompassing both economic structures that incentivize producing fish as commodities, and 
mechanistic logic from mathematical explanations of increasing ecosystem brittleness (Levin 
1998; Levin 2005).  They have done so by spurring a reconceptualization of marine ecosystems, 
considering them inherently uncertain and lacking any inevitable “average” or “normal” stable 
equilibrial state (Wilson 2006). Although ecological, this reconceptualization has been a critical 
aspect of building support among fisheries scientists for governance reform because it indicts the 
conventional approach to fisheries management as becoming locked into controlling variability 
above all else to produce fish as commodities (Holling and Meffe 1996). Complex dynamics 
form from the bottom up, and historical events influence which pathways emerge among a 
multiplicity of possibilities. The most important implication of CAS is that there is no “grand 
plan” for change, recovery, and disturbance – all are instead driven by bottom-up processes. In 
short, a CAS is a highly abstract, mathematical concept that describes a particular set of 
processes in terms of organization and behavior.  
At the same time however, because the influence of power imbalances on governance 
reforms (including in fisheries) are rarely outlined empirically, its detractors have argued that 
complexity and resilience may frame issues apolitically and privilege technoc
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Leach et al. 2008; Walker and Cooper 2011)6. In terms of global risk management, examples put 
forth include the contention that those most vulnerable to hurricanes and natural disasters must 
become more “resilient” (Walker and Cooper 2011). While the theory is more expansive, 
scholarship on managing for ecosystem resilience (i.e., adaptive management) remains weakly 
able to legitimize knowledge falling outside of a narrow scientific definition, recognize politics, 
address dynamic behavior in social science via mathematical models, and recognize the multiple 
ways that people and institutions could potentially, and actually do, adapt to change (Leach et al. 
2008).   
 
III. Methods 
My approach is akin to what Prowse (2008) calls “reflexive inductive livelihoods 
research” or an extended livelihoods approach, adopting an explicitly critical realist 
epistemology that foregrounds dialogue and reflexivity, is interdisciplinary, and extends out from 
positivist social science in various ways including triangulation of qualitative and quantitative 
work iterated and integrated over time. I did not conduct long-term ethnography as is part of 
Prowse’s (2008) advocated method; however I spent an intense amount of time in the field in one 
small community and stressed dialogue, reflexivity, and sensitivity in ongoing interactions 
between myself and participants. Prowse (2008) also notes that analyzing mediating processes 
such as market logic and institutional processes “in context” of their observed practices and 
operations rather than from a priori assumptions of their purposes and goals helps to expand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Walker and Cooper (2011) note that in complexity’s rise in global risk management, it’s “naturalizing metaphors” 
such as the unavoidability of surprise and the evolutionary selection of individuals in nature are an “intuitive 
ideological fit” with a neoliberal governance strategy that sees state intervention as more “unnatural” than private 
enterprise and a free market. Attitudes to natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina can include an absence of 
questioning of unequal social impacts under a contention that the most vulnerable must become more resilient, 
basically “neutraliz[ing] critical inquiry into the disastrous consequences of neoliberal approaches to financial 
regulation, urban planning and crisis response, [and] environmental policy and development” (144). 	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livelihood work as reflexive and inductive (see details in Chapter 4). 
The epistemological viewpoint of critical realism is part of a “post-positivist paradigm”, 
which asserts that objects in the world exist and can be known apart from human perceptions and 
knowledge of them (in contrast to pure social constructivism). Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
characterize post-positivism as claiming to be value-free and mainly trying to ameliorate the 
“context stripping” that positivism is susceptible to (197); others characterize it however as 
acknowledging that human subjectivities are central to shaping action and understandings of the 
world (in contrast to Popper-esque positivism) (Collier 2005; Poon 2005; Prowse 2008). In the 
sense of using quantitative methods to study uneven development, I engage with broader post-
positivist movements in Geography (Barnes 2009; Wyly 2009). Wyly (2009) notes that 
“…radical geographies has generally not encouraged an acceptance of the tools, languages, or 
analytical strategies of spatial science as legitimate part of the emancipatory critical enterprise” 
due to historical alignments of “mathematical/statistical/quantitative epistemology, and elite 
conservative politics”, particularly with spatial science in post-WWII America (314). While such 
stances have softened, the application of statistics toward a progressive politics of equity and 
inclusion is a still thin area in geography that has been coined “critical quantitative geographies” 
and “strategic positivism” (Barnes 2009; Wyly 2009). 
The basic outlines of the declining Galápagos fishing industry, like others elsewhere, are 
easy to identify from statistics on employment, yearly fleet catches and active participants, and 
profit and loss calculations. Beyond aggregate economic data however, social equity has subtle 
interactions with employment and place, which demand empirical study of community 
perspectives and their complexities. Qualitative analysis of interviews and participant 
observation is thus critical to this study. Ideally, going a step further and quantitatively linking 
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surveys, participant observation, and interviews to resource use patterns helps translate the 
degree to which different aspects of social change affect resource use, and thus environmental 
change. Quantitative analysis is thus a critical other half to my project. I argue this scholarship is 
understandable to fisheries managers and scientists and acknowledges the importance of 
ecological change. 
I therefore conduct a field-based and historical study with a concurrent, parallel mixed 
methods design where qualitative and quantitative data was gathered concurrently, and analyzed 
in parallel (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). There is a long tradition of mixed methods in 
livelihood work that have combined detailed surveys with historical narratives of change to 
produce multi-scalar, compelling narratives of how livelihoods have unfolded and intersected 
with global forces in various places (e.g., Adams and Mortimore 1997; Batterbury 2001). The 
foundations for the three empirical analyses in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 stem from mixed methods 
that include (1) a formal household survey and descriptive statistics, (2) open-ended interviews 
and participant observation, and (3) historical document and database analysis of demographic 
and employment trends in the Galápagos Islands.  
Although transitions are occurring all through the Galápagos archipelago, I focus on one 
island, San Cristobal, in order to more rigorously detail fisheries dynamics over a snapshot of 
time. San Cristobal is the birthplace of commercial fishing in the Galápagos, and still the port 
home of its seco salado or salted cod fleet, although cod vessels traverse the entire archipelago 
on their two-week trips. I focus on the island of San Cristobal because of known variety in multi-
species harvest strategies and livelihood transitions occurring there, and because accuracy is 
aided by minimal illegal fishing compared to other islands. 
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A. Data Collection 
I first generate empirical data on fine-scale social and occupational changes in San 
Cristobal fisheries. This analysis is a preliminary attempt to improve spotty documentation of the 
recent changes in the socioeconomic dimensions of Galápagos fishing. 
 
A1. The 2012 Galápagos Livelihood Survey 
The sustainable livelihoods “assets-mediating processes-activities” framework is central to 
my data collection on the differential ability of households to cope with change. I focus on 
household asset bases, the portfolio of work activities they engage in, and the mediating 
processes that enable people to actually translate their assets into activities in two ways: 
quantitatively through a household livelihood survey, and qualitatively through interviews, 
participant observation, and document analysis.  
Analyses in this project follow Ellis’s (2000) categorization of five types of capital assets. 
These are physical capital, or things “brought into existence by economic production processes” 
(e.g., homes, boats), natural capital or the natural resource base (e.g., land, water, fish stocks), 
financial capital or stocks (e.g., cash, credit, income), human capital (e.g., education, health), and 
social capital (e.g., personalized networks, ties, and mutual obligations).  
I conducted an original structured survey (N=167) from March – August 2012 in San 
Cristobal among individuals within the fishing community. Deliberately administered to 
individuals who were engaged in fishing to different degrees (49 full-time, 57 part-time, 12 
occasional, and 46 inactive) 7, I measured household assets, activities, and their changeover the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  I categorize fishing participation into four levels following the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the 
United Nations. Those who derive ≥ 90% of their income from fishing are full-time fishers, 30-90% are part-time, 
and ≤ 30% are occasional. Those not fishing but holding a valid license that allows them to fish at any time, are non-
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past three years (Scoones 1998). Aims were to assess how marine resource use practices fit into 
the lives of Galápagos residents – in terms of economic importance (absolutely and relative to 
other economic sectors), attachment, and changing practices. In addition rather than trying to 
perfectly capture household asset bases, the goal was to get some sense of differentiation among 
them. Since the survey was conducted once, most represent a window in time (spanning three 
years) rather than change over time, although it included retrospective questions. 
Questions fall into five major categories: (i) occupational portfolios, (ii) financial and 
physical capital, (iii) economic security and relative poverty, (iv) job satisfaction and industry 
preferences, and (v) demographics, social and human capital (Table 1.1).8 I distinguish category 
(ii) from category (iii) because the latter speaks to how people are able to leverage their capital 
assets in life, and not simply their ownership of assets. An example is the decision to send one’s 
children abroad for schooling, which many better-off families do for a higher quality of 
education. 
Sensitivity to respondent unwillingness to answer certain questions (most commonly 
around income), or an expressed preference to be interviewed rather than surveyed resulted in 
not all fishers being asked all of the same questions. While the sample size of different questions 
may therefore differ, the data gathered gives various understandings of fishing as individually 
practiced. I personally administered all surveys in Spanish and taped the majority to help with 
posterior review. Respondents were found by “man-on-the-street” style connections and 
subsequent snowball sampling. There were 8 refusals, giving a 95% response rate. I surveyed 
and interviewed many people in their homes and also on park benches, aboard cruise boats, at 
cargo docks, in tourism agencies, and restaurants. When possible public places were avoided for  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
active. In the non-active category, I lump together people who may return to fishing but simply did not participate in 
the 2011-12 season, and those that have retired and do not want to return to commercial fishing. 8	  The entire survey can be found in Appendices A and B. 
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Table 1.1 Major survey metrics of household assets, activities, and their change over the past three years 
Category  Variable values 
Occupational portfolio & changes 
 Changes in fishing participation, or 
“livelihood strategy” from 2009-11 
intensify, diminish, maintain 
 
 Changes in any jobs # increased, # diminished, equal # 
same, equal # different 
 Fishing preferences fish more, fish less, continue, 
ambivalent 
 Level of fishing engagement Full-time, Part-time, Occasional & 
Inactive 
Financial & Physical Capital 
 Household Income bracket  
 Fishing Income bracket  
 Boat ownership Y/N 
 *Home ownership Y/N 
Economic Security & Relative Poverty 
 Credit constraints: Ability to raise 
$1000 in one week 
borrow from friends/family, borrow 
from bank, sell something, go 
fishing, use savings, unable 
 *Have children that attend primary, 
secondary or tertiary school outside of 
the Galápagos 
Y/N 
 *Chronic disability or illness Y/N 
 self-assessed health comparison better, same, worse 
 *Self-assessed material standard of 
living (2012) 
good, more or less good, bad 
 Self-assessed material standard of 
living (2009-2012) 
better, the same, worse 
Job Satisfaction & Preferences 
 Liked being a fisher Y/N 
 Would still go into fishing, in 
retrospect 
Y/N 
 Would recommend fishing to their 
children 
Y/N 
Demographics, Human, and Social Capital 
 *Highest individual- and household-
level formal education 
 
 No. of dependents  
 involvement in the local fishing 
cooperative 
1=member, 2=also held a post, 
3=also has been president or 
member of UCOOPEPGALa 
 Family in politics or government 0=none, 1=public sector employees, 
2= nuclear family or sibling in a 
local political position, 3= family or 
close friend as head of an 
organization, or self was in a 
political position 
*These questions are duplicated from the 2009 Galápagos Living Standards Survey. 
a: UCOOPEPGAL is the provincial-level umbrella fishing cooperative that represents all Galápagos fishers and 
participates in regional and national-level political discussions. All four island-level fishing cooperatives coordinate 
with UCOOPEPGAL. 
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more private locales. Group settings also varied (alone, among one to several friends), all of 
which were recorded to note the positioning of speakers and listeners. All respondents but one 
were men, and surveys ranged from 34 minutes (shortest) to 3 hours (longest).   
 
A2. Participant Observation & Interviews 
I relied heavily on interviews and participant observation for information on how peoples’ 
livelihoods and careers had changed over time, accompanying survey point-in-time information. 
Approximately 77% of surveys (N = 127) were also interviews, accompanied by commentary on 
themes around general change in the industry, conservation in the Galápagos, and respondent-
directed concerns. Participant observation greatly helped to deepen my exposure to local 
perspectives through casual conversations. This method is defined as “…experiencing the lives 
of the people you are studying as much as you can” (Bernard 2002), with a goal of building 
experiential knowledge about a research place and situation. I learned of the everyday practice of 
being a fisher outside of an interviewer-interviewee divide, in which unspoken power 
relationships can manifest in unobserved ways (Becker and Geer 1957; Bernard 2002). I had 
myriad interactions with fishers in town, and accompanied fishers on their daily routines over 
three fishing trips using different gear types and target species, each lasting one day.  
 
A3. Documentation and Databases 
I utilize two independent databases. A broader socioeconomic context is provided by the 
2010 Ecuadorian Census, noted above, a household-level census with coverage in the Galápagos 
archipelago (N = 25,124). Questions covered household income, demographics, educational and 
occupational patterns, and indicators of economic, social, and health status (INEC 2010) and 
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provide a source of information independent from surveys and interviews for understanding 
occupational movement between various activities. 
I use the GNP fisheries monitoring database to obtain such as aggregate harvests in the 
Galápagos from 2009-11, and the number of active vessels and participants. Although coverage 
is complete only for the two most valuable species of fish caught, it is the only dataset of harvest 
activity in the GMR. The GNP fisheries database provides general background on fishing trends 
during the study period only, because it is not possible to map out catches onto individuals or 
even boat owners, without falsely assuming that boat owners are responsible for their entire 
boat’s catch. This database is a monitoring and data collection effort documenting harvest at the 
vessel level since 1994 (H. Reyes, pers. communication). Possession and permission for use was 
obtained in August of 2012.  
 
B. Data Analysis 
All quantitative analyzes and characterizations rest on the delineation of distinct fishing 
strategies over time. I use survey data to find the people who are fishing less, fishing more, and 
maintaining constant fishing levels by tracking their movement between full-time, part-time, 
occasional, and inactive engagements. I call these changes an individual’s “fishing strategy”, 
with the values of intensification, diminishment, or steady maintenance, assessed in the three-
year period from 2009-11 (Fig 1.4).  
This categorization is made possible by capturing individual occupational portfolios from 
2009-11 and broadly since respondents began fishing. These fishing livelihood strategies parallel 
livelihood strategies conceptualized in rural terrestrial contexts, where strategies of 
diversification have been contrasted with those of intensification or extensification of agriculture, 
where households deepen their reliance on natural resources for survival (Hussein and Nelson 
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1998; Scoones 1998; Ellis 2000). 
 
 
Figure 1.4. “Fishing strategies” of intensification, diminishment, or no change are based on how 
individuals transition between different levels of fishing engagement, from full-time to inactive.  
 
I synthesize current job portfolios, what work people are taking up as they leave fishing, 
and their labor preferences, which are not always synonymous. Overall, analyses identify various 
social conditions and employment changes from 2009-2011 in Galápagos fisheries. Side-by-side 
comparisons of quantitative and qualitative data are aggregated around thematic lines in each 
chapter. Quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed independently and compared, often 
resulting in “meta-inferences” drawn around livelihood themes and research questions. 
Quantitative analysis consisted of statistical inferences from categorical survey questions, and 
qualitative analysis of gathering emergent themes from open-ended interview questions and 
document analysis. While retrospective survey questions are asked, I rely more heavily on 
qualitative analysis to interpret change over time. 
Qualitatively, data collection and analysis were at times simultaneous. I took extensive 
field notes and synthesized emergent themes, then iteratively collected further data based on 
analysis of earlier observations (Becker and Geer 1957; Kleinman et al. 1997). My qualitative 
methods also iteratively influenced my quantitative data via the livelihood survey, which was 
conceived as a conversation piece more than a one-time assessment of individuals and their 
Diminishment Intensification 
n=49 n=58 n=12 n=46 
Full-­‐time (>=90%	  income) Part-­‐time (30-­‐90%	  income) Occasional (<=30%	  income) Inactive 
Fishing Strategy: 
	   30 
households. As participant observation reshaped or introduced new aspects of livelihood change, 
in several instances I developed additional survey questions where counting frequencies was 
possible: for example, as I saw that fishers had little savings despite yearly incomes that 
sometimes approximated Galápagos averages, I added a question concerning the ability to cope 
with sudden cash needs. I then found earlier survey respondents around town to ask what were 
now follow-up questions. I also used member checking across various respondents to triangulate 
the accuracy of qualitative data implications over time (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011).  
The main methodological challenge in applying a livelihoods approach to these dynamics 
was the effort needed to canvas the fishing community, broadly defined, in terms of their asset 
bases and occupational portfolios at such a fine scale. I argue that the truthfulness of respondent-
reported survey results improved over time as trust and rapport was built with the fishing 
community, and I had the opportunity for iterative questioning to clarify answers unclear to me 
when conversational opportunities arose.  I lived in San Cristobal for six months, from March – 
August 2012, and visited the islands several times in 2009 and 2010 as well.  
 
IV. Chapter Outline 
Understanding the varied effects of the decade-long downturn in Galápagos fisheries, and 
its multiple and complex meanings, is the overall project of this dissertation. To set the stage, 
Chapter 2 introduces the recent history of fishing in the Galápagos Islands, major actors, 
historical governance regimes, and existing knowledge on the state of both social and ecological 
change. The second half of the chapter presents general results of this project’s livelihood survey 
and major trends in the different ways that fishing livelihoods have been changing since the last 
in-depth study of fishing livelihoods was conducted in 2004 (Ospina 2006). Th
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my practical goal to assist Galápagos managers by answering basic questions such as how 
various elements of the fisheries occupation (i.e., production for consumption, identity; Ellis 
2000), are used by households and to outline trends in change.  
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 then present three empirical analyses that study different themes 
within social adaptation and conservation, in the transitioning Galápagos fishing industry on San 
Cristobal. Analyses span individual decision-making around occupational change as well as the 
broad economic structures that Galápagos fishermen operate within. Quantitative data from the 
2012 Galápagos Livelihood Survey is analyzed in two parts presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 3 uses survey data to analyze labor mobility through fishing. I analyze 
differences in asset bases to assess the degree to which individual adaptive strategies emanate 
from potentially variable abilities to leave, paired with analysis of preferences and attachment to 
fishing. Comparing various hypotheses from the economic theory of labor, the livelihood 
approach to small-scale fishing, and fisheries anthropology, I show that social considerations 
beyond profit seeking, a conventional assumption of fisher behavior, shape labor mobility 
through fishing as revealed through peoples’ acceptance of alternate labor choices that do not 
completely replace fishing incomes.  
While Chapter 3 analyzes why people move through fishing, Chapter 4 places focus on 
survey variables related to proxies of economic security and relative poverty to present an 
analysis of the social outcomes of present-day fishing strategies and degrees of participation. I 
place particular focus on two broader dynamics: how the tourism and fishing industries intersect 
through their overlapping local labor pool, and the double-edged sword of conservation 
governance on fisher wellbeing. While the fishing industry has undergone a decade-long 
stagnation, the tourism industry has also been changing, continuing a rapid period of growth. 
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These changes are changing the calculus of job switching away from fishing, and opening up 
non-fishing laboring opportunities that are highly uneven in terms of economic return, skill level, 
and independence. Visible differences in socioeconomic status among registered fishers show 
that a spectrum of marginalization and precarity is emerging in the fishing community.  
Chapter 5 uses the new Galápagos recreational fishing industry, pesca vivencial, as a case 
study in how resilience and complex adaptive systems (CAS) frameworks are beginning to be 
applied in the Galápagos. I contrast resilience and livelihoods interpretations of emerging 
resource use patterns, such as recreational fishing, and argue that livelihood work can help to 
better articulate the weak ways that “alternate stable states” and social feedback loops are 
analyzed in fisheries resilience scholarship thus far, which may shape the formation of different 
policy implications. Documenting the diversity of fishing practices that have arisen around 
recreational fishing, one strong dynamic emerging from community perspectives is the glossing 
over of how to maintain a self-restrained lifestyle of respecting the environment’s fragile limits 
(Gonzalez et al. 2008) amidst a loss of community control of the tourism industry. This analysis 
shows that pesca vivencial should be understood as a logical response by local residents to break 
into a wealthy tourism market that many perceived as captured by local and outside elites, rather 
than a pursuit of more extractive lifestyles for profit. 
 
V. Contributions from the Galápagos  
Nash (2009) argues that despite intense conflicts, the elements of a sustainable society are 
in the Galápagos due to international attention and commitment, strong local political pushback, 
and relatively healthy ecosystems. In a global context of continuing degradation of other ocean 
archipelagos, a sense of urgency has become associated with conservation outcomes in the 
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Galápagos: “We have one last chance to keep an oceanic archipelago ecosystem intact. Hawaii, 
the Pacific Islands, the Mascarenes, and other island groups have become an absolute mess” 
(Nash 2009: 107). Combined with the luxury of relatively well-funded conservation efforts, 
strong local control of government and progressive adaptive management policies, the Galápagos 
Islands offer a fascinating laboratory to tackle emergent issues in environmental protection and 
continuing social adaptation, given the rapid evolution of ongoing searches for more sustainable 
ways to support their population and environment. Registered fishers in the GMR who have been 
able to reduce their fishing engagements over time and boost their socioeconomic capital are rare 
examples of positive social and ecological outcomes of conservation policies in Protected Areas. 
Understanding the processes that enabled them to do so may help the conservation movement 
pursue needed goals while being a more benign force of globalization (Zimmerer 2000; 
Zimmerer 2005).  
In the Galápagos and beyond, this project’s intensive analysis of social adaptation is 
performed in the service of strengthening environmental conservation in both theory and 
practice. Since Allison and Ellis’ (2001) article, the term sustainable livelihoods and its tenets 
have become integrated in fisheries development work (i.e., Allison et al. 2002; IMM 2008). 
However, besides a large-scale development project in Africa (Allison and Horemans 2006), 
empirical studies of what sustainable livelihoods insights can contribute to understanding 
transitional or declining fishing industries have been sparse (but see Bene et al. 2003; Smith et al. 
2005). This project uses SRL to delve into the dynamics of renewal and reinvention in 
transforming natural resource industries, far less understood than, and a necessary 
counterbalance to major work on the demise of fish stocks in ecology (Pauly et al. 1998; 
Daskalov 2002), fisheries (Allen and McGlade 1987; Levin 1993) and social science (Acheson 
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2006; Wilson 2006).  
Theoretically, I speak to current debates in several geographic subfields. Within political 
ecology, I participate in a long-running debate around how to conduct serious research on social 
dynamics that is attentive to political and broader economic context without losing a connection 
to ecological outcomes (e.g., Vayda and Walters 1999; Peterson 2000). Although research within 
the context of sustainable livelihoods has linked different livelihood strategies to ecological 
impact, particularly in farming (e.g., Adams and Mortimore 1997; Batterbury 2001), such work 
is thin in fishing.  
I also take sustainable livelihood methods in unusual directions by expanding beyond 
studying the extremely poor or marginalized (Ellis 2000). It has been said that the Galápagos has 
“exiled extreme poverty” (Ospina 2006), but the insight remains that the relatively poor may 
have different needs and thus constraints on behavior that is more conservation-friendly.  
Within complexity scholarship, I participate in debates around the potential for more 
serious applicability to social dynamics, which necessarily includes explicit treatment of power 
and everyday processes. If complexity theory is to become more reflexive and applicable to on-
the-ground governance, serious application to social dynamics must be conducted at a fine, 
household level, compared to the broad, sweeping conceptualizations that have thus far marked 
engagement of post-structural scholars (Thrift 1999; Manson 2001), natural resource 
management (Seixas and Berkes 2003; Gonzalez et al. 2008), and environmental change research 
(Nelson et al. 2007).  	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CHAPTER 2 
Setting: The Changing Seas of the Galápagos Islands 
First considered a barren and harsh site for human settlement when encountered in the 
16th century, the natural bounties of the Galápagos archipelago slowly underwrote fishing, 
tourism, and scientific industries that coexist and share much overlap in territory and labor 
networks. This chapter provides necessary background on the fishing and tourism industries of 
the Galápagos, setting the stage for the in-depth analyses in the rest of the dissertation. In the 
first sections I present the main actors, institutions, and a short history of their interactions that 
has produced the conditions in which the fishing industry has been operating.  
Socioeconomic change is at least as fast paced and dynamic as biophysical changes in the 
ocean. It is unknown how the recent decade-long downturn in fishing has affected the 
demographics and socioeconomic character of the fishing sector. The latter part of the chapter 
provides an update on some broad socioeconomic characteristics of the fishing industry up until 
2012.  
 
I. The Biophysical environment  
The Galápagos Islands remain among the most ecologically intact oceanic archipelagos 
in the world, with an estimated 95% of its original biodiversity still extant (Watkins and Cruz 
2007; Nash 2009). Isolation from human predation until the 17th century, an absence of large 
mammals, a position at the juncture of three major ocean currents, and large altitudinal gradients 
has yielded a high level of microclimates and endemism with about one-fifth of all species there 
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found nowhere else. Flora and fauna are a distinct mixture of tropical, Indo-Pacific, and South 
and Central American species (MacFarland and Cifuentes 1996; Edgar et al. 2004). 
The archipelago consists of four large and hundreds of small islands and islets. The four 
largest and inhabited islands are San Cristobal, Santa Cruz, Floreana, and Isabela, from East to 
West. They sit on the Galápagos platform, an underwater shelf built from volcanic accretions 
over time and shallower than the surrounding Pacific Ocean at 200 – 1000 m depths (Banks 
2002). The Galápagos platform is home to many seamounts, underwater volcanoes that sit 
roughly 200 m below the surface and often have aggregations of various fish and shark species 
around them. The biophysical environment of the archipelago is very dynamic, with the coastal 
oceans undergoing large swings in water temperatures and nutrient loads given natural shifts in 
current patterns. These rich nutrients contribute to making the Galápagos Marine Reserve 
(GMR) a rich aggregation of both local 
and migratory marine life in the Pacific 
Ocean.  
Populations are susceptible to 
catastrophic El Nino-Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) events from across the Pacific, 
which are also linked to heavy rains and 
droughts, making this a fragile as well as 
unique environment (Snell and Rea 1999; 
Reidinger et al. 2002). Underscoring its 
fragility, although very few species 
extinctions have occurred many have Figure 2.1. The Galápagos archipelago, major islands, and capitol, Puerto Baquerizo Moreno. The 
Galápagos Marine Reserve extends 40 nm beyond the 
coastlines.	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declined in recent decades; in 2007 two species of Galápagos corals and 10 species of seaweed 
were put on the IUCN Red List, none of which are exploited by humans.  
Waters are also rich in fish species. Small pelagics such as mackerel and sardines occur 
mainly in the cooler waters of the slope, shelf, and seamounts on southern and western coasts, 
serving as food for many animals like sea lions, large pelagics, sharks and penguins. They are 
also used for baitfish. Large pelagics and tuna species are found throughout the GMR, migrating 
through as well as spawning in waters 24° C or warmer. Species include billfishes, dorado 
(dolphinfish), sierra (Pacific King’s mackerel), yellowfin tuna, bigeye tuna, and skipjack tuna 
(Ben-Yami 2001). In addition there are myriad sharks, and the majority of rocky coastline in 
Ecuador is found in the Galápagos, explaining why it also holds the majority of habitat ideal for 
spiny lobsters (Bustamante et al. 2000; details in Section II below). Many of these species make 
up the backbone of contemporary Galápagos fishing industries. 
 
II. Fish and Fishermen  
The human dimensions of settlement and resource use are equally rich in history and 
dynamic in change. In the 1800s the islands were a sleepy outpost of penal colonies and private 
plantations, made part of Ecuador, and had a sprinkling of Ecuadorian and European settlers. 
Beginning in the twentieth century, the enormous natural wealth of the Galápagos archipelago 
underwrote the creation of both a local commercial fishing fleet and a nature-based tourism 
industry.  
 
A. Fishing Resources 
Fishing has a long history in the Galápagos reaching back to the times of the first 
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attempted settlements in the 1830s, and has filled multiple subsistence, leisure, and commercial 
needs. For local residents, fishing remains much engaged in for home consumption. Commercial 
activities began in the 1940s for salted grouper, the 1960s for lobster, and the 1990s for sea 
cucumbers, still the three dominant fisheries (MacFarland and Cifuentes 1996; Wilen et al. 
2000).  
The fishing fleet consists of three types of vessels. The largest is the bote, a wooden boat 
up to 18 m in length, with a small cabin for sleeping and a hold. Restrooms are uncommon. 
Small fiberglass dinghies called fibras can be up to 9.5 m long, and pangas are small wooden 
boats up to 6.5 m long, with approximately the same shape (Fig 2.2). Fibras are the most 
versatile as they are more easily convertible for other uses such as operating day tours, and some 
in fact have been converted into recreational fishing boats with the addition of a cabin and other 
features (more details in Chapter 5). They are also faster than pangas; Ospina (2006) notes their 
use in illegal fishing. In 2006 there were 446 total vessels (67 botes, 145 fibras, and 234 pangas; 
Zapata 2006). By 2013 vessels had dropped to 371 total, and 261 regularly sailing (GNP 2013). 
All information collected by the Galápagos National Park (GNP), as managing authority, 
and mentioned below is stored in a Fisheries Monitoring Database maintained jointly by the 
GNP and the affiliated Charles Darwin Research Station (CDRS), documenting harvest at the 
vessel level since 1994 (H. Reyes, pers. communication). Documentation is spotty and records 
before 1994 are extremely difficult to find. At present, the salted cod, lobster, and sea cucumber 
fisheries run on regular seasons agreed upon in a Fisheries Management calendar, which largely 
mimics export demands and avoids spawning times. The salted cod season begins around 
September and runs until Catholic Holy Week in April. Lobster fishing opens in September and 
ends December. Sea cucumber fishing is unique in being contingent upon an acceptable 
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measured density, and if opens occurs in June and July. The first fishing calendar was created 
shortly after the establishment of the GMR (c. 2000), and is reviewed and renewed 
approximately every five years. 
  
Figure 2.2. Various vessel types in the Galápagos fishing fleet. A larger wooden bote on the left in 
construction. Botes are given a coat of paint before going to sea. A line of fibras and pangas on the right, 
which are similar in shape but differ in material and length. The boat with a cabin in the foreground is a 
fibra. Photos by author.  
 
 
A1. Salted cod  
The seco salado is the traditional fishery of the Galápagos. It targets mixed demersal 
finfish, the most important of which are serranid groupers, focused on the bacalao (Myctoperca 
olfax) (Ben-Yami 2001). The vast majority of salted cod fishermen are still found on San 
Cristobal, the birthplace of this fishery. A few boats on San Cristobal, less than five, specialize in 
not groupers but salted mullet, locally known as lisa, to fill a smaller market niche. The 
predominant practice has remained fishing by hand with a baited hook attached to weights, 
called an empate. Lines are fed across that boat’s rail until they reach the bottom and then jigged 
until a fish is caught, whereby each fish is hauled hand over hand to the surface. Salted cod trips 
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are typically 15-18 days long and carried out from large wooden botes that travel throughout the 
peninsula. Fish are split and salted in the air before sale. Almost the entire catch is exported to 
mainland Ecuador, where it serves a culturally important role as food during the Holy Week 
before Easter. The season revolves largely around Holy week, beginning when mainland 
merchants start stocking up on bacalao in September although the height of the season begins in 
December, and continues until Easter (Molina et al. 2005). 
Information of seco salado harvests comes form two main sources: export records and 
fishing trip records, which captains are required to fill out after each trip, and include the fishing 
grounds visited and total trip catch amount. There is no other monitoring. Population trends are 
ambiguous, although many scientists think that abundance has decreased in the seco salado. 
Burbano et al. (2014) found that older generations of seco salado fishermen reported a greater 
past abundance of groupers than younger fishermen.  
 
A2. Lobster 
  The spiny lobster fishery is made up of two species, red (Panulirus penicillatus) and 
blue/green (P. gracilis). Red lobsters are more abundant and found throughout the archipelago in 
coastal waters. Both are reported as being littoral and found at depths < 10 m. A third lobster, the 
slippery lobster (S. astori) also known locally as Chinese lobster, is also fished solely for local 
consumption. All three species prefer rocky substrate, caves, and reefs. P. penicillatus is a 
nocturnal feeder (Bustamante et al. 2000; Ben-Yami 2001). 
Lobster was the earliest commercial fishery to successfully target an international export 
market for a sustained period of time. According to interviews, Japanese and other foreign 
vessels first came for lobster and began teaching local fishermen how to dive for them, first free 
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diving with gloves and spear, and now with hookah diving gear. In hookah diving, a diver is 
connected to the surface by a tube that continually feeds him air, compressed at the surface and 
sent down by an accompanying machine. Only the tails are exported, with catch usually reported 
in pounds. Lobster fishing is done by either small teams of 2-3 people in pangas who go out for 
one night, or with a larger bote and several pangas who go out together for longer trips of several 
days, during which the botes serve as mothership to the pangas, who are diving and bringing 
catch in to the bote. Fishermen sleep and eat communally on the bote.  
Management consists of seasonal closures. In the beginning, lobsters were harvested year 
round, although since at least the beginning of the Fisheries Management Calendar, harvest is 
only allowed from September to December. Population health is estimated by trends in catch per 
unit of effort over time; no independent abundance estimates are made. There is 100% 
monitoring coverage of catches brought in to the docks of Isabela, Santa Cruz and San Cristobal 
by Park guards. The Galápagos catch makes up the majority of lobster exports from Ecuador, 
since national export data and Galápagos catch data closely track each other (Bustamante et al. 
2000). 
This fishery has undergone the most dramatic fluctuations in catch and market price that 
is clearly related to conditions outside of fishing alone (Bustamante et al. 2000).  In the 1990s the 
fishery was depressed with market prices below $10/lb and low catches per unit effort. The 
fishery has recovered in abundance and profitability however, beginning in the mid-2000s due to 
boosted market prices and stronger enforcement by the GNP of seasonal closures and sanctions. 
This period saw a continued drift of fishers into tourism as well, so that overall from 2005-08 
active participants dropped by half (Murillo 2010 unpublished). One indication of a long-term 
decline in lobster over the decades however is the transition to a completely nocturnal fishery 
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from a previously diurnal one, where animals are caught on the open sandy bottom when they 
come out of the rocks to feed and are more easily captured. The time of this transition is unclear, 
although it occurred before 2001 (Ben-Yami 2001). Night diving is more uncomfortable with 
colder water and more sharks, and so indicates something that would only be done as abundances 
decline. It is the second most economically valuable fishery after sea cucumbers. 
 
A3. Sea cucumber  
The sea cucumber (Stichopus fucus) is the last marine resource to have been discovered 
to have economic value. Fishing began in the 1990s in the Galápagos Islands (Ben-Yami 2001; 
Bremner and Perez 2002), coinciding with the largest economic crisis of the century in Ecuador 
from 1995 – 2000, and the realization that highly valuable sea cucumber stocks were still in great 
abundance in Galápagos after they had been fished out of the Ecuadorian coast (Ospina 2006; 
Hearn 2008). Fishers cook and dry the animals before selling them to merchants, who usually 
quote a price per pound (c. 3-4 animals). Harvests are usually reported in terms of number of 
animals, referred to as units.  
This resource is managed in the same way as lobsters, with 100% coverage of catches 
brought to the docks. Sea cucumbers are the only marine resources that are counted yearly by 
scientists for abundance estimates. Seasons are 2 months, and if densities are lower than 
2/100m2, then a season is not opened. Fishermen commonly take issue with abundance counts 
and claim underestimates. It is noted that the GMR’s no-take zones are “evidently hardly useful” 
in protecting this stock because sea cucumber grounds are largely outside of them (Ben-Yami 
2001). Illegal fishing was rampant in the 1990s by all sectors of society – fishing, tourism crew, 
and Navy and government officials, depending on who recounts the story (interviews 2010 and 
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2012). What is clear is that enforcement was extremely spotty. Illegal fishing and enforcement 
has improved over time, to an ambiguous degree. 
This resource is exhausted to a great degree. At first easily harvested at depths no more 
than 3-4 meters, Ben-Yami (2001) reported that cucumbers were harvested down to 20 m in 
2001; in 2012 fishers reported commonly diving past 35 m. The fishery has thus shifted from one 
characterized by easy profit and low skill, to one of hard-earned profit with mounting physical 
risk. Yearly dive accidents occur, and long-term or permanent paralysis is not infrequent.  Prices 
paid to fishers by exporters have risen but not maintained overall compensation levels. Although 
the 2011 price of sea cucumber was up to $4/unit (Reyes et al. 2012) from the 2000 price of 
$0.73/unit (Bremner and Perez 2002), gone are the days of phenomenal profits and bountiful 
daily harvests.  
 
A4. Whitefish 
 Finally, multiple marine species are caught and sold fresh for bait or consumption to the 
local market. Smaller pelagics are caught for bait with beach seines, including clupeids and 
anchovies, and offshore with hook and line, including mackerel and small arangids. Recently 
Heel (2012) found that fishermen were catching not only smaller pelagics but top predators like 
yellowfin for bait, indicating possible overly high pressure on bait fish stocks. 
 A fishery for tuna and other midwater finfish also exists and appears to have grown since 
2001. These fish are largely consumed locally and caught by trolling, or dragging a hook and line 
called an arrastre through the water behind a moving boat. Rod and reel are used, although less 
commonly. Fish are sold directly from the docks, through seafood shops called marisquerias and 
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often combined with butcher shops, and from fishermen themselves driving around the streets 
and proclaiming their catch.  
In management terms, all of these fishing practices are referred to with the catch-all term 
pesca blanca or whitefish. No information on their population abundance or trends exist or is 
collected, and their degree of exploitation is ambiguous. Improving fishing techniques and the 
rise of trolling may be some cause for concern (Heel 2012). 
 
A5. Sharks and Illegal Fishing 
 Shark fishing has been practiced for decades, and before the establishment of a marine 
reserve was not illegal. The lucrative market for shark fins fuels a continuing illicit trade, 
rumored to be more prevalent on Isabela than other islands given the distance from government 
offices and a weaker economy outside of fishing. Even on San Cristobal in 2012, several fishers 
admitted to me having finned sharks recently, and one indicated the willingness to do so if he 
needed to raise quick cash, noting how their numbers have risen dramatically from previous 
densities before the Marine Reserve was established. Aided by conservation establishment, the 
archipelago is renown for having schools of sharks in densities found in only a handful of places 
on Earth. 
Industrial fishing fleets from the Ecuadorian fishing center of Manta and from other 
countries fished the rich Galápagos waters for many years, coming very near to the coastlines to 
take tuna and lobster before the Marine Reserve was established. After 2001 industrial ships still 
entered the GMR zone to fish illegally, to the consternation of local fishers. The situation was so 
common that in 2001 Ben-Yami noted, “Obviously, mainland-based seiners catch small pelagics 
within [the] GMR. Since this is illegal fishing, no information is available” (np). A common 
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description related to me was being able to see so many vessels at night in certain areas that the 
scene resembled a city on the water. Only in the last few years has a satellite vessel monitoring 
system been implemented, which according to officials has greatly reduced illegal entry by 
industrial ships into the Marine Reserve to virtually zero (interviews 2012).  
 
B. Political Organization and Interests 
The artisanal fishing sector is made up of heterogeneous actors with different roles, 
patterns of harvest and profit making, and political interests at times. Each of the three major 
islands has a local cooperative which represents fishing interests: COPREPAG on Santa Cruz, 
COPAHISA on Isabela, and COPESAN and COPESPROMAR on San Cristobal, the only island 
with not one but two. These organize under the provincial level cooperative UCOOPEPGAL. 
One man, Marco Escarabay, was UCOOPEPGAL’s president in 2012. Many on San Cristobal 
have cited Escarabay, who also lives on that island, as the real political head of the fishing sector 
regardless of who contemporary presidents are of the island-level cooperatives for many years. 
The local cooperatives are the official conduit through which the fishing community 
communicates with the GNP, state and provincial institutions on relevant issues. Delegates to 
meetings are typically the presidents. Cooperative presidents are nominated and voted upon, and 
serve with little or no compensation. The president and board members manage affairs, and 
board members similarly volunteer for 2-3 year unpaid terms. Initially, cooperative membership 
was mandatory for obtaining a fishing permit, agreed upon by governing institutions with the 
fishing community. With the new Ecuadoran constitution in 2008, membership was dropped as a 
prerequisite as part of a broader national movement of freedom to choose associations. 
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Cooperative membership extends past active fishermen. Many registered but inactive fishermen 
are members, as well their children, wives, and sometimes relatives, and also seafood merchants.  
On San Cristobal the existence of two cooperatives is indicative of the fractious nature of 
fisheries politics on the island, because no practical difference but internal strife caused the split 
among fishers several decades ago. When asked why they were part of one or the other 
cooperative, local fishermen all indicated choosing solely based on the membership of family 
and friends, or that they were the same. Fieldwork showed that on San Cristobal in the past, local 
fishers have disagreed on the decisions and agreements made by their presidents with the GNP 
on various issues. For this reason, frustration and disenchantment with the San Cristobal 
cooperatives is common.  
Notwithstanding the fractious nature of fishing politics today, in the past there have been 
several notable acts of solidarity by the fishing community. The most often cited sector-wide 
political action taken by fishermen are the dramatic 3-day protests in 2001, where local 
fishermen made international headlines for boldly storming the offices of the Galápagos National 
Park en masse, demanding a relaxation of sea cucumber fishing quotas (de Roy 2001). The 
takeover of GNP headquarters and threats to harm endangered tortoises caused fishermen to be 
characterized as chaotic exploiters, “…interested only in profit in the short run…” (TRAFFIC 
cited in Ospina 2006).  
However, fishermen have played key conservation roles as well. The Galápagos fishing 
lobby’s stance against industrial fishing and insistence on extending the Marine Reserve out to 
40 nautical miles past the archipelago’s coastline was critical. Ben-Yami notes that the scientific 
community, National Park and CDRS were “…ready to meet the industrial fishing interests 
halfway and, in fact, to agree to [a] 15 sea miles zone.” He goes on: 
“…the fact remains, however that the width of the 40-mile zone is less dictated by 
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protection needs of the Galápagos marine habitats, than by the resolution to allocate to 
local fishermen extensive offshore fishing grounds. This exclusivity can be used in the 
future as compensation for the much-needed reduction of inshore fishing effort” (2001: 
np)  
 
Therefore, the stances that the fishing sector has advanced over the years on management 
issues cannot be cleanly characterized as either anti- or pro-conservation, but reflect more 
complex local politics and a sector that is highly heterogeneous in political views.  
 
C. Institutions and Governance Regimes 
Both marine and terrestrial governance can be characterized by various historical 
governance regimes.  Arguably, in the beginning resource use was open access given the absence 
of state oversight. Low human population densities were joined with narratives that describe 
bounty and a lack of the need for restrictions or closed zones (e.g., Ospina 2005; Engie unpub. 
data). The fishing and tourism sectors grew organically and informally; local residents and 
fishermen often took visitors out on their small boats for day trips. As tourism and industrial 
fishing in the coastal areas of the Islands both grew and attracted actors from the mainland and 
abroad, conflicts between local fishermen, industrial fishermen, and tourism groups grew as well. 
With the establishment of the Galápagos National Park (GNP) in 1959 and the affiliated CDRS 
in 1960, conservation interests came to the archipelago, with great international networks of 
participants and interests. By the 1990s, these sectoral conflicts had grown to extraordinary 
levels.  
The writings of MacDonald (1997), Grenier (2000), and Ospina (2006) have dissected 
this period. MacDonald (1997) argues that the intense conflicts of the 1990s have at their heart a 
disagreement between local residents and institutions over the nature of resource use and rights. 
Locals have always considered Galápagos resources common-property due to their longstanding 
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use of the landscape. In reality, resources are public property and the Ecuadorian State rather 
than the community has always owned them. Such divergent viewpoints lay dormant until hands-
on governance intensified in 1959, when the State decided to enclose 97% of all land inside the 
newly created Galápagos National Park, introducing tensions with island residents. MacDonald 
advocated for managing resources as if they were communal property, putting community-based 
management in action with participatory processes that would give local people more inclusion 
and say in policies.  
Grenier (2000) also argued for the necessity of local control of resources, and believed 
the Galápagos faced a choice between further connections to outside, global networks of 
capitalist development, or local use of resources that compromised some development and 
amenities for the sake of the fragile environment. The former would continue to erode ecosystem 
and cultural diversity. Both works had great influence over the structure of the landmark legal 
reforms implemented in 1998, called the Organic Law for the Special Regimen for the 
Conservation and Sustainable Development of Galápagos (LOREG) or simply, the Special Law.  
Formed with intense effort put into consensual and participatory processes and incorporation of 
known ecosystem science, the Special Law represented a paradigmatic shift for local governance 
(Baine et al. 2007; Heylings and Bravo 2007). It gave significant power to the province, making 
the Galápagos the most autonomous of all Ecuador’s provinces. Part of this autonomy stems 
from a dedicated source of income, since 45% of income from entrance fees to into the 
archipelago9 go directly to the GNP, 25% to municipalities, and 20% to the provincial-level 
Governing Council, formerly known as INGALA (GNP 2013). Making up over $21 million from 
2010-11 (GNP 2013), these funds enable the National Park and local governments to plan and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  In 2012 these entrance fees were $100 per adult of foreign descent, $50 per child under age 12 of foreign descent, 
and $6 per adult for tourists and foreign nationals residing in Ecuador (GNP 2013).  
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execute their mission with significant flexibility. Ospina (2006) argues for an “optimistic” 
interpretation of what the Special Law represents, which is a mutual limitation of economic self-
interests by conservation, tourism and fishing actors, each of whom agreed to previously unheard 
of limits in territory and practices.  
The Galápagos Marine Reserve was established in 2000, modifying the prior-existing 
Galápagos Marine Resources Reserve, so that it’s borders extended offshore to 40 nautical miles 
beyond the outer edges of the islands, enforceably excluding industrial fishing for the first time 
(Heylings and Bravo 2007). This space encompasses 133,000 km2 and represents over one-third 
of all waters protected in Latin America for conservation (Guarderas et al. 2008).  
Out of this era was born the constellation of documents, institutions, agencies and boards 
that currently govern resource management and fishing in the Galápagos Islands. Major 
documents are a Fisheries Management Plan that lays out the major rules of catch, gear, timing, 
and commercial access by permit registration to be renewed every two years. This Plan was 
revisited in 2009 and updated. While subsistence fishing was previously entirely unregulated, 
anyone can still obtain a subsistence fishing day permit to do so. Entry into commercial fishing 
has hardened, and only children of currently registered fishermen may now apply for a license 
(Wilen et al. 2000). The 5-year fishing calendar mentioned above was also begun. As new laws 
or modifications are created over time, they are put into effect largely by the publication of 
Resolutions (by the GNP) and Executive decrees (by the national government). All governing 
decisions are formally funneled through the GNP, which has final authority on actions (Fig 2.3). 
The Participatory Management Board (JMP in Spanish) hears issues and proposals and votes on 
resolutions, with each member organization carrying one vote. By consensus, resolutions are 
passed to the Inter-institutional Management Board (AIM in Spanish), where again, each 
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member group casts one vote. The AIM commonly takes recommendations given to it by the 
JMP and approves them. The JMP and AIM represent official channeling of the community’s 
participation in management issues.  
 
Figure 2.3.  The participatory management structure within the Galápagos Marine Reserve. Spanish 
acronyms are used for the AIM, JMP, CEDENMA, and UCOOPEPGAL. Modified from Heylings and 
Bravo 2007.  
*The CDRS serves an advisory role to the GNP and no longer has voting power. 
 The constellation of institutions in the Galápagos is prone to fighting amongst themselves 
and exerts relatively weak control over law enforcement. Further, “the Ecuadorian State transfers 
to the Galápagos its structural weaknesses: regional disputes, budgetary and technical shortages, 
the inability to apply its orders and politics, and the lack of confidence of the citizens in the 
integrity of its decisions” (Ospina 2006: 124). In many ways, policies are designed to contain 
contradictions and competing uses, and there are many inherent tensions.  
International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also played key roles in 
Galápagos governance, drawn to the archipelago by high levels of endemism and role in the 
science of natural history. NGOs serve as environmental advocates and partners in finance, 
research, and development with local and state institutions. Major environmental NGOs with 
offices in the Galápagos (mostly Santa Cruz) are Conservation International, WildAid, the World 
Wildlife Fund, and Sea Shepherd. Others more oriented toward local social issues as well as the 
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environment include Fundacion Natura and the University San Francisco de Quito. The US, 
Spain and Japan have also funded major initiatives through their development agencies. In 
fishing, NGOs have funded major initiatives to develop the processing capacity of the sector and 
foster ties between the fishing and tourism sectors around sustainable seafood. Prominent 
ventures include building processing plants on both Santa Cruz and San Cristobal, the latter by 
the Spanish Aid Agency ARAUCARIA. Other projects have included strategy and financial 
support for local value-added seafood initiatives, pilot projects for recreational sport fishing 
ventures, and periodic assessments of the Marine Reserve. WildAid and Sea Shepherd specialize 
in giving the GNP vessels and mechanical support for monitoring, and have significantly funded 
the recent satellite vessel monitoring system.  
 
D. Fluctuating Social Conditions: Socio-demographics and Livelihood Diversity  
Perhaps because the seco salado began there, San Cristobal is home to over half of all 
Galápagos fishermen, followed by Santa Cruz. The oldest fishing families began doing so in the 
early days of Ecuadorian colonialism in the mid-1830’s, and by now are on their fourth 
generation, making the Galápagos fishing tradition relatively young compared to many fishing 
communities around the world.  
By all accounts up until the 1980s, Galápagos fishermen numbered less than 200 (120 in 
1981; Ben-Yami 2001) and focused on finfish and the seco salado. Some call these old-timers 
the “authentic” fishermen, contrasted to the relative newcomers and “opportunists” who came 
into the fishery from 1992 onwards with the beginning of sea cucumber fishing (Ben-Yami 2001; 
Ospina 2006). The sea cucumber boom attracted a flood of new entrants: locals, immigrants from 
mainland Ecuador, and many first-time fishers (Bremner and Perez 2002). Daily profits were 
enormous; they exceeded Ecuador’s per capita yearly gross income for several years (Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1. Gross and per capita income estimates for the sea cucumber and lobster fisheries over time.  
All figures are in U.S. dollars.  
 *Sea Cucumber **Lobster  
Year Gross  income 
Per capita gross 
income 
Gross  
income 
Per capita gross 
income 
~Avg Ecuadorian Per 
capita gross income 
1994 4.0 million 10,204 517,176 1,296 (1997) 2,050  
1999 3.5 million 4,428 933,504 1,369 1,599 
2000 3.6 million 2,929 1,701,700 1,438  1,462 
2005 - - `820,000 1,244 3,013 
2008 - - 687,940 1,792 4,256 
*  Source: Ospina 2006 
**Source: Murillo 2010 (unpublished data) 
`Source: Ramirez et al. 2012 
~ Source: World Bank 2014 
 
In 2001 the fleet was characterized as having more newcomers than old-timers by Ben-
Yami (2001), who however were establishing larger roots in the islands by establishing families, 
building houses, and investing more in fishing equipment. These newcomers were largely from 
Manabí and Ecuador’s other coastal provinces (Ospina 2006). Several years later Ospina (2006) 
categorized the “social origins” of fishermen into three groups, the first two as described above 
and a third group attracted by a more recent “commercial boom”, dealing in the commerce as 
well as harvesting side of fishing, and whose primary economic support was other work in the 
public sector and commerce (39). This third group includes people from old colonial families as 
well as newer migrants.   
Besides these three “waves” of various social origins, a second axis on which to 
categorize the fishing sector is via the functions that individuals carry out, which also relates to 
their share of profits and to some degree, gender and age. Zapata (2006) and Ospina (2006) have 
both outlined the major subgroups according to their specialization in specific activities, 
summarized again here: 
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 Armadores: are the owners of fishing vessels, who may or may not always fish with their 
boat, and often captain if so. Most women in fishing are involved as armadores. Boat owners 
outfit vessels with gasoline and supplies and shoulder all upkeep. To compensate for this 
responsibility the boat commonly earns an equal “share” of the catch, which is split evenly 
among fishers, so that an armador/pescador (fisherman) earns two shares, one for him/herself 
and one for the boat. They shoulder more responsibility, but earn more profits. They often 
maintain contacts with seafood merchants as well; other fishermen less so.  
 Buzos: are the divers. Diving is done for lobster and sea cucumber, and a smaller number 
also dive for octopus, conch, and fish for local consumption. Diving carries the greatest personal 
danger among fishing practices, and is commonly a job for younger men. Divers earn more 
compared to fishermen who do not dive, given the higher profit margins in sea cucumber and 
lobster fisheries. They are rarely the armador.  
 Fishing assistants: Several types of fishing assistant roles also exist, the most prominent 
being the panguero. The panguero is a trusted assistant to a diver, often a close friend or family 
member, operating the hookah’s air compressor machine and maneuvering the panga or fibra on 
the surface with the moving diver to avoid rocky ledges. This job is very important since he can 
save a diver from death or conversely cause him great harm. Many are paid a set dollar amount 
per day ($50 in 2012) that can be far lower than a diver’s earnings, although some (usually 
family members) are given an equal share of the catch. The other major fishing assistant role is 
the cocinero or cook, who typically gets a small (c. $50) set rate per day on top of his share of 
the catch for providing the cooking services on botes.  
 Comerciantes: are seafood merchants, who buy catch from fishing boats and ship them to 
mainland Ecuador or abroad.  
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 Although many people have entered fishing in times of lucrative profits, Ospina (2006) 
notes that entry into fishing is also driven by family needs and circumstances. I myself have also 
interviewed fishermen of this stripe. One man in his mid-thirties recounted being the oldest of 
four children, and beginning to fish to help support the family. Fishing has always served as a 
source of income when other jobs were not available. Interviewing fishermen of all ages in 2012, 
a common reply to the question of why someone started fishing in decades past was “there were 
no other jobs”. Like other fishing communities, kinship ties play major roles in choosing fishing 
partners (e.g., Lofgren 1972, Terkla et al. 1988); I observed many fishing crews of relatives such 
as brothers and brothers-in-law, sometimes responsible for involving each other in fishing. 
There is much overlap in the labor pools between fishing and other sectors. It is often true 
that a fisherman is a tour operator is a public servant, or some combination. This livelihood 
diversity stretches across comerciantes, armadores, and fishermen on the ocean. Job switching 
into and out of fishing is also a long-standing dynamic. Of all the original fishing families on San 
Cristobal, perhaps half left decades ago and turned toward tourism (Ospina 2006, Reck pers. 
comm, Engie unpublished data).  
Despite various attempts at developing more productive linkages between the fisheries 
and tourism sectors, these linkages remain weak, with locally caught fish largely serving the 
consumption needs of local residents and export markets, and the tourism food sector using 
significant portions of imported seafood, even while buying some local catch. In terms of the 
local market, many fishermen on San Cristobal have noted that a handful of full-time fishermen 
could easily satisfy island demand. These indications highlight the utmost importance of the 
external market to the maintenance of local fisher livelihoods. 
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E. Changing Seas 
Tourism is the economic engine of the Galápagos archipelago. The strength of the 
industry lifts not only the provincial but the national Ecuadorian economy, with gross revenues 
estimated at around 175 million in 2003 (130 going to the national economy; Ospina 2006) and 
300 million in 2007 (Dixon 2007). Deliberate alignment between tourism and conservation 
interests several decades ago helped to spawn the “floating hotel” model of high-end tourism that 
the Galápagos market is known for, with the reasoning of keeping its human footprint relatively 
low and economic benefits relatively high (Ben-Yami 2001; Grenier 2007). 
The archipelago experienced exponential growth between 1999 and 2005, with a GDP on 
par with the fastest growing economies in the world (9.6% annually). Tourism contributed ¾ of 
this GDP growth (Taylor et al. 2006). Despite this growth, per capita income increased only 
1.8% annually between 1995 and 2005, pointing to growing social inequality and raising 
questions around of the official goal of channeling economic benefits to the population of around 
26,000 residents to create conservation incentives. 
While fishing briefly rivaled tourism in value at the height of the sea cucumber boom of 
the 1990s, it has since been eclipsed and is likely shrinking in contributions to island gross 
domestic product (GPD). Gross revenues for all fisheries likely remained below 5 million in the 
mid-2000s or < 4% of total Galápagos income, to contrast the value of tourism given above 
(Hearn et al. 2007; Watkins and Cruz 2002).  
From the 1980s to 2001, the fishing sector was characterized by continuous growth in 
both participants and vessels. However (coincidentally) since the enactment of the Special Law, 
catch rates have been generally declining in the Marine Reserve in terms of both abundance and 
size in the primary fisheries of sea cucumber, lobster, and salted fish, as outlined above (Hearn et 
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al. 2007). This decrease in catches intersects with several processes: (a) improving economic 
prospects in local tourism and commerce, (b) gradual improvement in monitoring and 
enforcement, and (c) shrinking populations of resources in the sea.  
 
 
III. Galápagos Fishing Livelihoods In 2012 
In many ways Galápagos fishermen are still being characterized by their past growth and 
seen as potentially degrading forces on the environment – and because they are ever changing, 
being mischaracterized. Histories of past conflicts, demands for greater harvesting privileges, 
and undeniable overfishing from the 1990s often leads to the characterization of the fishing 
community as politically volatile and potentially dangerous to conservation because of their 
potential to fish down marine resources. In reality much has changed: the sector has been on an 
extended decline that began in 2001.  
Preliminary interviews in the archipelago in 2009 and 2010 revealed that social 
dimensions of the rapidly changing fisheries sector were not being studied at length. To some, 
reorganization of the fisheries sector is welcome, but managers now see a larger “issue” with the 
pollution and safety of fisher-led initiatives to work in loosely regulated taxi and ferry transport, 
although they rarely discuss the lack of resolution on the impediments to labor movement in 
more preferred channels (i.e., tourism).   
What are fishing livelihoods like now? Below I present broad trends in the directions that 
fishermen see their industry and themselves going, condensed into broad fishing livelihood 
strategies. Subsequently, the effects on species fished, the direction of labor flows, and who in 
the community is leaving are discussed.     
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A. Livelihood portfolios among Registered Fishers 
The pool of those fishing regularly seems relatively stable on a yearly timestep, with little 
movement into and out of fishing in San Cristobal from 2009-11. Of 167 surveyed, 15 people 
had diminished and 7 intensified fishing (as a measure of their total income), while 145 
maintained their fishing levels10 (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2. Survey respondents who are intensifying or diminishing their fishing engagements from 2009-
12 (left), and through the course of their working career (right).  
2009 - 2011  Career-wide 
FISHING STRATEGIES N (%)  FISHING STRATEGIES N (%) 
Diminishment 15  Diminishment 117 
FT – PT 7 (47%)  FT – PT 57 (49%) 
FT – Occasional 1 (7%)  FT – Occasional 9 (8%) 
FT – Inactive 4 (27%)  FT – Inactive 38 (32%) 
PT – Inactive 2 (13%)  PT – Occasional/Inactive 12 (10%) 
Occasional - Inactive 1 (7%)  Occasional - Inactive 1 (1%) 
Intensification 7  Intensification 10 
PT – FT 3 (43%)  PT – FT 7 (70%) 
Inactive – FT 2 (29%)  Inactive – FT 2 (20%) 
Occasional - PT 2 (29%)  Inactive - PT 1 (10%) 
Steady Maintenance 145  Steady Maintenance 70 
Full-time 44 (30%)  Full-time 40 (57%) 
Part-Time 47 (32%)  Part-Time 16 (23%) 
Occasional 11 (8%)  Occasional 6 (9%) 
Inactive 41 (28%)  Inactive 8 (11%) 
 
On longer timescales, of the 58 occasional and inactive fishers interviewed, most had 
once been full-time (n=47, 81%). The other 13 had fished since childhood in occasional and part-
time capacities, sometimes during school holidays or weekends or with family members who 
fished. In total of the 167 surveyed, 117 (70%) have diminished their fishing engagements over 
time.  
Consider entry into fishing in three eras: waves 1, 2, and 3, as characterized by Ospina 
(2006): (1) the older fishermen who were involved before sea cucumbers began, which Ben-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  In light of the relatively few people that fished occasionally (12 of 167), where fishing accounts for ≤ 30% of 
their income, I lumped this group of fishers in with the 46 inactive survey respondents for statistical and graphical 
analyses. 	  
	   58 
Yami (2001) pegs at 1992, (2) those who entered in the sea cucumber era, and (3) those who 
came in later with a renewed interest in commercialization of fishing. Survey respondents 
entering during these three eras span the gamut of fishing participation levels (Fig 2.4). Those 
from “wave 1” are now shrinking in full-time participation, with age and the rise of non-fishing 
work opportunities over time, although many are still fishing actively. Notably, no one in Wave 
3 is full-time, indicating that those entering fishing now view it as part of a diversified livelihood 
portfolio, and not an exclusive 
occupation.
 
Figure 2.4. The fishing status of individuals according to the time they entered fishing.  
 
The 2012 livelihood survey confirms and sharpens past observations of how people 
participate in fishing in different ways. Part-time fishing was found to be very common, in line 
with past observations. The livelihood diversity found among registered fishers shows that they 
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were highly connected to other economic sectors in San Cristobal (Fig. 2.5).  The median 
number of income-generating activities held was two per person, and ranged from one to six. 
Eighty-eight percent of survey respondents also prefer to have more than one job in the 
household. Of people that were not full-time fishers, the majority (81.4%) reported having more 
than one job. Eighteen (36.8%) full-time fishers also reported more than one job, which while 
representing a very small portion of their total income, shows that a third of even full-time 
fishers worked in other economic sectors from 2009-11 in fishing off-seasons. 
Job switching in general occurred more frequently than job switching in fishing, with 
slightly less than a third of all individuals (28.4%, N=48) reporting that they or someone in their 
household changed jobs from 2009-2011. This is a much higher frequency than individuals 
reported moving in and out of fishing. From 2009-2011, 72% (N=121) of active fisher 
households reported the same occupations with no changes. Registered fishers were involved in 
various types of non-fishing work, the most by far (n=62) being in tourism, most commonly as a 
tour boat captain followed by a marinero, or deckhand or sailor (Fig 2.5, Table 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.5. Work that survey respondents reported having worked in, besides fishing. Frequency counts 
are overlapping, so that one person could be counted in several categories depending on the number of 
jobs they hold.  
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Table 2.3. Specific jobs held by survey respondents that are contained in the loose categories graphed in 
Figure 2.5. 
Tourism 62 Profession/Office Administration 14 
Tour captain 12 accountant, govt 3 
marinero 11 teacher/professor 3 
tour guide 10 executive 3 
tour agency owner 9 Assistant 3 
tour boat owner 4 public works 1 
tour boat cook 4 welder 1 
hotel owner 3 Local retail 10 
timonela 3 local shop owner 3 
dive guide & timonel 1 restaurant owner 3 
patron costanero/armador 1 local shopkeeper 3 
aceitero 1 laundromat 1 
tour boat manager 1 sundries & internet stores 1 
Transport 18 Management 7 
taxi driver 8 GNP guard 3 
driver, govt 3 *GNP monitor 1 
bus driver 3 GNP guard to fisher 1 
water taxi 3 fish plant operator 1 
Cabotaje driverb 1 Real Estate 6 
GNP boat captn 1 rental apts 6 
PV 16 Agriculture 4 
Manual labor 16 Owns cattle ranch 2 
security guard 5 Owns farm 2 
construction 7 farm worker, wood carver 1 
cargo 4 Carpentry 3 
  Naval carpenter 2 
  Carpenter 1 
*contract work 
ahelmsman or mate 
binter-island ferry 
 
Survey respondents roughly follow one of three broad livelihood strategies at present, 
apparent from both their work patterns and stated preferences: (a) individuals seeking to 
completely transition away from fishing, (b) strategies of long-term livelihood diversity, and (c) 
strategies of fishing exclusively.  
 
A1. Strategies of Transitioning Away From Fishing 
Many active fishers were seeking to leave the industry. Overall half of surveyed full-time 
fishers would like to find work outside of the fishing sector and 45% of part-time fishers would 
like to reduce their fishing levels further (Table 2.4). These long-term strategies were not in 
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perfect alignment with the categories of “intensifying”, “diminishing”, or “steadily maintaining” 
fishing levels from 2009-2011.  
 
Table 2.4. Fishing preferences of survey respondents, according to their fishing status in the 2011-12 
season.11 
 Full-time Part-time `Occasional Inactive Overall 
Fish more - 1 (2%) - 1 (2%) 2 (1.2%) 
Remain as-is 15 (31%) 19 (33%) 8 (67%) 40 (87%) 62 (37.1%) 
Fish less 31 (51%) 26 (45%) 1 - 37 (22.2%) 
Go into recreational fishing 0 4 (7%)  1(8%) 3 (7%) 7 (4.2%) 
`4 out of 12 occasional fishers were asked this question 
 
Transitioning out however of fishing is often a multi-year process. Twenty-three 
individuals who did not change occupations from 2009-11 have nevertheless applied for some 
type of tourism permit before; many continue to actively fish while seeking other opportunities. 
These applications show long-term efforts to transition away from fishing or diversify, even 
among those still actively fishing. 
Table 2.5. Survey respondents who have ever applied for a permit for any tourism-related operation (e.g., 
operating tour boats for day tours or cruises, recreational fishing). 
 Yes No 
Fishing Strategy   
Intensify 0 7 
Diminish` 7 7 
Same 23 115 
   
Fishing status*   
full-time 8 40 
part-time 11 43 
Occasional/Inactive 11 44 
`14 out of 15 diminishers were asked this question 
 
 
Many now-active fishers implied plans to leave in coming years. Some fishers are planning 
transitions with the aid of their spouses or family members, and some are simply seeking an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Individuals were asked if they preferred to continue with their current labor activities or not, and then what they 
would prefer to do. Open-ended responses were categorized into four levels of preference around future fishing 
levels: to fish more than at present, less, continue with their activities, or some ambivalent response.	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opportunity with no current plans, ambiguously saying the would like to, “renounce fishing and 
work in tourism” or, “if there were an opportunity, I’d take it”. A non-significant portion of all 
individuals seeking other work indicated a desire to work outside of any positions requiring 
customer service, although this did not preclude them from looking for (and finding) crew-based 
work on tour ships. 
 
A2. Strategies of Long-Term Livelihood Diversity 
In general, part-time fishing represents a deliberate move away from full-time fishing but 
not necessarily a desire to leave fishing entirely.  Among one-quarter of part-time fishers 
surveyed, there is a strong desire to retain fishing as a source of employment in diversified 
livelihoods. Nineteen of the 35 part-time fishers asked intend to remain in fishing part-time. An 
additional 12 expressed a desire to stay for another 5-10 years before switching to non-fishing 
work entirely (Table 2.4; lumped into “fish less” category). Twenty percent of these individuals 
have been part-time fishers12 for their entire careers, 80% were formerly full-time. In terms of 
the social origins discussed by Ospina and Ben-Yami above, those pursuing strategies of 
permanent diversification span all three “waves” of fishermen – old-timers who began before 
1992, those who began between 1992-8, and a third wave who entered fishing in the 2000s. The 
two youngest fishermen interviewed (ages 20 and 21 in 2012), who entered in 2010 have always 
been part-time, pursuing work in tourism and commerce as well. Joining their ranks, five of the 
15 “diminishers” were moving towards part-time fishing as preferred long-term work. One was 
becoming more involved in the new recreational fishing industry, and one always fluctuates 
between occasional and part-time fishing.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  “Current” refers to the time of survey, in spring 2012.	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While the reasons for livelihood diversity are complex, interviews revealed both a 
significant informal economy and uncertain job stability. In non-fishing work, respondents 
repeatedly noted the lack of job security, even for government positions, because new political 
regimes triggered job turnovers in potentially any position. Fishing is thus continuing to provide 
a security net in times of job loss or low non-fishing work. 
Declining and erratic incomes were noted as a major reason for part-time involvement. 
Diversifying across fishing and other work spreads risk throughout diverse labor markets and 
seasons, in what Ellis (2000) calls “covariate risk”. As one put it, 
Fisher 13752: When I can go, I like the life of the sea. When I get the chance I go, even if 
just to catch a little bit. What we catch doesn’t cover fuel. Since we have our other 
activities, I use the pay from those and spend the day well. If we fish well, good. If we go 
badly, it’s just as good. We always go fishing as a family. I have another cousin who is 
also a fisherman, my brother also. The three of us go. We all have other activities apart 
from fishing. We don’t depend exclusively on fishing.  
 
It is notable that even those individuals pursuing livelihood strategies of permanent 
diversification appear constrained in the non-fishing work they can find. Fifty-five percent of 
part-time fishers would like more non-fishing work, and 53% of full-time fishers would also 
prefer some non-fishing work if it were available (Table C2 in Appendix C).  
 
A3. Strategies of Fishing Exclusively 
Finally, a third and relatively small group of interviewees, 17 total, reported that they 
would remain in fishing full-time or wanted to fish more. One out of seven individuals who 
intensified fishing did so because “fishing is more fun. In tourism one is more enslaved”, 
returning after 1.5 years of work as a sailor in tourism. Some echoed these sentiments, having the 
assets and capabilities to work in tourism, but in some cases choosing not to. One interviewee 
noted that he wouldn’t work in tourism as an employee, but only as an owner of an operation if 
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he had the chance. Why do so, when “fishing is adventure. Each day is a new day to know 
something.” Another reported that fishing was more “tranquil” than working in institutions, 
which were political. Other individuals however believe they have no other options, because of 
age or education:  
Interviewer: what do you want to do besides fishing? 
Fisher 63392: At my age! I don’t know because at my age I’m already old. (laughing, 
40 years of age) 
 
After reporting that he did not want to continue fishing for the rest of his life, one fisher 
related,  
Fisher 65620: You know it’s difficult. If you don’t have for example, higher education, 
you are not able to get work in an institution, and then sometimes fish on the weekends. 
But with an incomplete level of studies, it’s difficult to enter an institution.  
Interviewer: Do you have some type of preferred work outside of fishing? 
Fisher 65620: Ah no, because I can’t work in anything else. Nothing. When I have no 
work [in fishing], I just help my wife in her workshop [sewing clothes]. 
 
However, those fishers who mentioned staying in fishing along with an inability to leave 
due to age or lack of opportunities with their low education levels show a belief in an inability to 
leave the profession.  
 
B. Conclusion: Continuing Fluctuations in Social Conditions  
B1. Changing Species Impact 
How then, have fishing livelihoods changed with the downturn of the recent decade? In 
terms of the species fished, although the decline in fishing participants has been fairly steep, 
none of the major Galápagos fisheries appear to be disappearing. Many full-time fishermen are 
generalists and participate in every major season. Part-time fishermen mostly participate in 
lobster and sea cucumber and also the whitefish day-trip fishery, but rarely the seco salado, 
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whose 2-week trips are more difficult to balance with other work. As one scientist put it, sea 
cucumber fishing is the last one that people give up since it is the most profitable. To a certain 
degree this is true; after people get into the mid-thirties or 40 years of age, they largely stop 
diving because of its dangers, and then participate very little in either sea cucumbers or lobster. 
Some act as pangueros occasionally, but the majority interviewed expressed a dislike for going 
out if they were no longer diving. At this stage, those still part-time are participating in the seco 
salado and then working seasonal jobs during the rest of the year. There are thus various patterns 
of where part-time fishing effort is placed: mostly in lobster and sea cucumber, mostly in 
whitefish for those who dislike diving and long trips, and mostly seco salado and whitefish for 
others.  
 
B2. Socio-demographics of Exiting and Recent Labor Flows Between Sectors 
Both older and newer entrants, “opportunists” and longtime fishers, are leaving the 
profession, looking to leave, or would like to leave. Those remaining full-time are increasingly 
the minority. Active participants have declined from a high point of over 1100 in 2000 to 536 in 
2011, archipelago-wide. This gives an overall rate of 49% of active fishers and 50% inactive 
(GNP 2013). The family networks of fishers from older island families provide assistance in 
several ways: as potential sources of financial support and partnership in entrepreneurial 
ventures, and as a source of general connections since they also tend to have family members 
with decades of experience and connections in either public service or owning businesses. 
However, the “second wave” of migrants into fisheries in the 1990s now have considerable roots 
as well, and any differences in social networks don’t always make a big difference. In addition 
such support often extends only to one’s nuclear and very close extended family, and conflict 
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within family trees is also common. Illustrating this, the sizeable element of the fishing 
population that are pursuing long-term, diversified livelihoods in fishing (i.e., part-time fishing) 
cut across the three “waves” of fishermen characterized by Ospina (2006) according to the time 
they entered fishing (Fig 2.4). 
The direction of labor flows between fishing and the other economic sectors of the 
Galápagos economy has switched entirely from 2001. Registered fishers seem to be drawing on 
the same type of livelihood diversity that they always have: seasonal handiwork such as 
construction, painting, and carpentry, and more steady work in the public sector, tourism, and 
from family businesses. Movement into tourism, and interest in more tourism work, is notably 
larger than in 2001. Ben-Yami (2001) reported strong socioeconomic pressures to move into 
fishing because of higher wages compared to the sea-based tourism industry and stagnation of 
local land-based tourism.  
The directions out of fishing have changed alongside the evolution of structures and 
opportunities in tourism and the public sector. Sea-based crew jobs onboard tourism boats have 
grown since 2001, when scholars noted that it did not pay as well as fishing (Ospina 2006). In 
2012, field observations showed that the base for local tourism was higher than in 2001, although 
still a far cry form Santa Cruz. The number of hotels, restaurants, and bars on San Cristobal has 
slowly risen, and attract a steady stream of land-based travelers, although tour agencies reported 
a consistent under-capacity. Wages are also higher for sea-based crew, although a full-time 
fisherman can still earn more than semi-skilled positions such as sailors and deckhands (Details 
in Chapters 3 & 4 below). 
The following chapters investigate more detailed aspects of the livelihood strategies 
found in fishing presented here, on the various motives besides profit maximization that drive 
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fishing pressure (Chapter 3), the various interpretations of shifting social vulnerabilities in 
Galápagos society and the political economy of job creation in the tourism economy (Chapter 4), 
and regulatory debates and political dynamics in recreational fishing (Chapter 5). 
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CHAPTER 3 
A Livelihoods Approach to Declining Participation in Galápagos Fisheries: Community 
Perspectives 
 
I. Introduction  
This chapter represents the first of a two-part analysis of the 2012 Livelihood Survey 
described in Chapter 1, investigating labor mobility through fishing.  Chapter 4 will present a 
second and highly intertwined analysis of what survey data reveals about the social outcomes of 
socioeconomic change; here is presented the analysis of why and how people leave fishing, as 
they themselves tell it. Specifically I ask why it is that some are better able than others to leave 
fishing. Analysis investigates occupational change through fishing in San Cristobal in a recent 
three-year period (2009 – 2011) as well as over long-term career trajectories. Results bring out 
more detail from the broad overview of trends presented on changing livelihoods in Chapter 2.  
The simple question of why people move through fishing is key to a prominent issue in 
fisheries management in the Galápagos and elsewhere, namely the long-term concern for many 
marine stocks declining due to human exploitation (e.g., Pauley 1998; Hearn and Murillo 2007). 
Many “alternate livelihood” programs and governance policies have deliberately aimed at 
shrinking fishing sectors worldwide, but their ambiguous outcomes have given rise to the 
question of whether some people are less able or willing to leave fishing than others. Factors 
often cited include understudied and easily misunderstood local job market dynamics, and 
reluctance or inability to exit by some individuals that is attributed to high job satisfaction (e.g., 
Pollnac et al. 2001; IMM 2008) or poverty (e.g., Cinner et al 2009). Even as reserves show 
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compelling benefits to degraded ecosystems over time (Côté et al. 2001; García-Charton et al. 
2008), the difficulties alternate livelihood programs have had add to the trenchant critiques of 
their “social failures” that are now a major threat to stakeholder buy-in (Christie 2004; West et 
al. 2006). 
A second aim of this chapter is to connect the focused study on community-based 
perspectives conducted here with ongoing econometric analyses of seasonal fishing patterns, a 
potentially fruitful interdisciplinary area. Past work on fishermen’s perspectives, discourses, 
relationships with nature, histories and socioeconomic conditions (e.g., Finchum n.d.; Reck 
1986; Ben-Yami 2000; Wilen et al. 2001; Ospina 2005, Ospina 2006) have left unremarked the 
potential contributions to the short-term, quantitative analyses conducted around Galápagos 
fishing, which are often richer in biological and spatial detail than social studies (e.g., Viteri et 
al. 2005; Castrejon 2011; Bucaram et al. 2014). Quantitative modeling of fisher behavior is 
highly influential to management decisions, but heavily weighted toward short-term seasonal and 
monetary factors. This runs the risk of simplifying the broader influence of coastal economies 
that fisheries are embedded within, perhaps given the sparseness of reliable long-term economic 
data on many fleet activities. The focus here on occupational transitions rather than seasonal 
participation translates cross-sector ties into broader and often quantifiable metrics of 
employment and economic security and foregrounds social dynamics longer than a fishing 
season.  
From the collective weight of evidence I conclude that in terms of transitions out of 
fishing in San Cristobal, (a) strengthening human capital is of major importance, (b) 
socioeconomic inequality produces constraints on household actions highly analogous to those of 
concern due to poverty, and (c) job satisfaction has very weak retentive effects on fishing 
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employment in the Galápagos. 
What follows is a background section (Section II) and an empirical livelihoods analysis 
of individual change and differential abilities to leave fishing in San Cristobal (Section III). 
Discussion and implications for quantitative bioeconomic characterization of fisher behavior 
follow in Sections IV and V, and concluding remarks in Section VI.  
 
II. Background “There	  is	  nothing	  more	  enticing,	  disenchanting,	  and	  enslaving	  than	  the	  life	  at	  sea.”	  	  Joseph	  Conrad	  
  
 
A.  To Fish Or Not To Fish: What are the Questions?  
Fisheries scholars have long acknowledged that a tendency to misunderstand fisher 
behavior is often a more critical factor in the collapse of fisheries around the world than any lack 
of knowledge of resources themselves (Hilborn 1985; Salas and Gaertner 2004). The dynamics 
under which people leave fishing has taken on particular significance in scholarship on “fisher 
behavior”. Hilborn’s (1989) call for analyzing the "dynamic behavior of fishing fleets" outlines 
four areas that reflect the prominence of economics in fisheries social science: investment, 
movement, catching power, and discarding. Gordon (1954), advocating a “bioeconomic” 
framework which combined biological theories of how fish stocks grow with neoclassical 
economic assumptions of human behavior, hypothesized that the socially optimum allocation of 
labor must take into account industry profit, but did not consider social benefits and therefore 
labor decisions beyond profits. Even while these calls expand out beyond biological analyses 
they look outward from the fishing sector only slightly in terms of productive activities that 
individuals engage in. 
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Allison and Ellis (2001) advocate an outward facing approach to understanding how 
fishing industries change via the “sustainable livelihoods approach” to fisheries management, 
which interprets peoples’ actions as part of long-term livelihood “strategies” that are embedded 
in economic needs but also social responsibilities and relationships, and particular to spatial, 
temporal and cultural contexts. Like everyone, fishers are people living in particular societies 
and times that also influence their occupational and harvest choices. To meaningfully understand 
the breadth of influences on peoples’ actions, attending to the resource user perspective on the 
role that fishing fulfills for an individual and household is critical (Allison and Ellis 2001). 
Livelihood scholarship has commonly utilized a conceptual framework of investigating 
the “assets-mediating processes-activities” framework, which begins with a focus on household 
asset bases, the portfolio of work activities they engage in, and the mediating processes that 
enable people to actually translate their assets into activities, previously described in Chapter 1. 
Ellis (2000) notes that assets are “the basic building blocks upon which households are able to 
undertake production, engage in labour markets, and participate in reciprocal exchanges with 
other households” (31). Differential access to resources, activities, and asset bases (including 
income) is thought to produce a differential ability of individuals and household to adapt to 
livelihood change and uncertainty, including via job switching. 
Beyond the general livelihoods approach, two prominent theories of individual 
differentiation in fishing exits have emerged from past work on livelihoods, fisheries migrations, 
and exits from fishing industries (Terkla et al. 1988; Scoones 1998; Ellis 2000; Pollnac et al. 
2001; Cinner et al. 2009). One is what is termed here the “poverty trap hypothesis”, which posits 
that some individuals remain in fishing because they lack the means to leave. Fishing can have a 
relatively low cost to entry, particularly in artisanal fisheries that are relatively low-tech (Allison 
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and Ellis 2000) or open access. Cinner et al. (2009) found that “fishers from poorer households 
were less likely to exit a severely declining fishery”. Poverty can play into some peoples’ 
calculus to become fishers, stay in fishing, and their ability to leave fishing. Poverty represents 
not simply an absence of wealth but different responses to change; poorer people can be more 
risk averse, prioritizing less-risky strategies over profit maximization. They relate this behavior 
with literature on poverty traps in general, 
“situations in which poor people are unable to mobilize the necessary resources to 
overcome either shocks or chronic low-income situations and consequently remain in 
poverty. Generally, the poor are excluded from higher-return livelihood strategies 
because of constraints on cash liquidity, a lack of access to credit, and social exclusion 
(Dasgupta 1997; Adato et al. 2006; Barrett et al. 2006). (Cinner 2009: 128)” 
 
Others have summarized the plethora of non-economic motives driving occupational 
choice under the concept of job satisfaction. A “satisfaction bonus” has been hypothesized to 
have a retentive effect on labor in fishing but for reasons of choice, keeping fishing rates high 
even beyond what makes economic sense (e.g., Anderson 1980; Smith 1988; Pollnac and Poggie 
1988). Pollnac et al. (2001) infer that higher than average job satisfaction among fishermen may 
contribute to the ambiguous outcomes of many policy interventions specifically designed to get 
people to leave fishing, asserting that a fundamental and erroneous assumption of alternate 
livelihood programs is that fishing is “a dirty, hard, undesirable occupation, hence employment 
of last resort and that fishers are amongst the poorest of the poor” (531). Surveys in Asia and 
Alaska raise doubt over the idea that people would leave for comparable income elsewhere, and 
note a “psycho-cultural” attachment to fishing by some personality types who have higher risk 
tolerance than non-fishers, generating resistance to exiting (Pollnac and Poggie 1988; Pollnac et 
al. 2001; Pollnac and Poggie 2006). In a comparative study of small-scale fishers in the 
Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia, Pollnac et al. (2001) found that a minority of fishers (16, 25, 
and 36% respectively), would readily leave the occupation and many would recommend it to 
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their children. Because researchers specifically posed hypothetical choices involving equal or 
better pay, results indicated that people do not engage in fishing purely for economic incentives. 
The above studies however involved only active fishers and tested decisions to leave with 
hypothetical questions. 
 
B. Study Contributions: The Dollars and Sense of Alternate Livelihoods in Galápagos “We	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  get	  the	  fishermen	  to	  do	  things	  because	  it's	  technically	  correct,	  because	  we	  are	  thinking	  about,	  you	  know,	  sustainability	  and	  the	  future…but	  we	  haven't	  really	  appealed	  to	  them	  as	  people.”	  -­‐	  Conservation	  Scientist,	  Santa	  Cruz	  (2012)	  
 
Like many fished areas, Galápagos fisheries bear the mark of ecological strain; a “gold 
rush” style fishery for valuable sea cucumbers beginning in the early 1990s has effectively 
decimated sea cucumber stocks (Toral-Granda 2005; Hearn 2008). Institutional and scholarly 
reaction to this (selective) degradation in the Galápagos can be seen as forming two distinct 
currents. First, under limited resources governance efforts have been technically focused, as 
acknowledged by conservation managers (interviews 2012). In other words greatest effort has 
been put toward monitoring and enforcement, rule setting, permit requirements, and studying 
biological robustness. Secondly, the immense conflicts of the past several decades have sparked 
much scholarship on dimensions of power, politics, and conflict resolution in Galápagos (e.g., 
MacDonald 1997; Ospina 2005; Ospina 2006; Payne 2007; Stacey & Fuks 2007; Finchum n.d.). 
All together, circumstances have arisen so that at present the socioeconomic and temporal 
dimensions of fisheries are a thin area of understanding between (a) technical ecological 
understandings and (b) analyses of environmental politics.  
As valuable nearshore marine stocks have declined over the years, fishers and managers 
have embarked on an extended search for alternatives, both within and outside of fishing, with 
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results that have been mixed at best and not closely examined. It is not actually known, for 
instance, how well non-fishing work substitutes and provides for fishing families, the different 
livelihood roles that fishing fulfills for households, or what former fishers are doing. Taylor et al. 
(2006) noted the need for better household-level data on distributional impacts of recent 
development. Murillo et al. (2007) reiterated the need to know more about fine-scale 
occupational changes,  
“First, however, it is important to identify the various interest groups within the sector, 
as it is unlikely that any one solution will satisfy everyone… It is important to identify 
those fishers who are dedicated to artisanal fishing, that is, those who consider fishing 
more than just a source of employment but also a way of life, and who wish to find 
solutions within the fisheries. It is also important to identify those fishers who are open 
to employment away from fishing, either in tourism or in other areas. With this analysis 
completed, specific projects can be targeted to smaller interest groups. (18)”  
 
A survey by Gravez et al. (2008) of the members of 
the fishing cooperative of Isabela Island (Fig 3.1, called 
COPAHISA for short in Spanish) lends support to the 
hypothesis that Galápagos fishers utilize a strategy of 
occupational diversity to hedge their vulnerability to 
different adversities, like other small-scale fishers 
elsewhere (Allison and Ellis 2001). As far back as 
1999, Wilen et al. (2000) noted that many 
registered fishers harvested only occasionally or recreationally, and Murillo et al. (2007) found 
that fewer than 60% of registered fishers had participated in nearly every fishing season from 
2002-07. Besides these sporadic observations however, not much has been formally outlined 
about occupational diversity in fishing in the Galápagos.  
Four major Galápagos censuses conducted in 2001, 2006, 2009, and 2010 only lightly 
touched upon the fishing community. Because all censuses grouped workers in fishing, 
Figure 3.1. The diverse occupational activities 
of registered members of COPAHISA, the 
fishing cooperative on Isabela Island. Data 
from Gravez 2008. 
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agriculture and cattle into one category, none have connected household characteristics to fishing 
activity or yielded much detail on individual fishing practices and profits. Other short surveys 
have provided socioeconomic snapshots and smaller sample sizes than that proposed here. Hearn 
et al. (2007) carried out an extensive pilot study of profitability (i.e., net income change) in the 
lobster fishery from 2002 - 2005, but noted that the number of fishers carrying out other 
activities and income outside of fishing was unknown. Wilen et al. (2000) conducted detailed 
household surveys on costs and profits from fishing, but surveyed only 40 households across 
three islands. None included former fishers. With the benefit of over a decade of hindsight, I ask:   
(i) How and why have individuals left fishing, and why is it that some are better able than 
others to exit?  
(ii) What are the implications for modeling of a livelihoods approach in terms of long-term as 
well as short-term motives to fish in San Cristobal? 
 
III. Results  
I first review recent (2009-11) labor movements through fishing, and then analyze the 
relationships between occupational change and three broad hypotheses around how and why 
people move through fishing: (i) differential asset bases following a sustainable livelihoods 
framework, (ii) the related hypothesis about relative poverty traps, and (iii) job satisfaction.  
As described in Chapter 1, the 2012 survey and accompanying interviews serve as the 
empirical basis for testing these hypotheses in a mixed methods analysis that compares (a) 
quantifiable and categorical survey data questions for the 2009-11 period with (b) open-ended 
qualitative interviews on change over time and participant observation. The former measures 
relative metrics of household assets while the latter asks individuals what helped them to leave, 
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or why they still fishing. While the survey included retrospective questions, in the end analysis 
relies more heavily on the qualitative data to draw implications on change over time based on 
local perspectives, career histories, and analysis of non-economic and cross-sector factors. For 
each hypothesis, quantitative and qualitative data are analyzed in parallel and their implications 
compared.  
 
A. Industry Exits, Alternate Labor & Opportunity Costs    
As laid out in Chapter 2, fishing livelihoods have changed significantly since the 
establishment of the GMR in 2000. Labor flows are now predominantly away fishing, with the 
majority of active fishers preferring to fish less and half seeking to transition away from fishing. 
While these tendencies have been observed in the community for many years (e.g., Zapata 2005; 
Ospina 2006), the question still remains as to what makes some better able to find alternate work.  
As described in Chapter 1, survey data show the people who are fishing less 
(“diminishers”), fishing more (“intensifiers”), and maintaining constant fishing levels based on 
questions on their movement between full-time, part-time, occasional, and inactive engagements. 
These changes are called an individual’s “fishing strategy”, assessed (i) in the three-year period 
from 2009-11 and (ii) over the course of their fishing careers.  Of the 167 registered fishers 
surveyed on San Cristobal in 2012, relatively few people had changed fishing levels from 2009-
11. Fifteen diminished their fishing engagement, and 7 left fishing entirely. On the opposite side 
of the spectrum seven individuals intensified fishing. The remaining 145 maintained steady 
fishing levels13. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  In light of the relatively few people that fished occasionally (12 of 167), where fishing accounts for ≤ 30% of 
their income, I lumped this group of fishers in with the 46 inactive survey respondents for statistical and graphical 
analyses. 	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In terms of alternate labor, almost half of all individuals exiting from 2009-11 did so 
because of winning a permit to operate a tour boat in 2009 (3 of 7), therefore the most common 
way of leaving fishing (Table 3.1). Three others voluntarily retired with age (69, 61 and 65 in 
2012) and did not time their decision with the acquisition of new work. The deciding factor for 
two out of three was to care for ailing spouses. Two continued to operate local shops and the 
other did odd jobs until he found steady work as a security guard two years later. These older 
fishers plan to continue working for the foreseeable future, illustrating the thin retirement options 
for fishers and Galápagos residents in general except for those with government pensions. 
Three individuals diversified into non-fishing jobs specifically because of dive accidents 
that endangered their health and necessitated a recovery period, which was ongoing in 201214. 
Two other individuals left after receiving temporary semi-skilled work contracts in government 
institutions. Other reasons given include decisions to begin work in tourism to work with family 
(in this case a newly awarded tour operator permit owner), fishing’s general difficult life, and 
because of the growing effort needed to maintain catches in coastal fisheries. In all of these cases 
except for the tourism permit competition, individuals had the skills and certifications needed to 
work outside of fishing before they left, at times for decades, and simply decided to leave during 
the 2009-11 period.  
One individual applied for a recreational pesca vivencial permit when given the 
opportunity, and might be considered to have diversified the least, since he still fishes most 
major seasons as well.  
In the opposite direction, three of the seven individuals who intensified their fishing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Many others had experienced past dive accidents; 2012 was simply not in their recovery period. 
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levels from 2009-11 did so as a direct result of losing contract work in recent years 15. Jobs lost 
spanned semi-skilled labor as building guards, work for the GNP (fisheries monitoring and goat 
hunting), and other odd jobs in construction and transport. Another intensifier reported returning 
to fishing (after several years away) despite preferring non-fishing work because salaries as crew 
on tour boats were lower than full-time fishing and difficult for supporting a family.  In total, 4 
of 7 who intensified fishing would rather work outside of fishing. 
Table 3.1. Alternate labor taken up by those recently diminishing their fishing levels (2009-11)  
Alternate Labor Accepted Reason given, if any # of people 
Became inactive 
None, then night guard Care for ailing spouse, age 1 
Shop owner, then tour boat operator Care for ailing spouse, age 1 
None, continuing a local sundries 
shop Age 1 
Tour boat operator/won permit  3 
Construction/cargo loading None given 2 
*government institution contract work More family time 1 
Became part-time 
Sailor (certified mariner) Reduced fishing when father retired (from fishing), driven to work with family 1 
Sailor (certified mariner)  Increasing time and effort needed in fishing 1 
Construction/cargo Broken boat, unable to crew (not owner) 1 
Construction Recovering from dive accident (taking one season off) 1 
Water taxi owner/operator Very hard work and low income 1 
PAV boat Took an opportunity as it arose 1 
Cruise ship cook Tough and intermittent work of fishing 1 
*still fishes occasionally, on the weekends 
 
More broadly, 96 (57%) survey respondents have diminished their fishing in some way 
over their careers (48 are still part-time) and 8 (5%) have intensified their fishing levels. While 
declining earnings were among the motivators for people diminishing their fishing levels, 
interestingly various reasons were given for these declines. Shrinking fishing abundance but also 
a belief in restrictive policies that keep the market small, prevent profitability, and generally 
provide little support to cultivating a fishing lifestyle were the two most prominent factors 
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  A fourth person lost a job with the Galápagos National Park in 2012, and was also set to start fishing again with 
his family as a result. 
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named. One noted, “I tell you there is no help to have a permanent income (in fishing). What can 
we do? Prepare to work as professionals in other areas.”  Several active fishers noted that while 
there was fish to catch all year, the (all local) fresh market was so small as to not support many 
outside of the major export seasons.  
Interviews thus showed that beyond earnings, other factors such as health, age, individual 
or family illness, and commitment to family time contributed to decisions to diminish fishing, for 
some even during the profitable sea cucumber era. Health concerns were largest around diving, 
the most dangerous task in Galápagos fishing. As one noted about the period over ten years ago 
when he quit, 
Fisher 69972: The idea [in leaving] was more for, for health. For life. Because, in this 
time, there was a lot of money. There was a lot of sea cucumber. But there were already 
many deaths. Certainly. Many fishermen died. Every day, two dead, one dead. …Money 
was there, but - I could die in one day.   
 
Jobs in both fishing and tourism were noted as being hard on families, if one was 
involved in particular temporal cycles. Some individuals served as crew on tourist cruise ships 
that are typically out at sea for eight-day stretches, with one day ashore between trips. Work best 
for families interestingly can span fishing, government, or tourism, based on the circumstances. 
One fisher chose a contract day job with the government to either fishing or tourism: 
Fisher 68272: Look. I have my family. In tourism and fishing, you spend – 3 weeks, 4 
weeks away from, from your home. Out to the other side of the islands. Damn! At the 
same time [now], well I have my job [here], it’s good, I’m here until 5 o’clock in the 
afternoon, and [then] I’m with my family. I’m with my children, I’m with my wife. Yes. 
I’ve given a lot of time to the sea. I worked on the sea a long time. 
 
Another however, chose to leave land-based work as a night guard to return to recreational 
fishing, since working nights left him sleeping much of the day when his children were around.   
At times then the question of to fish or not to fish was trumped by a basic a desire for stability, 
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with fishing taken up if it provided more family time than other work. The theme of stability was 
commonly expressed in conjunction with becoming married.  
Fisher 50521: My mentality started to change when I was married. Yes… married, I felt 
that the money was not enough. They offered me the opportunity to work at INGALA, as 
captain of one of those little boats, but even then it was not as much. One needs [more], 
the salary was very little, I earned 60 sucres a month at that time. … Fishing was much 
more profitable. 
Interviewer: But you wanted a job more….secure? Or…? 
Fisher 50521: More….I wanted more stability.  
 
For many former fishermen, an opportunity that presented itself was reason to leave, 
commonly cited by college degree holders. Fisher 77962 explained, “First, apart from fishing we 
[my family] had to study to be professionals. I am an engineer. So then, with this title, one can 
already convert your job. Without a title, there’s little work.”   
 
Figure 3.2. Categories of non-fishing work that survey respondents are engaged in, broken down by their 
active or inactive status. Occasional fishermen, whose income from fishing is <10% of their annual 
income, are grouped in the inactive category here. Active fishermen include those who own boats but do 
not go to sea themselves. 
 
In all, inactive former fishers were found working in a broad range of activities from 
tourism to the public sector (Fig 3.2), and made up the majority of those working in professions, 
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local retail, and management, while active fishermen made up the majority of those working in 
manual labor, transport, pesca vivencial, and carpentry (Fig 3.2).  
As is also evident from the above excerpts, the alternate labor taken up by those leaving 
fishing does not and has not necessarily offered higher wages – in fact in a non-trivial portion of 
cases, lower wages have been accepted. Most survey respondents have gradually earned more 
money outside of fishing over time, although there are a few who have never achieved this 
parity. Of the 43 diminishers who were asked if their incomes now were greater than the last year 
they fished full-time, 6 reported that they were not, and three of these had left recently.  
 
B. Hypotheses Around Labor Mobility Through Fishing  
Original plans to analyze how groups with different fishing strategies may differ in their 
ties to other economic sectors by conducting multivariate regressions were not possible, given 
the relatively small number of “intensifiers” and “diminishers” found. Instead interpretation 
relies upon (a) bivariate statistical comparisons and (b) synthesis of survey and interview data to 
compare how various “capitals” are linked to people’s ability to adapt to uncertainty, including 
the interview data summarized above in Results Section A.16 In terms of the former since data 
are cross-sectional rather than panel we cannot directly correlate asset bases to individuals’ past 
mobilities throughout their career. However comparisons between those who have moved out of 
fishing recently (2009-11) and others may provide some insight, since their present asset bases 
are most similar to when they left fishing. In addition it is possible to test hypotheses around 
relative poverty and job satisfaction by testing across not asset bases but active and former 
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  The 2012 Livelihood survey measured household assets, activities, and their changeover the past three years 
through various metrics and proxies (details in Ch 1). Questions can be summarized into four major categories: (i) 
occupational portfolios, (ii) financial and physical capital, (iii) job satisfaction and industry preferences and (iv) 
demographics, social and human capital. The entire survey can be found in Appendices A and B. 
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fishers, assuming that their measured asset bases reflect the cumulative effects of staying in or 
leaving fishing over time. 
 
B1. Hypothesis I: Labor Mobility & Asset Bases 
In terms of recent movements through fishing, there were no statistical differences in the 
asset bases among those changing fishing levels and others (Table 3.2A). This may imply that 
the 3-year window assessed is too short to observe any differences in wealth building, which is 
likely a slower process. When measured over their fishing careers however, certain assets 
differed significantly among people that have moved out of fishing and those who have remained 
(Table 3.2B). Of these factors, education is likely to have influenced labor mobility the most 
because it is more likely to have been attained before leaving fishing, given the rarity of fishers 
found who returned to school later. Other statistical differences found in boat ownership, 
household income, homeownership, and material standards of living are more difficult to parse 
out causally, since they could have been established either before or after leaving fishing. The 
statistically significant difference in fishing incomes is irrelevant because it is not independent of 
one’s current fishing status. The significantly greater involvement in active cooperative 
management among long-term diminishers may be an indicator of thicker social ties. Putnam 
(1993) used formal membership in a community organization as a metric of social capital.   
While statistical results weakly differentiate asset bases among households, turning to 
descriptive statistics and qualitative data (i.e., interviews with the 22 recent intensifiers and 
diminishers summarized in Results Section A above) showed that certain elements of asset bases 
stand out as having been important to labor movement despite not being statistically significant. 
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Table 3.2. Bivariate associations between different assets and metrics of relative poverty and economic 
security with fishing strategies from 2009 – 11 (A) and career-wide (B). Fishing strategies were 
condensed into three groups: intensified, diminished, and same.  
 
N df (Χ2) Χ2 p (Χ2) p (Fisher)` 
(A) Fishing Strategy (2009-2011)      
Household Income 163 8 5.9394 0.654 0.6885 
Fishing Income 120 10 6.5348 0.7685 0.8224 
Boat Ownership 167 2 0.6391 0.8952 0.6765 
Home Ownership 164 6 4.4416 0.6171 0.7794 
Ability to raise sudden cash need ($1000) 158 10 5.0097 0.8905 0.9444 
Individual Education 167 10 14.278 0.1607 0.2079 
Household Education 166 8 4.9518 0.7627 0.8077 
Social Relations 157 6 4.8197 0.5671 0.5604 
Involvement in Cooperative  160 6 3.2189 0.7809 0.8865 
Fishing generation 166 8 3.6968 0.8834 0.8253 
(B) Fishing Strategy (career-wide)      
Household Income 163 8 7.553 0.4783 0.4322 
Fishing Income 120 10 17.9319 0.05612* 0.1868 
Ability to raise sudden cash need ($1000) 158 2 1.5922 0.4511 0.5523 
Boat Ownership 167 2 5.4347 0.06605* 0.06315* 
Home Ownership 164 2 7.8337 0.0199* 0.01377* 
Individual Education 167 10 17.7643 0.05907* 0.0342** 
Household Education 166 8 3.8959 0.8664 0.9043 
Social Relations 157 6 8.7821 0.1862 0.1702 
Involvement in Cooperative 159 6 13.1471 0.04076** 0.04979** 
Fishing generation 166 10 error error 0.8493 
`two-tailed 
* significant at the 90% level 
**significant at the 95% level 
      
Interviews collectively indicated that the strongest three markers of social difference in 
terms of the ability to capitalize on alternative livelihood opportunities, if distilled into types of 
“capital”, were social connections, wealth, and education. First, while it proved extremely 
difficult to quantify whether social ties helped people in changing jobs or maintaining their 
wellbeing, qualitatively its importance was self-evident for many who left between 2009-11. 
Two individuals who had been seeking to leave and remained in fishing until they found 
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alternate work both reported social connections as key factors for exiting. One asked the mayor, 
an old friend, and the other found contract work “politically. Through friends, well, they 
facilitated the work. Thank you.” Others mentioned the support of family networks in helping to 
invest in new opportunities such as the 2008-9 competition for tour operator permits (described 
below) and new business partnerships with family members.  
Differences in wealth and education speak not only to differential asset bases but the 
specific hypothesis on poverty traps and are discussed in conjunction with this hypothesis below. 
 
B2. Hypothesis II: Relative Poverty Comparison17 
If recent “intensifiers” and “steady maintainers” have patterns of lower income, assets 
(boat and home ownership), and other wealth indicators than “diminishers”, some evidence for 
poverty traps may exist.   Statistically however, short-term fishing strategy was not significantly 
correlated to (a) household income, (b) individual fishing income, or (c) self-assessment of how 
material wellbeing has changed over the past three years (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3. Bivariate correlations between fishing strategy and household income, fishing income, and 
self-assessed changes in material standards of living from 2009-11. Results from both Fisher’s exact tests 
and chi-squared tests are shown. 
 
N df (Χ2) Χ2 p (Χ2) p (Fisher)* 
Household Income 163 8 5.9394 0.654 0.6885 
Fishing Income 120 10 6.5348 0.7685 0.8224 
Material wellbeing from 2009-11 163 4 4.4773 0.3452 0.2833 
*two-tailed 
      
In addition if looked at as a snapshot in time, the household income curves for 2011 were 
strikingly similar for those groups of people intensifying and diminishing fishing (Fig 3.3a and 
3.3c). Therefore there is no evidence of relative poverty traps in recent exits from fishing (2009-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The relationship between relative poverty and labor mobility is focused on here; Chapter 4 focuses on the highly 
related analysis of relative poverty as a social outcome of fishing levels over time.	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11) provided by statistical comparison of the quantitative survey data alone. However building 
from discussion of asset bases in general, qualitative work suggests that there are indeed poverty 
traps in fishing. On one hand, poverty in the conventional sense was not found as even the 
poorest interviewee comfortably covered his basic necessities and never went hungry or without 
shelter (e.g., Yapa 1996; Ellis 2000).  
It is clear that socioeconomic inequality exists. The fact that part-time fishers were 
majority boat owners, while full-time and occasional/inactive fishers were minority boat owners 
indicates that owning a boat may help people transition from full-time to part-time fishing work 
because they can leverage higher fishing earnings into start-up costs for other careers such as 
trainings or business investments. Interviews substantiated this livelihood pathway.  
 
Figure 3.3. Household incomes among individuals who have diminished, intensified, and maintained 
fishing engagement in the short-term (a) and the long-term (b). Short-term is defined as from 2009-11, 
and long-term is broadly over the course of their careers. Trends are similar among groups. 
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In addition recent diminishers seem on more stable financial footing than recent 
intensifiers in several ways. Many diminishers interviewed expected their incomes to rise in in 
coming years, because of making new investments in apartments and business ventures, while 
this optimism was absent in intensifiers. A quarter of diminishers also had savings that could be 
tapped for coping with a sudden need for cash. No one intensifying fishing reported savings they 
could fall back onto. If opportunity costs were assessed purely on the basis of immediate income 
comparisons, most people intensifying fishing recently (2009-11) would have made seemingly 
lateral moves or taken pay cuts, as 3 (43%) made the same household income and 3 (43%) made 
less in 2012 than 2008-09 (Fig 3.3b). On the other hand more of those who diminished their 
fishing engagement reported higher incomes in 2012 than 2008-09 (9 of 14, Fig 3.3b). These 
trends also hold over time in terms of career-wide transitions (Fig 3.3d).  
Actions to leave fishing despite weak substitutes, acceptance of lateral or lower incomes 
by many leaving recently, and the relatively weak human capital of fishermen strengthen the 
possibility that some fishermen cannot find work alternatives equivalent to fishing to move into, 
despite consistent policy support in terms of retraining programs over the years.  
Overall, perhaps the most critically weak and variable asset found among San Cristobal 
fishers was their human capital: the loose conglomeration of education, skills, and health that 
make up a household’s labor potential, including their ability to discuss, debate, and negotiate 
their options (Bebbington 1999; Ellis 2000). Although the tourism industry contains many 
marine-based jobs, some “invisible barriers” exist in the form of formal education, which “ are 
largely to do with navigating officialdom, in which lack of literacy, numeracy, knowledge of 
procedures, and contacts diminish the access of the rural poor” (Ellis 2000: 94) – or in this case, 
the urban fisherman.  It is notable that no “intensifier” households had any member with a 
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tertiary education. Individual and household-level education is likely tied to the pursuit of 
higher- vs. lower-skilled alternate livelihood options, with accompanying levels of payoff. Many 
fishers seek to become marineros, but far fewer threw their hats in the ring of the 2009 tourism 
permit competition. While technically open to all, the latter is quite difficult to participate in 
given the high entry costs in time, money and bureaucracy. One contest entry proposal 
personally reviewed was 240 pages long, and from others seen around town, a typical length. As 
the interviews in Results Section A above show, interviewees noted a marked difference in ease 
in finding work with a secondary or tertiary degree. Some noted that Galápagos labor markets 
are unstable in general, with work difficult at times for those with tertiary degrees as well. This is 
substantiated by insights into segmented labor markets in other areas like India (Breman 1978a 
& b), discussed in further detail below (Discussion Section B2). 
Overall, evidence lends broad support to the existence of a mild poverty trap in fishing 
because some people, whether technically “poor” or not, are excluded from various occupational 
choices based on educational and financial assets.  
 
B3. Hypothesis III: Job Satisfaction 
It is theoretically possible that those who have left fishing in San Cristobal were less 
satisfied in the occupation than those who have remained active, as a “satisfaction bonus” 
hypothesizes, but was found to be untrue in the San Cristobal case. The island’s fishers report a 
high level of job satisfaction in line with fishers elsewhere (Pollnac and Poggie 1988; Pollnac et 
al. 2001), which however has had very little retentive effects on employment in the industry. A 
great majority of those surveyed liked being a fisher, or 152 out of 154 (98.7%)18 and would still 
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  Of the two that did not, one was part-time and one was inactive.	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choose to go into fishing if they had their lives to live over, for the years that they did it (84.5%). 
These proportions were remarkably consistent regardless of the degree that an individual fished 
or their fishing strategies (Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4. Survey respondents who would and would not still go into fishing if they had their lives to live 
over.   
Fishing status                    Y N 
Full time 80.0% (40) 20.0% (10) 
Part time 88.9% (48) 11.1% (6) 
Occasional 85.7% (12) 14.3% (2) 
Non-active 83.7% (36) 16.23% (7) 
   
Fishing strategy (2009-11)   
*Intensification 85.6% (6) 0 
*Diminishment 93.3% (14) 0 
Same 89.7% (130) 1.4% (2) 
   * some non-responses 
 
Bivariate correlations show that job satisfaction metrics are unrelated to recent departure 
from fishing, status, and fishing preference (Table 3.5), giving more credence to the likelihood 
that many would like to leave fishing but are constrained in various ways of doing so. This 
evidence helps to weaken the possibility that those who have remained in fishing simply do not 
want to leave. In addition over half of active fishers would prefer to work more outside of fishing 
(Ch 2, Table 2.4). 
 
Table 3.5. Bivariate correlations between fishing strategy, fishing status, fishing preference, and (a) 
whether one would still choose to be a fisher for the years that they did/are doing it, and (b) whether one 
liked being a fisher for the years that they were/are one. Results from both Fisher’s exact tests and chi-
squared tests are shown. 
Still choose to be a fisher N df (Χ2) Χ2 p (Χ2) p (Fisher)* 
Fishing strategy (’09-’11) 159 2 0.1408 0.932 1 
Fishing status 159 2 3.243 0.1976 0.2038 
Fishing preference 159 4 4.562 0.3353 0.3592 
Liked being a fisher      
Fishing strategy (’09-’11) 152 2 0.3071 0.8577 1 
Fishing status 152 2 0.8805 0.6439 1 
Fishing preference 152 4 7.531 0.1104 0.2466 
*two-tailed 
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Digging deeper into the qualitative aspects of job satisfaction led to implications 
for why high job satisfaction was not enough to keep people from wanting to leave 
fishing in the Galápagos, while it seems to be so in other areas. Pollnac and Poggie 
(1988) broke down job satisfaction into three basic themes: self-actualization (i.e., 
adventure, challenge, working outdoors, and peace of mind), a “Basic Level” of 
providing a good living (i.e., earnings, health, safety, fatigue), and a “Middle Level” of 
love, belongingness and self-esteem (i.e., time away from home, ability to come and go 
as you please, being your own boss, community in which you live). While these elements 
paralleled the reasons Galápagos fishermen gave for liking the job, interviews show that 
some also can be said to characterize the motives given for wanting to leave fishing as 
described in the Results Section A above. Notable downsides encompassed health, safety, 
and time away from family, falling primarily into the Middle and Basic Levels. The 
ability to interview former fishers confirmed that the negative rather than positive effect 
on labor retention in San Cristobal was not a recent phenomenon. 
 
IV.  Discussion  
This chapter has provided more fine-scale descriptive socioeconomic data on labor 
movements throughout fishing, anchored by reasons given by fishers themselves, and has also 
tested various existing hypotheses around how and why people move through fishing. Below I 
discuss the implications and validity of the results presented above, followed by broader 
contextual influences beyond asset bases not yet tied into the Results above. Implications for 
modeling are subsequently discussed.  
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A.  Asset Bases, Labor Mobility & Social Difference: Mixed Methods Implications & 
Validity  
For each of the three hypotheses around labor mobility through fishing investigated in 
this Chapter, the quantitative results for both the 2009-11 period and longer career histories 
proved more weakly compelling than the qualitative results, from which a much deeper and 
richer story of change over time could be surmised. Taken together I argue that they show “meta-
inferences” (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011: 213) about why people leave fishing and 
differential abilities to do so. I found overall evidence for (a) the influence of differential asset 
bases in the form of social connections, wealth and education, (b) the existence of a mild 
“poverty trap” in exiting fishing, and (c) no effect of job satisfaction on keeping individuals in 
fishing.  
What can be said about the “approximate truth” of these inferences, or in other words, the 
internal validity of gathered data (Angelsen et al. 2011, Creswell and Plano Clark 2011)? 
Various means of validation are often used for mixed methods data (Creswell and Plano Clark 
2011) and here include triangulation of conclusions with broader scholarship on Galápagos 
society, member checking of certain conclusions with fishermen around town in casual 
conversation, and a lack of divergence between quantitative and qualitative analytic results. 
Consistency in interviewing and analytical personnel (as the main author was present at 100% of 
interviews and surveys) also helps contribute to internal validity by eliminating interviewer bias 
possible across more than one person (Fowler 2002). 
In terms of causality, although I found that asset bases (including metrics of relative 
poverty) did differ among San Cristobal fishers fishing at different levels over time, no causal 
inferences can be made with quantitative data alone since survey data does not reveal whether 
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measured asset bases were the cause or the consequence of labor movement decisions around 
fishing over the years. 
Broadly, the richer implications given by qualitative and contextual data than statistical 
analyses of asset bases aligns with livelihoods work that has long noted that access to resources 
and options can be the most critical “asset” in shaping livelihood strategies (Bebbington 1999). 
The influence of various factors on access to livelihood pathways is discussed in further detail 
below in Discussion Section B.  
More specifically, qualitative narratives based on project interviews as well as broader 
scholarship on Galápagos society give meaning to weak quantitative results in terms of both the 
insignificance of certain factors named as important by those recently moving out of fishing, and 
the weak significance of others. For instance social relations were not found to be statistically 
significant, even though they were named as significant for those who happened to move out of 
fishing recently. However, social relations permeate all dimensions of life in the Galápagos and 
Ecuador in complex ways (Ospina 2006), helping to explain how the metric assessed (whether an 
individual had friends or family working in politics or government institutions) turned out to be 
consistent across interviewees whether they switched jobs or not. It is far more difficult to 
measure who among those working in institutions actually exerts influence over hiring decisions 
in any given year, and in the end was beyond the ability of interviews to ascertain. The construct 
validity, or appropriateness of the chosen metric, was thus weak (Angelesen et al. 2011). 
However past work on the political nature of the Galápagos labor market (e.g., Ospina 2006) and 
labor markets in general (e.g., Breman 1978a & b) substantiate the importance of social 
connections in obtaining jobs that some interviewees noted.  
Interviews also substantiate conclusions around the significance of other factors such as boat 
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ownership and education which were only weakly significant in bivariate statistical comparisons, 
but also appear critical over time. It was generally agreed by managers, scientists, and fishers 
interviewed that boat owners on the whole earned more profits from fishing than fishers who did 
not own boats, helping make sense of why part-time fishers were majority boat owners, if in fact 
the higher profits likely help many leave fishing by investing in other opportunities as surmised 
here. However the wildly variable substitutability of fishing vessels over time may help explain 
why boat ownership was not sufficient for leaving fishing for all who desired to do so (see 
discussion in Section B1 below). Education was also agreed by all as key to helping find jobs 
more quickly, by fishers both with and without tertiary degrees.  
My arguments that relative inequality, if not poverty, is a large part of the answer to why 
some individuals have been better able to maintain their standards of living through alternate job 
opportunities are also in agreement with past scholarship on inequalities in Galápagos society. 
Although tourism revenues make the Galápagos one of the wealthiest provinces in Ecuador, the 
rising tide of prosperity has not lifted all boats but rather engendered a “bitter social mobility” 
among fishers and other residents (Ospina 2006).   
Finally, the quantitative results around disproving the job satisfaction hypothesis are 
more robust than those around differential asset bases and relative poverty because they test and 
refute a major element of this theory, namely that individuals who have left fishing did not have 
lower job satisfaction than those who remain. Pollnac and Poggie (1988: 897) hypothesized, 
“…those who are highly dissatisfied probably leave the occupation as soon as an alternative is 
available, leaving behind those who are less dissatisfied.” The ability to survey over active and 
former fishers represents a significant improvement over past studies where only active fishers 
were included and given hypothetical questions about what would make them leave. Here 
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inactive fishers can be described as synonymous with former fishers given a lack of preference 
and plans to return to fishing for all except for 2 individuals (Table 2.4, Chapter 2).  
 
B. Mediating Processes  
How and why people move through fishing is also based not only on individual behavior 
and household needs and capabilities but interdependent with the frameworks that choices are 
made within, namely the broader institutional, market, political and environmental mediating 
processes that regulate access to assets and resources (Scoones 1998; Ellis 2000). Two processes 
that stand out as affecting the labor mobility of San Cristobal fishers and their use of their assets 
are (i) conservation governance and (ii) the broader structure of the San Cristobal labor market. 
 
B1. Conservation Governance within a Protected Area  
Perhaps the most important process influencing access to various livelihood pathways 
through fishing in San Cristobal over the past decade has been conservation governance and the 
overarching prioritization of biological conservation over fisheries economic development in the 
Galápagos Marine Reserve (GMR). Firstly, policies clearly affect individual attitudes toward the 
future and how they weigh the future potential of livelihood pathways. In terms of job 
satisfaction for instance, I conclude that the occupation has become less attractive to fishers for a 
complex variety of reasons including increasingly stringent fishing policies aimed at conserving 
marine resources, more risky fishing practices, and evidence of eroding incomes for the same 
fishing effort over time. Fishers in the Galápagos operate within a marine reserve that constrains 
their flexibility in fishing techniques and markets. One noted: 
Fisher 37780: I would stay in fishing if there were responsible management of resources 
by the authorities. It doesn’t exist. There are obstacles. Because nowadays, they are not 
on the side of fishing. Every day they confine us, confine us, and reduce the fishing sites. 
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This is something criminal that they are doing. I would stay in fishing because I am from 
a family of fishermen. 
 
The above fisherman was using his interview to place blame on declining stocks on the 
side of managers; regardless of responsibility, conservation governance has undoubtedly played 
a role in making fishing less appealing over time, including restricting its growth.  
Secondly, policies also affect how individuals can make use of their assets, and the value 
given to various types of capitals. Boat ownership and social capital provide the most clearcut 
examples.  
 
B1.1 Policies & the Value of Boat Ownership 
Fishing boats most dramatically illustrated how certain types of capital were more highly 
valued and fungible than others, and how this fungibility could change over time as dictated by 
GNP policies.  Between 2009 and 2011 fishing boats had higher substitution value than any other 
kind of financial capital for those wanting to switch occupations to operate boat-based tours, and 
fishing armadores had a highly advantageous position in the policy framework of the Galápagos 
Marine Reserve. This substitutability was due to the first ever expansion of the number of 
permits to operate tour boats since the beginning of the infamous “cupo” system in the 1980s 
(Epler 2007), which was designed as a point-based competition announced in 2008 and 
concluded in 2009.  Competition rules made several clear lines in the sand that differentiated 
peoples’ baseline ability to win. The competition strongly favored fishing boat owners, who got 
extra points for planning to retire a fishing boat. Owners of non-fishing boats received no extra 
points, although many had business experience conducting boat-based tours on San Cristobal.  
Thus people with equal or greater cash assets, income streams, credit worthiness, and tourism 
business experience were disadvantaged. Not surprisingly, all four cupo winners interviewed 
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were armadores, ranging from 47 to 72 in age. However, because this competition was so unique 
the strong advantage of boat ownership in job switching in this period is likely higher than any 
given year.  
In sharp contrast, outside of this competition fishing boats have little to no alternate 
value. The selling and upgrading of fishing boats is strictly regulated in the GMR, and in many 
cases older boats cannot be sold but must be destroyed before permission for an upgraded vessel 
is granted. Several interviews with managers and conservation professionals noted the initial 
rationale for such a rule, where officials did not want older boats to proliferate and raise the 
overall number of vessels in the GMR which was strictly capped at its establishment in 2000. 
However since most boats cannot be sold for cash, they cannot be leveraged in non-fishing 
investments as in other parts of the world. In essence, their value is negated outside of fishing.  
These constraints help explain why, while boat owners consistently earn more money 
than non-boat-owning fishers, owning a boat is not sufficient for transitioning out of fishing if 
one chooses to do so, as evidenced by the active armadores who express a desire to leave. 
 
B1.2. Social Capital & Institutions 
Livelihood policies have also inadvertently reinforced the importance of political ties in 
the Galápagos, most notably again, through the tourism permit competition of 2008-9 and its 
related Executive Order 1416. This order proclaimed that no individual could be granted a 
tourism permit if one had previously existed in their family, which “shall be deemed the 
relationship to the fourth degree of consanguinity and second of affinity” (INGALA 2009). This 
policy made the likelihood of being penalized from the competition stronger the larger and older 
one’s family network was. In the language of livelihood assets, it made “horizontal” social ties 
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such as family ties, often regarded as positive social capital, actively negative for many. Many 
fishers from older families were disqualified and instead relative newcomers to the islands and 
those with fewer relatives were favored. While the four cupo winners have large extended 
families as is common in the islands, their nuclear families are not within the 4-5 oldest island 
clans. Two are half brothers of the mayor, which has caused some to suspect nepotism although 
it may be just as true that this family has no kin with tourism permits, while others did.  
In the end vertical ties to people in positions of authority have benefitted individuals 
more than horizontal ties to friends and family members, in terms of directing their work 
choices. Bebbington (1999) notes that when vertical ties are stronger than horizontal ones, there 
may be weaker capacity for collective action given more limited access to the state.  
The positive and negative influences of conservation governance on fisher livelihoods are 
further fleshed out in the following Chapter, to enable a fuller discussion after analysis of social 
outcomes has also been presented. 
 
B2. Labor Preferences & Multiple Labor Markets  
 Interviews and participant observation in San Cristobal quickly made clear that once 
fishermen look outward from fishing to alternate employment, there were different types of jobs 
that various groups of people aim for and circulate within. On the one hand there is unskilled 
manual labor and semi-skilled and sea-based work in jobs such as security guards, sailors, 
hunters, and marine resource monitoring assistance. On the other hand there are “professions”, 
often salaried, and found in state, municipal, and various public institutions and companies, 
where jobs include lawyers, teachers, bureaucrats, administrative assistants, and technicians in 
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businesses like the electric and telephone companies. In between are non-salaried and contract 
positions in public institutions and businesses. 
 Heen (1988) observes that labor market studies often assume that a single labor market 
exists. A crucial yet little discussed aspect of the Galápagos labor market is its multiple, 
overlapping sectors of different types of work, each with different dynamics of entry, exit, 
access, mobility, and degrees of scarcity of work types. In other words, the Galápagos labor 
market is fragmented rather than homogeneous. Individuals therefore not only have different 
abilities to leave fishing and different asset bases from which to draw from, but they have 
different constraints depending on the types of work they are seeking outside of fishing. 
Breman (1976a and b) discussed two labor market dynamics in India that are highly 
illuminating regarding these heterogeneous constraints and abilities. First is the question of 
“particularistic access” to jobs. Not only qualifications but patronage played a strong role in 
obtaining work in India, and likely does in San Cristobal as Ospina (2006) has observed for the 
Galápagos and Ecuador. In other words, “not all those who meet…requirements have equal 
access” (Breman 1976b: 1906) and certain people at certain times can guard access to jobs. 
Everyone in all types of work in San Cristobal face these particularistic constraints.  
Secondly, there exists scarcity and surplus labor in various areas of the labor market, 
alongside particularistic access to jobs. Reasons for this scarcity vary; interviewees stressed the 
political nature of job selection but much likely also relates to the nature of small island 
economies, which tend to specialize in a few areas and have limited capacity in many others 
(Kerr 2005). A government manager noted: 
Interviewee 74999: Even today, as [title removed], I need professionals to work with me. 
We are three, working at this moment. Trying to cover the whole province. And I cannot 
find the profile [of qualified people]. And of course it is easy to say it's because in 
Galápagos, people don't study and we don't have professions. We do have profession[al]s, 
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but they're [emigrated] out. Because they were not given, they were not given the 
opportunity here. The doors were closed to them.  
And nobody's going to come here to apply, to expect, to see if they are going to 
be called when they already have a job out there [elsewhere in the world or Ecuador].  
 
At the same time there is a scarcity in some jobs, there is a surplus in different areas of 
labor demand, notably manual and semi-skilled work. Those excluded from IMO-certified sea-
based work have very thin options besides fishing, on land and at sea. At the lower end, many 
active fishermen are ready to work for the GNP if it wants to hire seasonal help for sea cucumber 
or lobster monitoring activities, when less than 10 are needed in any given year. Many 
interviewed were looking for piecework as carpenters or other seasonal land-based jobs.  
The dynamics of particularistic access, scarcity, and surplus in various segments of the 
labor market strengthen and make more complete the livelihoods focus on differences in asset 
bases, mediating processes, and access, helping explain why certain household characteristics 
make an individual more amenable to being able to find work, and also why not everyone with 
those characteristics can. It must be realized that individuals not only have differential abilities to 
leave fishing, they are striving for different goals. 
 
C. Livelihoods and Bioeconomics: Implications for Modeling Linked Social-Ecological 
Change  
Several implications for quantitative modeling efforts from this livelihoods analysis are 
presented below. A major conclusion of this chapter is that it is insufficient to think of latent fleet 
capacity (in the form of inactive fishers) as waiting to enter when market conditions improve, a 
conventional expectation, particularly if a timescale longer than one season and non-economic 
factors are considered. In addition instances where individuals do not choose to maximize profits 
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exist and are discussed in three areas: the relationship between income and labor mobility, 
satisficing, and job satisfaction.  
 
C1. Income, Labor Mobility, and Long-Term Profit Maximizing  
Income comparisons are often assumed to be the primary factor influencing mobility in 
economic labor market theory, which holds that individuals will seek to maximize their labor 
benefits and minimize costs (Gordon 1954, Heen 1988). However, at present a full-time 
fisherman participating in all major seasons can still earn a comparable wage to someone 
working in contract government jobs, or as an intermittent tour guide or sailor.  
This analysis concludes that labor mobility makes most sense when considered in terms 
of long-term career strategies rather than seasonal profit seeking and participation. Tourism 
wages have slowly risen and fishing incomes fallen so that some work has equalized, and only 
recently has secure tourism work surpassed fishing incomes. Beyond equalizing however, the 
long view of tourism’s bright future and fishing’s dismal one now make comparable wages seem 
better in tourism. As one foundation manager put it, “Tourism will be what will produce income 
to the Galápagos Islands, you need not be wise to know that this will happen in the future. The 
fishing issue is going to be increasingly restricted…” (interviews 2010). Results match those of 
Heen (1988), who also found that “future income was more decisive than present income” in 
Norwegian fishermen’s decisions to leave their industry (405). 
Contrary to economic theory, a broad swath of the fishing community is willing to take 
on alternate labor that gives them lower incomes compared to year-round fishing, a trend that 
seems to have grown more common in recent years. Recent exits were accompanied by gains and 
losses in income in almost equal measure. Creating wealth while diminishing fishing 
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engagements was only observed with the aid of government sponsorship, for the four individuals 
who won tourism permits. Other exits were roughly horizontal moves or accompanied by a loss 
of income if an individual retired without securing alternate work or temporarily stopped fishing 
due to health or broken boats. Even here (long-term) profit maximization fits the behavior of 
some but not all. While some former fishers have gone on to great success in business, I argue 
that another group has no active plans to make more money in the future when they leave fishing 
but are driven by non-economic concerns of health, family time, and the vision of earnings that 
may continue to shrink in fishing at the same time that their physical strength diminishes with 
age. Due to the above dynamics, assuming that the labor choice with the highest economic 
returns can predict declining fishing effort is overly simplistic. This is not to say that as more 
jobs of comparable income and attainable skillsets are made available to fishermen more will 
seize the initiative to leave, but only that higher incomes outside of fishing, while desirable, may 
not be a necessary trigger. 
Heen (1988) presents an interesting discussion on how the concepts of being “pushed” or 
“pulled” into work by unfavorable or favorable conditions, respectively, also present difficulties 
for using income as the main predictor of labor movements. Individuals who have been pushed 
out of work through being fired for instance, are clearly not leaving in search of greater wages 
elsewhere. Some may find equal or higher incomes, but these outcomes are not the cause of their 
mobility. The push/pull dynamic roughly parallels the distinction between coping and resource 
management made in livelihood work (e.g., Ellis 2000), where the former refers to reactive and 
the latter proactive decisions about when to change livelihood strategies.  
In the end, distinctions were difficult to apply here. Many actions can be considered 
products of both pushes and pulls simultaneously from different factors. Some survey 
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respondents represent those pushed into fishing after job loss, while others represent a pull into 
fishing by some who chose to enter, including the younger interviewees. Tourism’s increasingly 
favorable conditions however represent a pull on registered fishers who choose to enter that 
industry given its better prospects. Interestingly, out-migration for other jobs was not a common 
resulting push coping response observed among interviewed fishers, as it has been in other areas 
that have experienced fisheries declines such as Newfoundland (Antler and Faris 1979). Only 
one worked abroad in Spain for one year before returning, and another planned to move his 
family to Guayaquil to save expenses, while working apart from them in Galápagos.  Regardless, 
the multiplicity of dynamics around labor choices presents another complication to using income 
exclusively as a modeling variable for understanding labor mobility. More realistic modeling of 
labor market movements in bioeconomic models could incorporate this empirical reality; two 
detailed dynamics are described below. 
 
C.2. Good Enough to Leave: Satisficing in Exiting  
“Satisficing” is usually used to describe a pattern of bounded optimization as individuals 
reach a certain satisfactory level of profit (rather than the maximum), after which they are driven 
by non-monetary goals (e.g., Robinson and Pascoe 1997). I propose an alternative, outward 
consideration of “satisficing” that considers profit seeking outside of fishing as it affects 
activities within fishing: a threshold of acceptable alternate income is all that is needed for 
individuals to leave. By assuming not that individuals will always exploit to the greatest extent 
possible but that they only seek means to leave, this reverse satisficing is more aligned with 
sustainable livelihoods approaches. These dynamics do not offer a predictive modeling solution 
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to fishing effort since individual thresholds are unknown and likely vary, although in effect 
‘bounded optimization’ can describe actions. 
However such an explanation aligns with much of the reasoning around job switching 
offered by interviewees. Empirically it was found that even though non-fishing jobs are 
available, a certain level of income is a prerequisite for many fishers who remain active while 
seeking alternate work opportunities. This level is ambiguous and often described as needing to 
be enough to support individual fishers and their family. 
 
C3. The “Satisfaction Bonus” 
Anderson (1980) recommends adding a variable to models that incorporate a satisfaction 
bonus, in the form of the monetary equivalent to what a worker’s satisfaction would be. A 
general equilibrium economic model could thus be formulated that accounted for both the profits 
from an industry and the worker satisfaction bonus, to account for why wage differentials might 
exist in an economy otherwise in equilibrium (since the satisfaction bonuses from each industry 
might differ). In this way the “social surplus” from a fishery can be formally incorporated into 
models, and a negative satisfaction bonus can also be presented. In the San Cristobal case the 
satisfaction bonus was found to be negative, in contrast to most others previously reported. The 
effects of any “satisfaction bonus” in the Galápagos have been contradictory - working to help 
people move out even before it is economically necessary because negative aspects are 
outweighing positive ones in terms of job satisfaction. This finding dovetails with the reverse 
satisficing discussed above. This analysis concludes that one should cautiously assume that a 
satisfaction bonus exists, and even more cautiously add it to models, perhaps only after empirical 
evidence of the strength and direction of any satisfaction bonus in a particular fishery. 
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D. A Livelihoods Approach to Declining Participation: Policy Implications  
Finally, the fine-scaled empirical data generated offer various policy implications in 
terms of enriching socioeconomic data on the fishing sector, and knowledge around the 
interactions between job switching through fishing and conservation governance. First the 2012 
Livelihoods Survey adds much detail to the intricacies of labor movement and preferences not 
before known in the Galápagos. Survey data show for instance, that most individuals who have 
moved out of fishing work in tourism in various capacities, although work taken up ranges from 
manual labor to the professions (Fig 3.2). In addition the majority of the fishing sector in 2012 
could be described as waiting to exit, however compared to the few who did leave raise the 
question of bottlenecks to doing so.  
Behind policy applications of livelihoods work to poverty alleviation is often a belief in 
raising the “asset status” of the poor as a means through which individuals can have greater 
capabilities to better their lives, since assets are “fundamental to …the strategies  [the poor] 
adopt for survival, and their vulnerability to adverse trends and events” (Ellis 2000: 28). 
However, conclusions around the equal or greater importance of access to various livelihood 
pathways over asset building implies that policy makers might do well by taking a two-pronged 
approach. Rather than focusing exclusively on programs designed to build up individual 
household assets such as financial credit and educational skills (while important), it is equally 
necessary to consider how policies might be retooled to widen various routes through which 
fishers can and have left the industry. Regulations demanding destruction of fishing boats stands 
out as detrimental to fisher capital in ways that are unusual in other areas globally. In addition 
the rarity of trainings to become certified naturalist tour guides might slow some from leaving 
fishing in this route that might adopt such a pathway as others have in earlier generations. 
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V. Conclusions  
This chapter has provided a nuanced understanding of recent individual-level job 
switching through Galápagos fisheries. Boat ownership, higher educations, and vertical social 
connections stood out as the key factors enabling some to move out of fishing in recent years, 
although differences in asset bases are far from strongly distinct. The weak differentiation likely 
reflects the variety of occupational pathways found out of fishing over time, the equally 
influential mediating processes of conservation governance and a segmented labor market, and 
the fact that measured asset bases likely represent both the “capability” from which people draw 
to switch work, and the social outcomes of those changes (analyzed in Ch 4). 
Several major points can be summarized. First, the prominence of institutional 
intervention for those experiencing rising wealth when moving away from fishing (and no one 
else) and the National Park’s control over the radical fluctuation in exchangeability of boats as 
financial assets underscore institutional influence on livelihood pathways and options for 
Galápagos residents. The GNP channels allowable occupational pathways to prioritize 
conservation over economic needs. Those with less education, wealth, and more horizontal social 
ties were disadvantaged from participating in the highest revenue pathway (i.e., the tour 
competition) out of fishing in recent years. The influence of conservation governance on 
fisheries change is a common thread that runs through this entire dissertation project, and will be 
further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Applying a sustainable livelihood analysis of “assets-
mediating activities-access” therefore shows that individual level occupational changes can be 
better explained (i) with greater focus on the “mediating activities” and “access” enabled by 
institutional governance than on differential asset bases, and (ii) against the backdrop of broader 
labor market dynamics. Second, because non-fishing work was often the limiting factor in 
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transitioning out of fishing, I conclude that fluctuations in fishing activity are closely linked to 
comparable compensation and space within other economic sectors.  
Third, while the sustainable livelihoods approach has been widely taken up in 
development and aid circles (e.g., Bebbington 1999; DFID 2000), it has yet to make inroads in 
modeling and management efforts and outside of largely developing countries and subsistence 
contexts. The bioeconomic framework assumes income predicts labor mobility; while individual 
motives for fishing participation do include profit maximization, they also build out from income 
in diverse ways that reflect longer-term concerns and responsibilities. Modeling based on higher 
income triggers is therefore insufficient to understand Galápagos fisher behavior in this period of 
decline. Work is intended to compliment past studies on the social dimensions of fishing in the 
Galápagos that have emphasized proximal dynamics such as choosing fishing grounds (Castrejon 
2011) and quantitative analysis of fishing effort (Bucaram et al. 2014).  The initial attempts at 
providing explicit nodes of intersection between livelihoods and modeling work is hoped to spur 
more such interdisciplinary research in the future.  
Fourth, results extend existing scholarship on fisher livelihoods and behavior by 
presenting an outward facing understanding of fisher entry and exit, and data-driven testing of the 
potentially retentive effects of job satisfaction and poverty traps on fishing employment.  Past 
studies on job satisfaction have relied on hypothetical scenarios of when fishers would leave, and 
shows that unlike other areas, high job satisfaction does not have any retentive effects on labor in 
this Marine Reserve. Whether these results hold over other marine reserves remains to be 
investigated in future studies. It is possible that as marine reserves age, conservation policies that 
become more effective over time in terms of both monitoring and enforcement and propaganda 
may affect the desire to leave the profession despite strong attachments to it and competitive 
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profit margins, as evidenced by those leaving who did not find comparable compensation in 
other jobs. 
In the following chapter, results presented here will compliment analysis of the social 
effects of fisheries change in the Galápagos, and a more in-depth discussion of how other 
economic sectors have affected such outcomes on the individual as well as societal levels. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Conservation Governance and Adaptive Fishing Strategies: Social vulnerabilities over time 
 
 
I. Introduction  
Galápagos fishers have moved through fishing in different ways over the course of 
several tumultuous decades. Previous chapters have categorized these movements by their 
changing environmental dependence:  “intensification”, “diminishment” (i.e., growing 
occupational plurality outside of fishing), or “steady maintenance” of fishing practices. These 
strategies are, in a sense, adaptive responses to social-ecological change. Building on analyses of 
why and how people move through fishing (Ch 3), this chapter represents the second of a two-
part analysis of the project’s 2012 Livelihood Survey, here investigating social outcomes. 
Analyses will show that a greater involvement in fishing is associated with higher social 
vulnerability in San Cristobal.  
In conjunction with social outcomes this chapter considers economic and governance 
processes outside of fishing that have shaped the different adaptive pathways taken by individual 
fishers over the past decade and their resulting social welfare. Including but expanding out 
beyond individual-level experiences, my aim is to situate fisheries change into the broader 
change of the Galápagos economy, and show how the social outcomes of fisheries change are 
intertwined with interactions with other economic actors. Two dynamic relationships stand out as 
having affected the choices and social welfare of fishers over time in the Galápagos. The first is 
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conservation governance, and the second the labor relationship between the fishing and tourism 
industries. Both have and continue to change the bounds of possibility for fishermen in terms of 
alternate livelihoods, and this chapter extensively investigates this changing calculus. The issues 
addressed can be summarized into three connected questions: 
1. What is the relationship between environmental dependence on fishing and social 
vulnerability in San Cristobal? 
2. How are active and transitioning fishers intersecting with the ecotourism industry?  
3. How has conservation governance affected the social welfare of fishermen? 
Two main arguments are presented here. The first is that social mobility through the 
fishing sector has historically been high, and livelihood transitions into tourism always 
prominent. However the pathways into tourism have constricted alongside the slow loss of 
ownership over the tourism industry by local residents to outside interests (e.g., Epler 2007). 
More fishers now act largely as a flexible, precarious workforce of wage labor and in fewer 
instances, transition into roles of owner/operators of tour boats or high-level crew as they once 
did. Hence today’s active fishers are more vulnerable to becoming “stuck” in fishing than their 
predecessors, and the gap between those who did and did not transition early may be widening. 
The second argument is that conservation governance has been a double-edged sword for the 
social welfare and choices of Galápagos fishermen. While the adaptive livelihood possibilities of 
active fishers today are channeled by regulatory impulses that grow evermore strict, the Marine 
Reserve is an island of steady economic prosperity, safety and security in Ecuador. This double-
edged sword implies a manifestation of the mixed consequences of delineating conservation 
boundaries – which have accentuated unbalanced attention between “privileged spaces of nature 
protection” and worsening degradation in the rest of Ecuador (Zimmerer 2000: 362, Harris and 
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Hazen 2006).  
Arguments are laid out in six sections. The methodological approach is first briefly 
reviewed (Section II). As a foundation for understanding the relationship between fishing and 
social vulnerability in the present-day (i.e, 2012), correspondence between social conditions and 
adaptive fishing responses are analyzed using this project’s survey data (Section III). Once these 
social conditions have been laid out, I analyze the changing labor relationship between the 
fishing and tourism sectors in Section IV, the effects of conservation governance on fishers in 
Section V, and summarize some temporal dynamics and policy implications around social 
vulnerability in Section VI.  
 
II. Methodological Approach  
 With a continuing emphasis on the sustainable livelihoods framework, social change in 
fisheries is considered here not through changing fishing practices but through changes in the 
broader coastal economy over time, to not divorce the sector’s practices from its wider political 
economy (Allison and Ellis 2000). Fisher perspectives via personal employment experiences 
inform this chapter and continue to situate the analysis in the viewpoint of local fishing resource 
users.  
Vulnerability is one’s exposure to a risk or susceptibility to harm (Leach et al. 2008) and 
defined here around two areas of susceptibility: (i) being unable to retain one’s economic 
security and income levels, and (ii) a narrowing of adaptive capacity, or the ability to change 
with circumstances as one so desires, as described in Chapter 1. Continuing the mixed methods 
analysis of this project, simultaneously collected quantitative and qualitative data are analyzed in 
parallel and their combined inferences inform conclusions. I pair factor analysis with interviews 
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and participant observation to investigate how socioeconomic conditions and wellbeing among 
registered fishers have changed over time. In addition, I interpret where social vulnerabilities lie 
in the heterogeneous fishing community and how they are shifting over time from attention to 
the changing and historical labor relationships between fishing and tourism, which help create 
economic opportunities outside of fishing that contemporary fishers react to.  
 
III. The Social Conditions of Adaptive Fishing Responses   
A. Quantitative Analysis 
As an empirical basis for understanding relationships between fishing and social 
vulnerability, I analyze how people with different fishing patterns differ in socioeconomic 
conditions. Survey data captured career full-time fishers, career registered but inactive fishers, 
and many who had diminished engagements to different degrees over time (57% total, Ch 3). 
The measured assets and socioeconomic conditions reflect the social welfare that is now aligned 
with their pathways. A multivariate approach is useful since vulnerability is accompanied by a 
combination of social conditions, which should be considered in conjunction when possible.19 
Using the livelihood survey described in Chapter 1, a multivariate Linear Discriminant Analysis 
(LDA) was conducted. LDA is a type of factor analysis that interprets the ways in which 
(categorical) groups differ, here fishing strategies, based on their relation to a number of 
“discriminating variables” (interval, ordinal, or continuous). In other words, it gives the 
composition of various social factors that accompany each fishing strategy, and shows how much 
they differ. The LDA does not test whether fishing strategies (i.e., intensification, diminishment, 
or steady maintenance) are dependent upon the discriminating variables, as in a multivariate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Because data are cross-sectional and not panel, they do not show social drivers of intensifying or diminishing 
fishing over time. For this reason a multivariate analysis was deemed unsuitable for the labor mobility analysis in 
Chapter 3, but suited for the analysis of social outcomes presented here.	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regression, but only the strength of their difference among groups. Other than this fine distinction 
in many other respects it is analogous to multivariate regressions (Klecka 1980).  
 
Table 4.1. Discriminant variables input into the linear discriminant analysis, and their possible responses. 
Responses were converted from categorical to ordinal and whenever possible, a “1” was given to the 
values that might align with lesser social vulnerability according to past scholarship. 
Factor Responses 
Still Choose fishing 
Yes/No (Y=1, N=0) 
Born in Galápagos 
Has applied for Tour Permit 
Has interviewed for a Job 
Family in Politics or Government 
Cannot Meet Sudden Cash Need 
Boat Owner 
Home Owner* 
Chronic Health Issue 
Children go to School Abroad 
Fishing has Diminished Over Time 
Sea Cucumber 
participation = 1, otherwise 0 
Lobster 
Seco Salada 
Fresh fish (hook) 
Fresh fish (dive) 
High Seas Tuna 
PV 
Diver 
Higher Income than in '09 
better (1), same(0), worse (-1) Health Comparison  
Change in Std of Living, '09-'12 
Std of Living, 2012 good (1), bad (-1), more or less good (0) 
Supports HH economically N (1), both spouses (0), Y (-1) 
Married married/free union (1), single (0), divorced/separated (-1) 
Involvement in Cooperative none (0), membership (1), active management role (2), president (3) 
Year started Fishing 
Numerical values 
Year Born 
No. children 
No. in HH 
Individual Education 
HH Education 
No. sub-fisheries 
HH Income 
Fishing Income 
No. Jobs in HH 
No. Jobs of Individual 
* values were own=1, rent=-1 
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Because a greater degree of social distinction was found between career-wide, long-term 
movements through fishing than changes from 2009-11, analyses focus more heavily on the 
former. A long-term focus is also more illuminating of the underlying dynamics of job switching 
across the past decade. The discriminating variables here are 37 metrics20 of financial capital, 
social capital, human capital, relative poverty and economic security culled from the livelihood 
survey (Table 4.1). In the end there were 72 cases of complete information for all 37 variables 
out of the 167 registered fishers surveyed.  
The discriminant analysis analyzed the 37 input variables and arranged them so as to 
maximize the “separateness” between groups (i.e., long-term fishing strategies) by weighting 
each variable to different degrees. These 37 weighted inputs are stored in two entirely new 
dimensions called Discriminant Functions (DFs), which are also presented graphically as two 
axes of difference, so that each data point (here representing an individual) can be graphed and 
their degree of similarity or distinction visualized (Fig 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. Clusters of survey respondents who have diminished (green crosses), intensified (black 
circles), and maintained the same fishing levels (red triangles) over their careers, as separated by via 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Survey questions on income, demographics, fishing patterns, social origins and activities that were not numeric 
were converted to ordinal forms.	  
	  	  	  
113 
discriminant analysis. The x- and y-axes represent calculated discriminant functions that summarize 
social characteristics and fishing patterns. 
People with different fishing strategies over time were fairly well separated along these 
axes, with some overlap among those who have diminished and maintained fishing levels (Fig 
4.1). More clearly showing the composition of each DF is a structure matrix (Fig 4.2) that 
contains simple correlation coefficients between each DF and the 37 discriminating variables. 
The factors that are the most powerful discriminators between groups contribute the most to DF 
loadings and have the highest structure coefficients (Klecka 1980), shown as the highest and 
lowest values in Fig 4.2.21  
Structure coefficients show that the discriminant functions (DF) took on different 
characters (Fig 4.2). DF1 was characterized most strongly by birth outside of Galápagos, a lack 
of ownership of boats or houses, no involvement in active management of fishing cooperatives, 
and declining material standards of living and household incomes from 2009. DF1 also indicated 
weak overall wealth and community involvement. DF2 was characterized by a high number of 
individually held jobs, rising incomes from 2009 and improving material standards of living, and 
low fishing income (Fig 4.2). In contrast to DF1 birthplace was unimportant.  
The low correlations with participation in sub-fisheries indicate no strong trend in leaving 
or remaining in certain fisheries over time as people intensified or diminished their engagement. 
However DF1 is associated positively with salted fish, whitefish, and sea cucumber, and 
negatively with lobster and Pesca Vivencial (PV). DF2 is associated positively with PV, salted 
fish, and whitefish, and negatively with lobster and sea cucumber. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Fishing status in the 2011-12 season was originally the strongest factor, although because of its correlation with 
either intensifying or diminishing strategies (i.e., no one who diminished their strategies would be a full-time 
fisherman), it was removed from the analysis.	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Figure 4.2. Structure coefficient values of each of the 37 discriminating variables in each discriminant 
function (DF). Coefficients are ordered by their DF1 value, since DF1 accounted for more of a group’s 
character than DF2. The structure coefficients (i.e., their scores on the x-axis) signify each variable’s 
contribution to a function. Negative scores to “yes/no” variables indicate stronger “no’s”, and vice versa. 
Scores closer to zero contribute less to a DF.  
 
Comparing the values of the discriminating variables within each DF yields a rough 
characterization of the social composition linked to the different degrees of present-day 
environmental dependence. These characterizations are further informed by bivariate and 
descriptive statistics, and align with the trends found in Chapter 3. They are summarized below 
for each social group. 
Reducing Fishing Effort: The low DF1 scores of all individuals diminishing fishing effort 
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over time (Fig 4.1) indicates a greater active involvement in the management of local fishing 
cooperatives, higher rates of home ownership (roughly equal boat ownership with intensifiers), 
and overall rising incomes from 2009. Many were born in the Galápagos. A greater proportion 
reported positive material standards of living in 2012 (i.e., good or more or less good), and from 
2009-11 (i.e., better or the same). In terms of active fishing patterns, the only consistency was a 
more positive association with pesca vivencial and a more negative association with sea 
cucumbers. Because by definition no one who has reduced fishing effort over time is a full-time 
fisherman, these scores indicate that part-time, occasional and inactive individuals are better off 
than full-time fishers. In sum, a reduced environmental dependence over time corresponded 
overall to increasing wellbeing and a slightly higher correlation to pesca vivencial involvement.  
Intensifying Fishing Effort:  There were few people who intensified fishing: only eight 
overall, seven of whom did so from 2009-11. Increasing fishing impact was roughly aligned with 
decreasing human wellbeing. More people in this category reported declining incomes in 2012 
compare to 2009, while more of those diminishing their fishing engagements reported the 
opposite, or rising incomes (Table 4.2).  These same trends hold for those intensifying and 
diminishing recently and over the course of their careers (Fig 3.3b & d, Ch 3).  
 
Table 4.2. Survey respondents compare their income in spring 2012 to that in 2009. 
 Higher Same Lower 
Fishing Strategy    
Intensify 1 3 3 
Diminish` 9 3 2 
Steady Maintenance 53 56 34 
    
Fishing status    
full-time 9 (18%) 17 (35%) 21 (43%) 
part-time 27 (55%) 22 (45%) 9 (16%) 
occasional/inactive 25 (60%) 23 (40%) 9 (16%) 
        `14 out of 15 people who diminished their fishing were asked this question 
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Those who have intensified their fishing engagements over time scored low in both DFs 
(all but one < 0). People in this group hold a relatively small number of jobs individually, and 
have fewer jobs per household, fitting with interviews that showed that three of out the seven 
intensified fishing from 2009-11 as a response to job loss elsewhere. They own boats in the same 
proportion as those reducing fishing effort over time, although proportions of homeownership 
are lower. These scores also indicate a greater association with lobster and sea cucumber than the 
other groups.  
Maintainers: Those who have maintained the degrees that they fish over time are the 
most heterogeneous group in terms of social conditions. Most scored highly in DF1 (< 0), 
signaling migration into Galápagos, a lower degree of home, boat ownership, and cooperative 
involvement than individuals who have diminished fishing over time. More experienced lower 
incomes in 2011 compared to 2009. Their even split between positive and negative DF2 scores 
indicate a range of fishing incomes, as expected, and that responses to self-assessed material 
standards of living vary.  
As a final note, testing of the efficacy of the LDA analysis itself is described by two 
statistics (Table 4.3). The “proportion of trace” shows that the first discriminant function, DF1, 
accounts for 75% of the overall separation between groups, and DF2 accounts for the other 25%, 
still contributing significantly (Table 4.3). The canonical correlation coefficients represent the 
measures of association between the discriminating factors and each DF, and show that DF1 is 
also more highly correlated to its variables than DF2, making it more cohesive in terms of 
interpretation. In addition because data are a sample and not an entire population, a test of 
significance is also run to test the probability of having found differences among groups that 
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might not exist in the population22. The test shows that DF1 and DF2 distinguish differences 
between groups that are likely to be occurring in the broader population of registered fishers, 
assuming random sampling, and that both discriminant functions are contributing significantly to 
the overall analysis.  
Table 4.3. Statistical summary of the LDA analysis. Table (A) values give metrics of the degree of 
separation between groups, and Table (B) tests the likelihood that the sample data findings would be 
found, if differences did not exist in the population. 
 (A) DF1 DF2 
   proportion of trace 0.7479 0.2521 
   canonical correlation 0.7862 0.5942 
   
      (B) 
     
Response DF1: DF 
Sum of 
Squares Mean Sq F value Pr (>F) 
ldaGroups 2 167.55 83.775 80.285 <2.2 x 10-16* 
Residuals 69 72 1.043 
  
      
Response DF2: DF 
Sum of 
Squares Mean Sq F value Pr (>F) 
ldaGroups 2 56.477 28.2384 27.062 2.11 x 10-9* 
Residuals 69 72 1.044 
  *significant at < 1% 
	   	   	   	   	   
B. Fishing and Social Vulnerability 
In the end, the multivariate discriminant analysis produced weak cohesiveness of social 
“signatures” accompanying adaptive fishing strategies. Implications are not surprising, in that 
they indicate that following a particular strategy in terms of environmental dependence is not the 
only thing that defines people in terms of economic security or social welfare. However, 
cumulative evidence from qualitative analysis of interviews and descriptive statistics brings out a 
clear picture of relatively high social vulnerability and lower wellbeing in Galápagos society for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  This test is somewhat predisposed to produce a statistically significant result since variable values that are the 
most different are first categorized, and then tested (C. Wiesen pers comm). Nonetheless it is the common approach 
to 	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full-time fishermen as a group, in many respects including the non-material aspects of wellbeing 
beyond income and assets, or “the human capabilities of doing and being, where doing involves 
agency, choice and freedom, and being involves welfare and happiness” (Ellis 2000:76). This is 
true even while some fishermen earn annual incomes on par with the Galápagos average and fish 
as chosen and desired livelihoods.  
As a whole, fishers were neither disproportionately rich nor poor in income in 2011. 
However moving along the spectrum from full-time to inactive engagement, a greater proportion 
of households reported earning ≥ $17,000/yr in 2011 (Table 4.4). The proportion of part-time 
fishers that made between $9,000 and $16,000 in 2011 is almost on par with their full-time 
counterparts (Table 4.4), indicating along with interviews that boat owners have the ability to 
shift some physical burden of fishing onto others while sharing in profits; some do not always go 
out with their boats.  
 
Table 4.4. Reported income from the entire household (left) and from fishing (right), of survey 
respondents23. Total household income is reported for all survey respondents (N = 167), and fishing 
income for active fishers (N = 119). Survey instruments for active and non-active fishers contained 
slightly different income bracket questions.  
HH Income  N %  Fishing Income N % 
    < 2 9 7.6 
3-6,500 14 8.4  2 – 5,500 27 22.7 
6,500-10,000 20 12.0  5,500-9,000 34 28.6 
10,000-13,500 25 15.0  9,000-12,500 22 18.5 
13,500-17,000 21 12.6  12,500-16,000 11 9.2 
> 17,000 83 50.0  > 16,000 16 13.4 
doesn't know 2 1.2  doesn’t know 0  
didn't ask 2 1.2  didn’t ask 0  
 
 
In addition, higher proportions of active fishers are less well off than inactive fishers in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Annual income was used as an overall proxy of wealth, and because the seasonality in income streams was hard 
to capture in a metric. I surveyed income brackets rather than exact numbers to reduce potential model and 
respondent sensitivity to an unknown variance in truthfulness.	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many metrics of relative poverty and economic security. Full-time fishers in the highest 
proportion reported that their material wellbeing had become lower, and in the lowest proportion 
that their lives had become better. It is notable that none of the people who intensified fishing, in 
the long- or short-terms, thought that their material standards of living had gotten better, and a 
greater percentage reported declining standards24 (Table 4.5). 
 
Table 4.5. Self-assessed changes in material standard of living from 2009 – 2011 for survey respondents 
who intensified, diminished, or maintained their fishing levels in the long- and short-term.  
 Higher Same Lower Doesn’t know/remember 
Fishing Strategy (long-term)     
Intensify 0 4 (50%) 4 (50%) 0 
Diminish 40 (42%) 36 (38%) 18 (19%) 0 
Steady Maintenance 15 (24%) 26 (41%) 20 (32%) 1 (2%) 
     
Fishing Strategy (short-term)     
Intensify 0  4 (57%) 3 (43%) 0 
Diminish 4 (27%) 7 (47%) 3 (20%) 0 
Steady Maintenance 51 (35%) 55 (38%) 36 (25%) 1 (1%) 
 
A greater percentage of active fishers also reported being in worse health than peers their 
age. Their cash constraints were strong; every individual that initially reported “no” to the 
question, “If you had to raise $1000 in one week, could you do it?” was an active fisher (Fig 
4.3). In addition to the generally lower wellbeing of full-time fishermen as a group, it is clear that 
for many interviewees, recent movement into fishing has been associated with more tenuous 
economic security following job loss as Chapter 3 described. Four of the seven recent intensifiers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Changes in self-assessed material wellbeing are chosen as a metric of vulnerability because it has been used as a 
metric of general household resilience in the past (Goulden et al. 2013). This metric blends respondent perceptions 
of their income and asset changes with their specific aspirations and how they’ve been able to respond to them. 
Hallerod (1994) and Mack and Lansley (1985) also found that people in Europe with lower material standards of 
living also tended to suffer from other hardships such as greater economic vulnerability and weaker safety nets. The 
exact question asked was, “The things you can do or buy for money – for example housing, furniture, food, cars, 
holiday, trips – are an essential part of our material standard of living. If you think of your standard today, do you 
consider it higher, lower, or approximately the same as three years ago?”, used from a 1992 representative survey of 
the Swedish population (Hallerod 1994).	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would rather work outside of fishing with three of these returning after job loss elsewhere. From 
a livelihood perspective, the hypothesis that those leaving the sector and diversifying income 
sources might have a greater capacity to weather fluctuations in fishing harvests seems borne 
out. 
 
Figure 4.3. Survey respondent answer to how they would respond to a sudden cash 
need of $1000 in one week. 
 
Compared to the general Galápagos population survey respondents also have very high 
rates of chronic disabilities (Table 4.6). Rates are twice as high as all agricultural, livestock and 
fishing workers in the Ecuadorian census  (grouped together in one census category). This 
indicates that fishers may have higher rates of disability than those in agriculture and forestry. 
Workers in this census category report disabilities at twice the rate again of other Galápagos 
workers, giving full-time fishers five times the rates of disability as all other Galápagos workers. 
Rates of having children that study abroad among the surveyed sample were also much lower 
than the Galápagos average (Table 4.7)25.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  This metric could be confounded by the prevalence of children that actually live on the mainland with their 
mothers, discovered while in the field, which would not denote being sent abroad for better educations. Even 
considering the different wording of this survey and Living Standards Survey, which asked of all household 
members who have studied abroad rather than only the children, the large difference in rates in the general 
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Part of the lower social wellbeing of full-time fishers as a group likely stems from some 
of the attributes of the profession. Fluctuating catches from the uncertain nature of hunting, the 
essence of what fishing is, are compounded by market uncertainties including export prices, 
merchant whims and decisions, and GNP decisions around fishing spots and seasons for lobster 
or sea cucumber, which are not opened every year. Fishing also requires demanding physicality, 
and a lax attitude toward dive training that has left many with chronic ailments over time. All 
divers have stories of accidents, from personal experience or of friends and family. All fishers 
are exposed to the risks described above, regardless of their degree of dependence on fishing, 
although full-time fishers are clearly the most exposed. 
Table 4.6. Rates of chronic disabilities among survey respondents and from the 2010 Ecuadorian census. 
The census question does not use the word “chronic” but records disabilities that last for at least one year.  
 
 Chronic Disability %(N) 
Group Y N No response 
Survey data    
Full-time fishers 10% (5) 88% (43) 2% (1) 
Part-time fishers 17% (10) 79% (46) 3% (2) 
Occasional/Inactive fishers 14% (8) 74% (43) 12% (7) 
2010 Ecuadorian Census*    
Workers in agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing 5% (61) 87% (983) 8% (85) 
All other workers 2% (270) 88% (10470) 9% (1116) 
Galápagos average 3% (331) 88% (11453) 9% (1201) 
*only data from the Galápagos Islands are used    
 
 
Table 4.7. Rates of household children that have studied or are studying abroad. The Galápagos Living 
Standards survey question asked of all household members who have studied abroad, rather than only the 
children. 
 
Children studying 
abroad 
Group Y N 
Survey Data   
Full-time fishers 43% (21) 43% (21) 
Part-time fishers 40% (23) 52% (30) 
Occasional/Inactive fishers 40% (23) 43% (25) 
  
  2009 Living Standards Survey 
San Cristobal average 83% (296) 17% (61) 
Galápagos average 82% (768) 18% (174) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Galápagos population, twice as high as my survey, implies that fishers likely send their children abroad for 
schooling at lower rates.	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Although the data are incomplete, it is not implausible that full-time fishers may always 
have had higher rates of chronic health issues and a greater proportion of low formal education 
than those fishing less, as was found here. The fishing profession has, until the registration 
system implemented in 2000, had a relatively low barrier to entry in terms of human and 
financial capital and thus continuously attracted some people with relatively low levels of formal 
education, although it has also served as overflow for educated residents who could not find 
adequate work (interviews 2012). These dynamics help explain how full-time fishers surveyed in 
2012 were, as a group, the most socioeconomically precarious, least educated, and least healthy 
of all interviewees.  
However, in many ways a more important finding than their lower social welfare is a 
narrowing of certain pathways out of fishing, particularly into tourism. Social mobility through 
the fishing sector is a historical reality; fishing has been a stepping-stone for many including 
relative newcomers of the sea cucumber era, some of whom bought houses, boats, and 
established tour agencies and stores with their earnings. Since the 1980s however, trends in the 
pathways out of fishing have slowly changed, much of it related to a changing political economy 
of job creation in tourism. Therefore full-time fishers today run a greater risk of becoming 
“stuck” in fishing than fishers of old, as elaborated upon below.  
 
IV.  Processes of Marginalization and Precarity: The Changing Face of Tourism  	  Happy	  families	  are	  all	  alike;	  every	  unhappy	  family	  is	  unhappy	  in	  its	  own	  way.	  
-­‐	  Leo	  Tolstoy,	  Anna	  Karenina	  (1878) 
 
A second implication of the weak cohesiveness of social “signatures” accompanying 
adaptive fishing strategies is that, like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, there is no one collection of 
processes and social conditions that corresponds to how individuals, households and families 
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have fared socioeconomically through the fishing downturn. Individuals have pursued 
occupational diversity in different ways starting at different times, and therefore differ widely in 
their social conditions.   
Considering fisheries change through the factors emphasized via bioeconomics 
frameworks alone (e.g., the economics of costs, profits, and the monetary value of one’s labor) 
leads to much focus put on changing individual incentives for fishing down resources faster than 
they can regenerate. Social scientists however have shown that changing fishing intensity is just 
as highly connected to larger political economic dynamics in a place as individual motives (e.g., 
Mansfield 2004).  The diverse social signatures of San Cristobal fishers show that like many 
other small-scale fishing communities studied (McCay 1978; Middleton 1977; Fabinyi 2010), 
Galápagos adaptive fishing strategies, coping mechanisms, and vulnerability come from not only 
the sea but the land. 
 
A.  “All the people now here are children of fishermen” 
To ask how Galápagos “fishermen” have changed over time is to run into the issue of 
ambiguously setting spatial and temporal boundaries. In many cases today’s “non-fishermen” are 
yesterday’s “fishermen”. Go back far enough, and you will find that “all the people now here are 
children of fishermen” (Fisher 32753, 2012).  
Beyond general occupational diversity, I argue that a crucial aspect of “traditional” 
coping mechanisms to social-ecological change has been social mobility through the fishing 
sector into tourism. It must not be forgotten that as many as half of the old Cristobal fishing 
families have left and switched to tourism, many decades ago (Reck pers. comm; Ospina 2005; 
Ospina 2006). Fishermen were among the first people to see tourism’s economic potential in the 
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Galápagos and experiment with tour businesses, with their vessels and seafaring knowledge. 
Local fishermen took tourists out on their small pangas for bird watching and trips around the 
bay (interviews 2012). They now appear prominently among the archipelago’s proud, 
homegrown minority tour operators. A “substantial” part of locally owned cruise ships, most of 
the small 16-passenger variety, “…come from a small minority of Cristobalan fishermen that 
converted their fishing ships into tourism ships and transferred from San Cristobal to Santa Cruz 
in the seventies” (Ospina 2006: 96). The Andrades and Serranos are prominent examples, many 
who eventually moved to Santa Cruz (e.g., Ospina 2006, interviews 2010 and 2012). The 
Serranos now own three small cruise ships and an agency (Ospina 2006), and the Andrades own 
a hotel on San Cristobal and several businesses on both islands. The large albatross statue 
gracing the port landing on Santa Cruz is a gift from Hugo Andrade Serrano in “gratitude” for 
the good fortune that the archipelago has brought to him (Engie interviews 2010). While labor 
movement into tourism is still occurring however, changes over time reveal much about the 
shifting social vulnerabilities of the Galápagos fishing fleet. 
 
B. The Changing Accessibility Of Touristic Labor  
In the early 1980s, two brothers decided to start fishing lobster and sell them to the large 
international vessels that would frequent the archipelago. They decided to collect animals on the 
rocky seashore with bait and string at night, and in three years saved enough to help buy a 6-
passenger tour boat (Ospina 2006). Rules around fishing and boat ownership were nonexistent, 
and one’s initiative easy to capitalize on. Combined with continental educations paid for by other 
siblings’ work on the first tour boats, “…the solidarity of family and the capacity to adapt to 
various jobs”, these brothers are now prosperous local tour operators (95). 
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In 2012 a 3rd generation (part-time) San Cristobal fisherman and tour boat captain 
similarly decides to try something new. He imports a sailboat to the islands, noticing tourist 
enthusiasm for them, and plans to sell something novel – recreational pesca vivencial (PV) 
fishing trips under sail rather than motor. Unlike the brothers above however, this recent fisher’s 
initiative has not only gone unrewarded but put him in further debt. Plans were quickly stymied 
by the Park, who grounded his vessel for not conforming to a “fishing boat”, as required by PV 
regulations. Months of formal appeals and mounting debt and paperwork followed.  
Regardless of opinions on whether a sailboat can be a fishing boat, these two contrasting 
stories show the slow solidification of institutionally acceptable pathways into tourism for both 
the local fisherman and the local resident. Today someone with an enterprising idea is far from 
free to try it. Labor mobility from fishing to tourism, arguably, has and continues to be an 
important coping mechanism to fisheries change, and the greater difficulty in becoming tour boat 
operators gives present-day fishers much reduced leeway in reacting to fisheries change. 
The unmistakable narrowing of the possibility of legally running a boat-based tour 
operation has emerged through a combination of growing bureaucracy and elite capture of rights-
based ownership of tour boats and operations, which were converted into private property in the 
1980s with the permit or “cupo” system (Epler 2007). In many respects, the changing nature of 
labor mobility between fishing and tourism is a reflection of the broader nature of how local 
participation in tourism has changed over the years. The historical arc of a gradual weakening of 
local ownership of tourism operations is now well documented (e.g., Epler 2007, Ospina 2006, 
Quiroga 2009), including in a convenient missive by the provincial fishing cooperative: 
  … local fishermen, earlier owners of the patents, permits, or however one wants to call 
them, which were delivered to permanent residents, these (residents) for lack of economic 
capacity, agreed to sign work agreements with foreign investors, which resulted years 
later to have dodgy clauses, who today have taken over the patents.  
     Until today, residents have lost almost all of their rights and revenues that were 
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generated by operations such as day tours, cruises, and other forms that were fellow 
fishermen’s, who started from nothing.” (UCOOPEPGAL 2012, np.) 
 
Certain avenues into tourism now are in reality quite narrow despite being technically 
available to all interested Galápagos fishers. Applying for tourism permits, as one interviewee 
put it, is “for those with money”. Recreational fishing or pesca vivencial (PV) is the latest 
attempt by fishers, and local residents more broadly, to right a perceived imbalance in 
participating in the ever-growing tourism industry. Molina (2005: 13), in an early report for the 
Charles Darwin Foundation, notes that PV “could be an alternative form of tourism in 
Galápagos. It would differ from traditional tourism by directly involving the local population in 
both the activities and benefits associated with tourist activities” (see Chapter 5 for a more 
detailed analysis of recreational fishing). 
The other major avenue through which fishers have traditionally worked in tourism has 
been as boat-based crew, either while fishing or transitioning completely. This avenue has 
similarly witnessed a reduction of access to the younger generation however, largely due to a 
change of rules in recent decades that make a secondary school degree a prerequisite for 
maritime certification courses standardized by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  
Some older individuals interviewed transitioned into comfortable careers as sailors and 
captains with only seafaring skills and incomplete secondary educations, working their way up 
the ranks. With a greater professionalization of the industry and international standardization of 
requirements however, younger fishers are more vulnerable to remaining “stuck” in fishing over 
time if they drop out of secondary school. One-third of full-time fishers surveyed lacked a 
secondary degree (16 of 49, 32.6%), a rate higher than part-time (9 or 15.5%) and 
occasional/inactive fishers (15 or 25.9%). One interviewee related that a few people have 
attempted to fudge a secondary degree to enroll in IMO courses. Going back to complete their 
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schooling is not an option they consider, since the make-up classes are incompatible with fishing 
trip schedules. Even for those who have completed secondary school,  
Fisher 63392: It’s difficult to devote oneself to [IMO] courses because….it’s more 
studies. So then, almost the majority of the fishing sector is not prepared. 
 
The collective results of these changes is that in many more tourism-related jobs taken up 
by registered fishers today, they act as a surplus labor force of precarious manual and semi-
skilled positions (e.g., sailor, boat drivers and bus drivers) that can be called upon to expand or 
contract, providing fluctuating capacity to match local tourism flows. They have no salaried 
positions and loose affiliations with various agencies, often revolving around family and friend 
networks. Many are called upon the day before (or day of) a tour to conduct their work and are 
paid per outing. This labor system extends beyond deckhands out to the tour guides interviewed 
as well. In many respects they reflect a shared precarity with the local businesses that employ 
them on San Cristobal, which receive far fewer tourists seeking land-based tours than Santa Cruz  
 
Figure 4.4. Job types gained or lost from 2009-2012. Frequency counts are overlapping, so 
that one person could have gained or lost more than one job type, for instance if they gained 
two additional jobs from 2009-12.  Detailed descriptions of job types here are in Appendix B.  
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Island. Economic security is precarious because of a higher susceptibility to job loss. Those 
holding contract jobs and manual labor represent the portion of inactive fishers who are most 
likely to return to fishing in the future. From 2009-12, these jobs were gained and lost at the 
highest rates (Fig 4.4).   
Registered and former fishermen are not unique in their situation, and these conditions 
related to tourism work have always existed. What has changed however, is the ease with which 
individuals can advance upwards and take greater control of the production of tourism business 
and its profits – as owners of agencies, tour boats, and higher-ranking crew. Some fishermen 
have indeed become small business owners, running tour agencies, dive shops, local retail stores 
of goods and clothing, restaurants, and for a handful, their own tour boats. Interestingly many of 
the former fishermen who have managed to establish tourism agencies have only done so with a 
turn toward illegality, because they operate on San Cristobal without a valid license for their tour 
boats. This dynamic is further elaborated upon in the next section. 
Reedy-Maschner (2007), studying the privatization of fishing rights via quotas in Alaska, 
regarded the possession of quotas a key factor in influencing individual life histories and social 
relations, where owning quota widened the socioeconomic gap while building on existing social 
structures by rewarding the best fishermen (at the time of distribution). Arguably, the same holds 
true here for those who were awarded and have held onto tourism cupos; perhaps rewarded for 
being the most forward thinking. Social relations are not untouched, “Successful local 
operators…bitterly complain about the envy and evilness of the ones that forget the hard work 
that helped them succeed from nothing” (Ospina 2006:154). 
In many ways this evolution downward in terms of shrinking abilities for upward 
mobility to owners from wage workers, and precarious job security of many tour jobs mirrors the 
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“proletarianization” of the non-fishing labor market that Antler and Faris (1979) found in 
Newfoundland fishing communities enduring a similar environmental decline in cod, or “making 
dependent and mobile laborers available to industrial capitalism”, by moving them out of the 
fishery (Antler and Faris 1979: 130). The greater vulnerability of active fishermen today is a 
reflection of an historical process of a partial loss of control of the terms in which they work – 
from one of strong to little control not in fishing, but in tourism.  
 
V. The Double-Edged Sword of Conservation Governance 
The constriction of adaptive pathways into tourism is highly intertwined with not only the 
changing tourism market (i.e., market competition) but also conservation governance (i.e., 
capacity ceilings and rights-based management). These dual roots show the (in many ways) 
highly synergistic effects of the tourism industry and conservation governance on alternate job 
options for fishers. Overall conservation governance has proved a double-edged sword to 
wellbeing by being both constraining of livelihood pathways and enabling of social wellbeing, 
increasingly limiting how fishers can use their assets in particular ways over time but also 
helping create and encourage certain elements of the local economy and protect artisanal fishing. 
These two effects are discussed below.  
 
A.  The Blade: Economic Trade-offs & Privileging Biological Conservation 
Residing in the 3% of the archipelago’s land not designated as national park and 
surrounded by a marine reserve, conservation governance permeates life in general and specific 
ways for Galápagos fishers and other residents. This section highlights some of the ways in 
which conservation governance and livelihood pathways intersect for Galápagos fishermen.  
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A1. Socioeconomic Effects on Fishing Operations & Livelihood Diversification 
Most visibly and tangibly, governance rules meant to strengthen environmental 
protections act to constrain the ways fishers can use their capital. For instance, regulations 
restricting fishing boat sales (Chapter 3) arguably constrict the ability of fishermen to accumulate 
wealth in traditional ways. Specifically, boats are becoming more expensive because of the cap 
placed on new fishing vessels. Thus the ability to move up from fisher to fisher-owner is no 
longer within as easy reach as it once was, pointing to an erosion of fishers’ abilities to substitute 
asset types, or turn cash into boats and improve their fishing returns over time.  
Secondly actions by the Galápagos National Park (GNP), charged with managing marine 
resources, have the effect of facilitating but sometimes prohibiting the exercise of labor choices 
and changes, creating livelihood uncertainty in various ways. A recent clear example is 
illustrated by Executive Order 1416 of the tourism permit competition of 2008-9. This order 
proclaimed that no individual could be granted a tourism permit if one had previously existed in 
their family, which “shall be deemed the relationship to the fourth degree of consanguinity and 
second of affinity” (INGALA 2009). For unknown reasons, this Order was announced after the 
date for submitting proposals for the competition, and thus many fishermen who had already 
spent up to $8000 each in preparing applications were disqualified and took on unneeded debt. 
An additional source of uncertainty introduced by the GNP is firing people in ways that 
the locals connect to political changes more than actual job performance (also extending to hiring 
and promotions). If one inspects job losses and gains of respondents by sector from 2009-11, it is 
notable that the only jobs lost from all government institutions except for the GNP, loosely 
categorized as “professions”, were from voluntary retirements. Jobs at the GNP however 
(categorized here under “management”) were more unstable – several respondents had been let 
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go or had short-term contracts not renewed (Fig 4.4). 
Finally, regulations have significant consequences by forcing individuals to take on more 
uncertainty in terms of their business operations, specifically for local tour agencies run by 
former fishermen on San Cristobal (a noted issue throughout the archipelago). The undercapacity 
of legal tour permit operations in contrast to the actual volume of tourists visiting the islands has 
been a long-running and highly political issue that is clear to both the GNP and local residents 
(Epler 2007).  One response to this backlog has been turning a blind eye to small tour agencies 
and operators that fill a necessary void in the tourism market, often act responsibly, but are 
technically illegal operations. The illegality of many local tour operations on San Cristobal is 
openly acknowledged at the same time it is explained.  
Fisher 69972: We do this activity with much enthusiasm, we participate in conservation, 
but the GNP, it is a political institution. They don’t give us an opening. Neither to us nor 
to others, they say, ok come, let’s achieve, you want to do this, that, others want to do 
this, that…then they say no. You cannot do that. The Park could do that tomorrow, and 
then we could not do tourism. We, the locals. The Park could say it, and we could no 
longer do [tourism work]. Because we don’t have the GNP required document, to do 
tourism.  
 
[on having applied for tour permits:]  
Many times. We have spent a lot of money, our capital, our monetary investments. Yes, 
we have done it all – through 10, 12 years, reinvested [in trying to get a legal permit]. But 
at the same time, we do not have the support of the GNP, especially. There is no support, 
up until now.  
 
An owner of another dive shop, when asked about why he did not possess a Park permit, 
said simply “Because it’s impossible (to get)”. A former Park director acknowledged the difficult 
bureaucracy, but also added “It’s easier for them not to have one”, because they do not have to 
pay taxes on unreported activities. 
 
A2. Institutions & Uncertainty  
Former and part-time fishers that have both recently and distantly transitioned into 
	  	  	  
132 
tourism work show that the adaptive potential to switch between these livelihood pathways does 
exist, and that there has long been at least some potential to cope with fisheries changes by 
tapping into the richer tourism economy, at least under certain conditions. The scarcity of recent 
transitions however implies that conditions have changed, including in the institutional realm.  
From a livelihoods perspective, the interactions of fishers with other actors in state, 
market, and civil society are the conduits through which they reshape their livelihood strategies 
and constantly negotiate their returns from existing strategies (Bebbington 1999). The histories 
of change in tourism and conservation governance reviewed here show a slowly degrading 
ability to defend, control and transform assets over time. This loss comes from both a transfer of 
some resources to other actors and an overall constraining effect from institutions on fisher 
ability to defend their assets (e.g., loss of financial capital in boats and the 2009 competition, 
legal uncertainty over local businesses).  
Ospina (2006) draws from an anthropological understanding of institutions which 
emphasizes their practices rather than just their functional purpose (i.e., existing to provide a 
public good and fulfill a specific function), affected by layers of historical (re)organization, 
connected to place-based social networks, and therefore having the effect at different times “…to 
embrace, moderate or exacerbate uncertainty” (Mehta et al. 1999: 37).26  Galápagos stakeholders 
use institutions as tools for political fights and negotiations, partially defining themselves and 
their stances in opposition to one another (Ospina 2006). Drawing from this understanding, 
several factors contribute to the inconsistent and economically inefficient functioning described 
in Section A1 above. First is the legacy of historical instability that includes the 1990s and 
2000s, where for instance, the GNP changed directors five times from 2003-05 (Ibid., 144). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 This contrasts with Ellis’s (2000) view that “the role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a 
stable structure to human action” (38).	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Secondly, institutional and family networks are highly overlapping on the islands, where over 
35% of the economically active population work for government. The percentage on San 
Cristobal is the highest of all of the islands, since it is the archipelago’s capitol. The lines 
between political and civil society are therefore blurred. Combined with a client-like sytem for 
delivering jobs, as in Ecuador, these above factors serve to make institutions and laws far from 
impartial or neutral spaces; the law is rather “an expression of will” (Ibid., 153). As one 
government manager noted, “The Special Law helps if it is applied to everybody. But the Special 
Law is applied only for those who are defenseless. Those who have resources or political 
connections go over the Special Law”.  
Finally, scholars have noted the influential role of governance institutions in “the 
discursive construction of what is meant by risk” (Mehta et al. 1999: 12). Underlying all of the 
above dynamics are a privileged perspective of the Galápagos as a unique ecosystem in need of 
protection since 1959, when European scientists advocated for and established the Galápagos 
National Park (Quiroga 2009). “Risk” in terms of fishing boat regulations for instance is framed 
in terms of the risks of overexploitation of the marine environment. Less considered has been the 
social “risk” to fishermen of reduced economic security and adaptive capacity, or the ability to 
change with circumstances as one so desires as this study emphasizes. 
 
B.  The Buffer: Conservation Boundaries and Privileged Spaces of Protection 
Galápagos fishermen find themselves in a strange position. At the same time as their 
prospects for upward mobility slow, their social welfare has been bolstered by the GMR to a 
much higher level than what most of their fellow Ecuadorians experience, illustrated below 
through the privileging of artisanal over industrial interests and steady economic prosperity.  
Geographers in political ecology and critical cartography have argued that this 
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contradiction comes easily. The act of bounding spaces into new conservation areas has 
unintended consequences, namely heightening the uneven attention given to areas that are legally 
protected over others (e.g., Zimmerer 2000, Harris and Hazen 2006). As Harris and Hazen 
(2006) note, “…we are also concurrently – albeit often unwittingly - accepting that other areas 
are less worthy of protection” (111). Protected Areas are recipients of considerable political 
influence and funds wielded by global conservation networks of NGOs and their supporters–a 
trend epitomized here, with at least two international nonprofit organizations dedicated solely to 
raise funds for conservation and research on the islands27, extensively discussed elsewhere (e.g., 
Ospina 2006, Quiroga 2009). Contrasts are stark in the realm of fisheries as well. For instance, 
sea cucumbers were depleted on the coast of Ecuador in the 1980s-90s, a collapse that went 
almost unnoticed (and little studied) until fishers then moved speedily to the Galápagos in the 
1990s. There in contrast, the strong conservation backlash ignited violent protests and an 
ongoing stock assessment program. Depletion and the socioeconomic “gold rush” that 
accompanied the “pepineros” is still considered one of the greatest environmental crises in the 
National Park’s history.  
 
B1. The Banishment of Industrial Fishing Development  
The Marine Reserve has afforded Galápagos fishermen social protections that must also 
be acknowledged. Of foremost importance is the political decision that the fishing fleet will 
always be small-scale. As a result, greater industrialization of fishing is effectively stifled as a 
possible solution to fishing declines, a not uncommon approach taken outside of PAs. 
 The process of industrializing is a complicated issue that often gets conflated with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  These organizations include the Charles Darwin Foundation and the Galápagos Conservancy.	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technological capacity building at any scale. Many fishers want more leeway in developing 
technologies and to “modernize” and “professionalize” the fishery while arguing to keep it 
small-scale. Marco Escarabay, president of the Provincial-level cooperative UCOOPEPGAL, 
notes that, “the fisherman should be a professional of the sea” (interviews 2012). Partial 
justification is that all kinds of people occasionally go out on fishing boats and give real 
registered fishermen a bad name by fishing in the wrong areas and times; he notes that fishermen 
should be knowledgeable, “not an empiricist that goes and throws a net and with this is a 
fisherman, no. S/he is a person properly trained and directed - one could create a fishing school 
in Galápagos so people can work with knowledge.” Some fishers also want to develop alternate 
fishing options to help relieve pressure on coastal stocks, such as longlines and aquaculture of 
sea cucumbers (various pilot projects have failed). Fishers have drawn an extended stalemate 
with conservation interests who have feared that “any acceptance of improvement of the fleet 
will increase total fishing effort and create a growth impossible to stop” (Ospina 2006: 164).  
It is clear however that all parties are united in their desire to keep large seafood 
processing companies and industrial tuna trawlers out of the archipelago. This decision imparts 
many advantages for individual wellbeing to the Galápagos fisherman. In Newfoundland large-
scale seafood processing operations reduced the incentive for small-scale fishers to conduct their 
own value-added processing and effectively ended a once thriving local economy in family-
owned processing of salted cod. Fishers also found themselves commanding a decreasing share 
of harvest profits, because of the creation of producer monopolies that took away their 
bargaining power in selling fish. Some that then left small-scale fishing became converted to a 
de-skilled and wage-based crew in processing plants (Antler and Faris 1979). Prioritizing small-
scale fishing has left production of fish in the hands of Galápagos fishing families, who own 
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their own boats, contract their own labor, and salt their own fish (in the case of the seco salado). 
While they have similarly weak bargaining power with many merchants, they nonetheless retain 
control over allocation of their labor power and production decisions. For now they have also 
sidestepped the possibility of ever undergoing a process of de-skilling and wage labor common 
in industrial fishing and processing. 
In addition, kin-based employment in Galápagos based on blood relations, also common 
in other small-scale fisheries (e.g., Lofgren 1972; Terkla 1998) serves to flatten profit sharing. 
For instance some fishers share the catch of lobster and sea cucumber equally with pangueros 
who are kin, far more than the going rate of $50/day (interviews 2012). Compared to anonymous 
“capital-based” hiring decisions, the “kinship-based” employment decisions may influence 
vessel decisions to keep people employed even after it is no longer profitable, in contrast to 
classic firm behavior (Terkla at el 1988).   
 
B2. Economic Prosperity  
Galapagueños have lived through a dramatic rise in island GDP since the 1960s (Taylor et al 
2006). While inequality certainly exists and many older residents mourn the loss of life “the way 
it was before”, without the regulatory layers and crowds (Ospina 2006: 151), the general 
prosperity of the archipelago has afforded local fishermen along with all Galápagos residents a 
relatively high quality of life with stronger literacy, crime rates, and basic housing than mainland 
Ecuador (Table 4.8). While Ecuador was enduring tumultuous financial crises in the 1990s and 
massive inflation of its sucre, the Galápagos continued to prosper largely because of steady 
tourism and the financial security of its dollar-based economy (Ospina 2006; Hearn 2008). 
Ospina (2006: 174) notes, “It is strange and pleasant to encounter in a poor and undeveloped 
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country, a region that has exiled, as the Galápagos has done, extreme poverty and 
unemployment.”  
Table 4.8. A selection of quality of life indicators for the Galápagos and mainland Ecuador.  
    Galápagos Ecuador 
Infant Mortality (per 1000 live births) 1998 8.7~ 31` 
	  
2013 3.56** 8.64** 
Annual mortality (per 1000 inhabitants) 1998 1.2~ 5` 
	  
2013 1.43** 4` 
Illiteracy rate (over age 15) 2009 1.9%* 16%` 
Houses without Sanitation  2009 29.5%* 20%` 
*Data from Galápagos Living Standards Survey 	   	  
`Data from World Bank 	   	  
~Data from Kerr 2005 	   	  
**Data from INEC 2013 	   	  
 
The Galápagos has not experienced the sustained and severe economic depression of 
many other small fishing communities in New England, Canada and Florida (Davis 2000; Smith 
et al. 2003), where fishing was a more major driver of the economy. An important result of such 
relative prosperity and an economy diversified from fishing is a much-reduced need for work-
related, long-distance migration. Of the 167 people interviewed, only two had migrated for work, 
or were planning to in the near future as a direct result of the fisheries downturn. As a contrast, 
Antler and Faris (1979) found that 79% of working men in a formerly fishing Newfoundland 
community had to migrate away from their homes to distant city centers. Increased time away 
from family negatively affects job satisfaction and family life (Pollnac and Poggie 1988), and 
interviewed fishers in this study corroborated the difficulty of being away from their families for 
long periods of time.  While jobs are not unlimited, this means that those leaving fishing often do 
not have to leave their community, and can maintain their family and social ties intact28. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  This point is a relative one, but still holds. Work in fishing, particularly the traditional seco salado where trips 
range from 15-20 days at sea, and aboard tour cruise ships that rotate around the islands every 8 days have also 
taken tolls on the family life of Galápagos fishers. Fisher GG is one example, noting that he was at sea more than 
home while his first two children grew up.	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Finally given its geographic isolation, growing monitoring efforts, and publicity of 
negative events, Galápagos fishermen have also reaped the benefits of greater personal safety at 
sea. Fishermen on the coast of Ecuador have become entangled in several violent disputes over 
the years, coming from (i) border disputes with Columbia and (ii) the drug wars. Interviews in 
2012 with Fisher RR in San Cristobal as well as an Ecuadorian scientist related that fishers on 
the Ecuadorian coast are sometimes held at gunpoint, robbed of gear and motors, and stranded at 
sea in skirmishes with Columbian armed vessels in years past. Such incidents do not occur in the 
GMR. In recent years, the escalation in narcotics activity through Manta and the coastal oceans 
of Ecuador has led to growing concern on all sides, for fishers who have disappeared or had 
boats destroyed by narco-trafficers or by U.S. warships in search of narcotics and illegal 
immigrants (Camargo 2014; Insight Crime 2014). Galápagos fishers have felt themselves 
embroiled in such trades as well; several scientists and conservation professionals noted that 
connections between illegal fishing and drug trafficking also extend through Galápagos waters. 
The Marine Reserve and geographic distance however, seems to have so far greatly attenuated 
the dynamics now creating turmoil in Manta. In sum, Galápagos fishermen, even withstanding 
recent restrictions in their pathways out of fishing, are still protected from many social issues in 
mainland Ecuador. In the words of one old fisher, life in the Galápagos is “one-thousand times 
better [than the mainland], in every way.” 
 
VI.  Institutions, Adaptation, & Change Over Time   
The collective evidence in this chapter suggests that several long-term processes are 
implicated in the higher social vulnerability of active than inactive and former fishers, and 
differences between those who have (i) completely transitioned into the tourism economy, (ii) 
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followed a pathway of long-term diversified livelihoods in fishing and elsewhere, and (iii) 
remained in fishing full-time. 
First, as noted above given the overlapping labor markets in the archipelago and the long-
term livelihood diversity that exists, an outward perspective that goes beyond the fishing sector 
must be used in considering the asset bases that fishermen draw from, a point noted around many 
rural livelihoods in general (Bebbington 1999; Fabinyi 2010). Strategies of livelihood 
diversification seem to help engender stability, as those in groups (i) and (ii) above have 
benefitted from the economic prosperity that tourism has brought to the islands, the latter at the 
least indirectly with the overall growth of work in areas such as government, goods and services, 
and local retail (Fig 4.4). In contrast those who have remained full-time fishers have borne 
effects of fisheries stagnation without any compensatory economic uplift. This contrast might be 
even more pronounced in years when sea cucumber fisheries are not opened due to low 
abundance counts, since interviews note that sea cucumber could easily account for $2-4,000 
USD of fishing income, a significant amount when the median range for fishing incomes were 
$9-12,000 USD/yr.  
Arguably Galápagos fishers face what Mehta et al. (1999) called growing and new types 
of uncertainties that stem from new intersections between global economic, ecological or social 
processes and local actions, making constraints on rural livelihoods more complex and 
intertwined with more and diverse actors on various scales. These global to local intersections 
are evident in the Galápagos with the spread of global safety standards and certifications for 
instance; more education is now the key to accessing many of the new seafaring tourism jobs. 
Intersections with global governance conceptions may be most explicit with the move 
toward privatization of both tourism and fishing rights that has been a major force in the gradual 
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constricting of adaptive possibilities into the highest-returning tourism occupations. The embrace 
of these rights-based management approaches, purporting to align economic and environmental 
incentives by transferring what was once common property (marine resources) to private 
property, are a reflection of the interaction of local livelihood processes with global conceptions 
of effective natural resource management, namely the increasing cache of market-based solutions 
in fisheries management (Mansfield 2004, Branch 2009).  
Privatization as well as global safety standards are important in considering social 
adaptation because they effectively change the structure of access to resources for future 
generations, meaning that active fishers cannot now follow the all of same routes into tourism as 
existed in past decades. In the Galápagos the constriction into tourism due to privatization is 
interesting because while the effect of privatization on limiting distribution of resource benefits 
has been noted with quota systems in fishing, here a quota system outside of the fishing sector is 
affecting fishermen’s labor and therefore the fishing footprint.  
Temporally, the benefits reaped from the tourism economy arguably accumulate due to 
several interacting dynamics, widening a gap between those who have become involved in 
tourism and those who have not. On the flip side, this cumulative advantage also implies a 
cumulative vulnerability of those not involved in tourism or diversified work outside of fishing. 
The growth of competition in all areas of the Galápagos tourism industry has made not only 
financial capital but business and social networks important in staying competitive. Earlier entry 
could cede an advantage in accumulating such networks, as well as financial capital.  
Quotas often become more concentrated over time, in fishing as more “efficient” fishers 
buy out less efficient ones; Branch (2009) has noted that market-based fishing quotas benefit the 
generation at implementation the most. Privatization also narrows the distribution of wealth from 
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natural resources to a smaller group of people, and has done so in the GMR (Epler et al. 2007). 
This is a well-known effect to policy-makers; Reedy-Maschner (2007), analyzing privatization in 
fishing rights in an Alaskan Aleutian community, noted that policy makers accepted the 
narrowing of social benefits from resources, determined to phase people out of the fishery in the 
name of increasing environmental protections. 
Besides declining catches cited recently, the reasons given by former fishers for leaving 
over time (Results section, Chapter 3) paralleled reasons recent fishers gave – health, greater 
family time, stability, and a perceived bright future in tourism. The constancy of most of these 
given reasons suggest that former fishers’ maintenance of their livelihoods is due to the 
opportunities that the Galápagos economy afforded them as much as it was to their own choices, 
and the narrowing and changing nature of accessibility of these choices over time indicates this 
is a critical part of the degrading ability of currently active fishers to follow in the footsteps of 
fishers of past decades.  
Several policy implications can be drawn from this analysis. The weakened ability of 
individuals to defend their assets over time in the fishing community implies that policies might 
look to aid people defending their assets in hand as well as in helping people gain new assets, a 
more common focal point. While a full policy and feasibility analysis is beyond this project, 
candidates for such policy reform include legal protections for responsible local tour businesses 
and a reassessment of the system of tourism governance and its distribution of wealth among the 
local population, although major structural changes to tourism industry regulations, admittedly, 
would be very complex politically. 
The fact that fishermen have always drawn from assets not only in the sea but also on 
land, as mentioned above, suggests that policy makers might also do well to expand their 
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thinking beyond purely sector-based assets and activities. While new applications in managing 
harvest and participation continue to be developed (e.g., Ramirez et al. 2012), targeting the weak 
human capital of the sector could also help empower the 53 and 55% of surveyed fishers (full-
time and part-time, respectively, Appendix Table C1) who would like to find more work outside 
of fishing. In addition serious thinking about how to make accessing important state resources 
easier and less bureaucratic could lessen overall, everyday livelihood uncertainty.  
As the above section on Conservation Governance described, institutions have been 
arguably focused on product and outcome oriented goals rather than process, in other words, 
producing rules or options that officially offer a livelihood alternative like the 2008-09 
competition, and creating forums for debating longlining and other fishing industry suggestions. 
These actions have done little to enhance the adaptive capacity of fishing households over time, 
if judged by their ability to change and maneuver their work portfolios (inside and outside of 
fishing) in the manner of their choosing. Adaptive capacity building programs might include 
allowing fishermen greater roles in participating in monitoring and enforcement of GMR rules, 
and in operating the recreational fishing sector, as will be described in Chapter 5. The effects of 
the thin attention to capacity building over time are also now emerging as the cumulative effects 
of the stagnating fishing industry continue to ripen. All in all, these factors arguably contribute to 
shifting the distribution of vulnerabilities in the Galápagos population to be overrepresented in 
the active fishing community compared to the general population, as census comparisons show 
(Section 3B above).  Multiple approaches to possible fisheries policy reform become apparent 
when a broad view of who “fishermen” are and the important socioeconomic linkages between 
fishing participants and other stakeholders are considered. As this chapter has shown, the 
governance of tourism strongly affects the fishing community, and any actions inhibiting 
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occupational plurality across the sectors represent a loss of flexibility in bettering lives. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
This chapter has taken a historical and cross-sector view of the social outcomes of how 
“fishermen” have and continue to transition out of the industry, emphasizing the influence of the 
broader Galápagos economy and governance regimes rather than change within fishing itself. 
San Cristobal’s fishermen, historically and at present, have undoubtedly prospered from tourism, 
which has led to longstanding fishing-tourism occupational plurality and given them livelihood 
flexibility. However, the terms on which many are participating in tourism are contingent and 
economically insecure, and their abilities to achieve greater security are far more restricted at 
present than in the past.  
In the end Galápagos fishermen find themselves in a strange position. Their vulnerability is 
situated in a particular Galápagos context, of a narrowing of adaptive coping strategies as their 
prospects for upward mobility slow, all the while remaining elevated in economic security above 
most of their fellow Ecuadorians. What to do about these growing contrasts between the 
Galápagos and mainland Ecuador is an issue that merits greater attention by policy makers and 
conservation interests alike.  These contradictory impulses, visible through a combination of 
extensive and intensive analytic methods, show that the effects of the development of the tourism 
industry and conservation governance have been positive and negative in different ways.  
Ultimately, these issues show the importance of taking into consideration (i) the interactions 
of the fishing community with other Galápagos stakeholders and (ii) the land- as well as sea-
based assets that fishers draw from to better understand their adaptive pathways and social 
outcomes over time. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The evolution of recreational fishing in the Galápagos Marine Reserve: adaptive livelihood 
feedbacks29 
 
I. Introduction  
This chapter investigates an ongoing scholarly framing of the Galápagos Islands as a 
dynamic social-ecological system (SES), both explicitly and implicitly using concepts like 
“dynamic feedback loops” and “alternate stable states” from resilience and complex systems 
scholarship (e.g., Folke 2006) to analyze how human and non-human elements affect each other, 
and the growing strains on the archipelago’s ecosystems (Watkins 2008, Gonzalez et al. 2008). 
With the 2014 book, “The Galápagos Marine Reserve: A Dynamic Social-ecological System” 
(Denkinger and Vinueza 2014), such conceptualizations increasingly tackle Galápagos marine 
environments.  
As dynamic, nonlinear systems-based frameworks continue to dominate ecological and 
natural resource policy understandings (e.g., Gunderson et al. 1995; Holling 2001; Levin 2005), 
it is important to ask what “perturbations” and other systems concepts of ecosystem change 
imply for the social realm, particularly when used in natural resource management contexts. 
Complex systems hold the promise of infusing more dynamism into fisheries governance by 
representing fishing systems as made of fluid relationships between constantly changing entities, 
connecting to regional and global networks, which help to rectify many longstanding, erroneous 	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  An earlier version of this chapter was published in 2014, co-authored with Diego Quiroga. It is republished here 
in modified form for educational purposes, as the author’s rights allow with Springer. Citation: Engie, K., and D. 
Quiroga. 2014. “The emergence of recreational fishing in the Galápagos Marine Reserve: adaptation and 
complexities.” In The Galápagos Marine Reserve: a dynamic socio-ecological system, ed. L. Vinueza and J. 
Denkinger, 203-226. Springer Science + Business Media: New York.   
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assumptions the behavior of fishermen and fish stocks as atomistic (e.g., St. Martin 2001; Berkes 
2006; Wilson 2006; Mahon et al. 2008). However much work remains to be done to make them 
more realistically applicable to Galápagos issues (and other areas), including improving weak 
application of the social dynamics in social-ecological feedbacks.  
In the Galápagos context, resilience scholarship has articulated social dynamics quite 
narrowly so far, important to address because this articulation tends to privilege certain policy 
implications over others. Who decides how to react to ecosystem change, and is there more than 
one policy prescription? Such questions show the importance of greater attention to analyzing 
processes of governance in shaping cross-scale relations in resilient feedbacks, or “arrangements 
for decision making and power sharing” (Brechin et al. 2002: 46). 
Following this project’s broader themes, the objectives of this chapter are to use 
livelihoods scholarship around development interventions to better articulate the amorphous 
ways that resilience and complexity regard how development “alternate stable states” come 
about. My case study is a recent local recreational fishing industry commonly known as Pesca 
Vivencial (PV) that has emerged as perhaps the most controversial of all the various alternate 
livelihood programs aimed at fishers in the GMR over the past decade, and one that has gained 
the most traction. A newly legalized exploitation of striped marlin (Tetrapturus audax; 
Schuhbauer and Koch 2013) has led to scientific concern for potential expanding ecosystem 
impacts. In addition although proposed by the fishing industry itself and highly anticipated, a 
relatively low level of participation by local fishers and uneven business partnerships with 
outside interests have become controvertial. In this chapter I focus on the regulatory debates that 
introduced recreational fishing, and trace the negotiations that changed its form from what was 
originally proposed to something different.  
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Building on research that has pointed out the various issues around PV’s implementation 
(Schuhbauer and Koch 2013), this analysis offers a broader, systemic consideration of what 
implementation issues indicate. I contend that while the activity is much anticipated it has also 
been deeply problematic because of its potential to shift economic and political relationships. 
Such an analysis requires investigation building from the individual level since people have 
engaged with PV in diverse ways, as will be shown, and therefore contributes to a thin area of 
research thus far, understanding the contested politics and livelihood struggles of the local 
fishermen involved. More broadly, strengthening empirically-based methods of analyzing how 
diverse stakeholders come together to influence social-ecological feedback loops in fishing may 
help strengthen the weak ways in which resilience approaches have analyzed environmental 
politics here and elsewhere (e.g., Leach et al. 2008).   
This chapter complements the socially differentiated analyses conducted in previous 
chapters, but places greater consideration of social difference at the sector level more than the 
household level. Helping to avoid a purely econometric accounting of assets that breaks 
processes down into inputs and outputs, this qualitative analysis focuses on how members of the 
fishing community have interacted with other stakeholders, a critical part of the story of the 
Galápagos fishing industry and how it’s changing.  
The following sections outline theoretical approaches (Section II) and methods (Section 
III), followed by PV’s early social history (Section IV). Section V then advances some 
implications for the workings of dynamic social-ecological “feedback loops” (e.g., Gonzalez et 
al. 2008) brought forth by a more explicit delineation of the dynamics of one social feedback, 
regulatory negotiations.  
II. Background & Theoretical Context 
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A. Adaptive Change in Social-Ecological Systems and the Galápagos  
The concepts of complex systems, resilience, and social-ecological systems are highly 
intertwined and often used together (e.g., Folke 2006). In fisheries management, the historically 
lesser attention to the dynamism of natural processes than to economic stability for fishing 
industries by governing institutions, and continuing collapses of global fish stocks, has been a 
major driver of the development of resilience and complex systems frameworks to natural 
resource management (e.g., Holling and Meffe 1996). Recognition that these governance 
patterns may actually make marine ecosystems more brittle and prone to collapse even while 
privileging economic stability has gained strong resonance in the fisheries science community 
(e.g., Allen and McGlade 1987; Berkes 2006; Wilson 2006).  
The current hybridization of complexity and social dynamics is reminiscent of but not the 
same partnership as cultural ecology’s earlier embrace of the systems ecology of the 1960s to 
study human-environment relations (e.g., Rappaport 1968, Nietschmann 1973). While past 
systems were thought of as closed and possessing homeostatic equilibria with culture playing a 
regulatory role in sustainable use, the complex systems of evolutionary ecology since the 1990s 
emphasize openness and exchange, contingent boundaries, network analytic approaches, and 
historical determinacy and interactions of local communities with global networks. A complex 
adaptive system contains within it various diverse entities or agents that interact in different ways 
and of their own accord, driving bottom-up patterns of change. Massey (2005) has noted that 
complexity may be part of a larger impulse in twentieth-century science towards multiplicity, 
pluralism, and acceptance of ambiguity and away from certainty.  
Arguably complexity and resilience have great potential to contribute to emphasizing the 
need for more holistic and cross-sector governance of fisheries. In its most expansive 
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interpretation, to assess small-scale fisheries as complex systems is to conceptualize fluid 
relationships between constantly changing entities: fish, fishermen, other community members 
and outwards to regional and global stakeholders as well. In the Galápagos as well, invoking 
social-ecological systems importantly calls for moving away from a historical emphasis on 
reductionist and discipline-based research to tackle increasingly intertwined issues (Watkins 
2008).  
However, assessing the social aspects of complex feedbacks in small-scale fisheries at 
least has often been less than expansive, one issue being a weaker articulation of the complex 
dynamics of social compared to ecological change. Positing a broad pattern of social-ecological 
change, Holling (2001) developed a larger theory of the connected complexity of “economic, 
ecological, and social systems”, also called the resilience perspective to analyze social-ecological 
systems (Folke 2006). With phases of exploitation, conservation, release, and renewal, system 
energy and resources are described as in a continual phase of re-formation in “Adaptive Renewal 
Cycles” (ARCs, Fig 5.1; Holling 2001), with successive systemic structures not exactly the same 
as the ones that existed before. Creative potential in terms of governance experimentation and 
“novel reassortments of elements” supposedly is highest in the “reorganization” phase or 
“backloop” of an ARC, but the mechanisms behind such are often without deep examination in 
resilience conceptualizations, and is admittedly the “least examined and the least known” (Ibid., 
395).  
When taken up in the natural resource literature, change in social-ecological systems have 
only used ARCs to describe wide sweeping change over time (Seixas and Berkes 2003; Gonzalez 
et al. 2008), and sometimes to recast interpretations of historical events (e.g., Nelson et al. 2007).  
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Figure 5.1. The adaptive renewal cycle or “infinity loop” developed by Gunderson and Holling (2001) 
and representing cycles of organization and reorganization of energy and capital in a system. The system 
is most brittle and least resilient in the K phase as privileging economic stability grows sectors for a time, 
but leads to inevitable inflexibility in both ecosystems and human response. The system is most open to 
various development trajectories from the “backloop” of release to reorganization. From Holling 200130. 
 
In the Galápagos as well, resilience analyses with unsubstantiated assumptions of social 
dynamics have tended toward privileging a top-down institutional perspective while leaving out 
other community perspectives. Gonzalez et al. (2008) most explicitly used the concepts of 
resilience, feedbacks and cyclic change to outline multiple possible development trajectories into 
the future. They concluded that shifts to new, less extractive isleno lifestyles over current, 
insular lifestyles attached to goods and services on mainland Ecuador were the key social change 
needed, as articulated by key stakeholders: 
“It is, however, not inconceivable that such a shift [to a less extractive lifestyle] could 
occur, relying largely on a new generation of galapagueños (Galápagos people) who have 
a different attitude toward the environment. These individuals must be willing to adopt a 
new lifestyle that is adjusted to the carrying capacity of the islands, only slightly 
dependent on continental resources, and highly conscious of the fragility and limits 
imposed by living in an oceanic archipelago. Unfortunately, the curriculum of the 
Galápagos educational system lacks the necessary elements to instill an understanding of 
the unique and fragile nature of the islands and create a sense of living in a special place.” 
(np, underline added) 
 
I argue these outlined feedbacks are only partial truths of how exactly Galápagos society 
and ecosystems interact – they provide no mechanistic clarity on state transitions and therefore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  This figure is reproduced with permission from Springer New York LLC.	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link societies and ecologies weakly. Must we wait for a new generation of galapagueños to 
willingly consume less, “highly conscious of the fragility and limits imposed” by the unique 
environment? Why does this generation not “change” fast enough?  
 
B. Study Contributions: Strengthening Social Application of Resilience and Complex 
Systems in the GMR through Livelihoods Perspectives on Adaptive Change  
Scholars within and outside of resilience and complexity work have called for deeper 
thinking around resilience and its social implications (Leach et al. 2008; Bassett and Fogelman 
2013). This analysis heeds such a call by seeking to engage with rather than reject these 
frameworks. Resilience and complex systems frameworks are not the only ones to have 
emphasized the need to attend to dynamism in social-ecological conditions, processes, and 
outcomes over time. Coming from an entirely different intellectual heritage, livelihoods 
frameworks have also dovetailed in critiques of conventional fisheries management and their 
inattention to the dynamism of natural processes and clearly influential cross-sector linkages 
(e.g., Allison and Ellis 2001).   
My analytic intervention is to trace the changing regulations of PV and use regulatory 
debates as a highly visible and socially (as opposed to biophysically) centered feedback loop 
where constant negotiations between different stakeholders with varying interests, needs, and 
levels of authority serve as the drivers of change. I draw from broad scholarship across marine 
policy, political ecology, and natural resource management that more rigorously asks how 
stakeholders co-create alternate livelihood policies via regulations to help inform the broad, 
sweeping, but unarticulated social dynamics of the reorganization phase posed in resilience 
feedbacks.  
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Following the broader themes of this dissertation project, I analyze how cross-sector 
interactions relate to (i) the use and transformation of household assets over time and (ii) the 
nature of participatory management, which strongly affects differential social outcomes at the 
sector level.  
 
B1. Dynamism in Asset Bases & Scale  
Bebbington (1999) proposes two manners in which livelihoods frameworks should 
ideally cross scales of analysis: addressing relationships between economies at the intra-
household, household, regional, and macro levels, and specifically addressing how households 
interact with institutions and organizations that shape how development interventions occur. This 
chapter, by virtue of its close attention to one particular development intervention, allows for 
closer analysis of the latter. As was discussed in Chapter 4, the ways that fishers interact with 
other actors in the state, market and civil society are key to understanding the changing, dynamic 
nature of access to resources and subsequently how livelihood options change over time 
(Bebbington 1999).  
Over time, the ability to obtain and renegotiate favorable terms of transaction in 
substituting or obtaining new capital has been found to be important for household abilities to 
maintain and develop “viable” new livelihood opportunities in other regions like the Andes 
(Bebbington 1999). Institutional spaces are important arenas for such negotiations, particularly 
participatory management schemes that engage community groups to help empower their control 
over resource management decisions. When participatory management schemes are unable to 
provide such terms for local partners, in contrast, efforts have been stymied. For instance 
Robards and Lovecraft (2010) noted that despite walrus comanagement in Alaska, “Alaska 
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natives do not hold collective choice rights to reinterpret the rules that govern them to reflect 
current social and ecological realities” such as the changing nature of “authentic” uses for 
hunting (269). Such factors show the importance of close examination of how participatory 
management works in terms of rights around asset transformation, elaborated upon below.  
 
 
B2. The Politics & Structure of Participation  
As an idea that originated within the community of resource users, one thing Pesca 
Vivencial represents is a community-driven preference for evolving resource use practices. 
Locally rooted ideas are now accepted as strengthening development and NGO interventions via 
participatory management arrangements such as co-management and community-based 
management, thought to impart more legitimacy and stakeholder buy-in and reflect local needs 
more than top-down governance that lacks community consultation (e.g., Christie et al. 1994; 
Pollnac et al. 2001; Day 2002; IUCN 2007; St. Martin et al. 2007; Charles and Wilson 2009). 
Scholarship on the legally mandated participatory comanagement system of the GMR confirms 
its credibility as a legitimately viewed arena in which stakeholders interact meaningfully, if not 
completely satisfactorily. Ospina (2006) argues that despite ongoing tensions, the participatory 
system has created spaces for dispute resolution and negotiation, and a slow improvement over 
the 1990s when local protests and tensions were even higher. Heylings and Bravo (2007) give an 
optimistic conclusion to their early evaluation of participatory governance conducted four years 
after it’s 1999 implementation, noting a steady expanse in “the capacity of the co-management 
process to effect real change in the dominant governance paradigm” and “novel solutions” to old 
issues, which they called the first 5-year fishing calendar and provisional zoning scheme (205-
206). 
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However experience over the past few decades has shown that the simple existence of 
participatory management rules and structures does not guarantee effective or socially accepted 
interventions. Work has focused on the need to account for not only who can participate but 
differential rights around the areas of rule setting, monitoring, and enforcement, and nonlocal 
forces that shape power dynamics and stakes among people (Brechin et al. 2002; Acheson 2006). 
First, even when participatory management enables community perspectives to be heard, 
without shared rights to create rules, often imparted to state partners, participation is not 100% 
co-management. Participatory structures can be pre-set as uneven because “when institutional 
preconditions or rules frame comanagement, they alter collaborative possibilities by providing 
the structural basis upon which comanagement efforts are built” (Robards and Lovecraft 2010: 
259). Secondly, with differing emphases than the above the broad scholarship on resource 
management in the political ecology literature has noted that beyond and perhaps contributing to 
any structural unevenness, struggles over different modes of resource use often represent broader 
stakes in terms of control and authority of economic wealth and development options in society 
(e.g., Peet and Watts 1996; Robbins 2004, Forsyth and Walker 2008). Fisheries management is 
an inherently political exercise as well, in the sense that decisions often allocate limited 
resources among users so that “deliberately or not, management systems express a political 
position on relations of power, conflict, and social justice” (Jentoft 2007: 428). It is thus 
important to pay attention not only to rule structures but to power imbalances and what is at 
stake in negotiations for different stakeholder groups, and various individuals within those 
groups.  
Past work on Galápagos management helps inform this analysis’s understanding of some 
constraints to the actions of different human agents. In terms of the structure within which fishers 
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and others interact in regulatory negotiations, the system is not technically 100% co-managed 
since the higher level AIM retains rights to rule-making authority over the lower-level 
Participatory Management Board (PMB) of local stakeholders (Fig 3, Chapter 2; Baine et al. 
2007; Engie and Quiroga 2014). Heylings and Bravo 2007 also concluded that the system 
suffered from a clear frame of reference for handling property rights and resource use, 
particularly relating to “maximum limits on fishing and tourism effort…and conditions for future 
access” (205), thus opening more ambiguity in how stakeholders might handle these points.  In 
historical and layered power dynamics, Ospina calls the final value of the PMB “worse for the 
fishermen, better for the environmentalists” (137). They do not have international constituencies 
like tourism and conservation interests, nor is their promotion an aim of society since Galápagos 
stakeholders have chosen tourism over fishing as the pathway to more sustainable, non-
extractive long-term development (Gonzalez et al. 2008). 
Historical context also helps inform understanding of how actors react to and perceive 
each other in participatory management, which (broadly sketched) may have affected how they 
reacted to PV’s introduction and negotiations. As a World Heritage Site, the Galápagos Marine 
Reserve (GMR) has become enrolled into the goals of interest groups in conservation, tourist 
business and academic research with not only local but also global constituencies (Nash 2009; 
Quiroga 2009). For instance it is economically and politically important to Ecuador, representing 
over 10% of all tourist business at the national level (Ospina 2006, Epler 2007). With such value 
it has been coined a “golden egg” (Stacey and Fuks 2007).  
The long-standing dissatisfaction of the fishing community with the application of 
conservation regulations described in Chapter 4, despite the fact that many were formed through 
a consensual and participatory process as part of the GMR management plan shows that fishers 
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perceive themselves on the downslope of power dynamics with other stakeholders. While 
Heylings and Bravo (2007) cite past fisher propensities to take to street protests as undermining 
the legitimacy of the officially legislated comanagement channels, Ospina (2006) implicates all 
sectors and argues that these reflect uneven power dynamics. Each sector appeals to governance 
channels they perceive as most friendly to them: other sectors might appeal directly to ministries 
or institutional connections and circumvent the need for agreement with the fishing sector, but 
fishers have the weakest direct institutional access and so take to the streets. This work also 
shows that regulatory debates are used by stakeholders as strategic means to promote particular 
agendas and challenge others in deciding what should be done in response to environmental 
changes (e.g., Lu et al. 2013). 
 
B3. Significance 
It is important to engage with resilience and complexity frameworks for several reasons. 
First, constructive critiques are vital since there is strong interest in a research agenda delineating 
social-ecological feedbacks in the Galápagos (Watkins 2008), and conceptualizing change via 
alternate stable states (Gonzalez et al. 2008).  
Helping to better address how social dynamics are understood in complex feedbacks with 
livelihoods insights, given the growing influence on natural resource management and many 
other arenas of global governance  (e.g., Walker and Cooper 2013), parallels a movement in 
“strategic positivism” (Wyly 2009), which has shifted from deconstruction toward “…more 
judicious strategies to (1) distinguish constructions that are useful from those that are irrelevant 
or dangerous, and (2) imagine and create more emancipatory constructions of economy, society, 
or space” (317). Therefore while others have noted that issues of power, poverty, or social 
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injustice have been treated lightly in complex systems work (e.g., Leach et al. 2008, Walker and 
Cooper 2011), we must also ask if they can be better addressed. In examining the history of 
Pesca Vivencial’s rise, one can note who benefits from ecological, political, legal or economic 
modifications (here emphasizing fisher perspectives on outcomes), and which modifications 
have persisted in the outcomes of regulatory debates and negotiations. Such an interpretation 
treats power as the ability of individuals and groups to constrain each other’s actions and 
opportunities (Dahl 1957), bringing political dimensions of resource use decisions into 
discussion with policy makers in their own language in a limited but strategic essentialization. 
In addition while thin on social theory, the bridging potential of resilience and complexity 
to link social dynamics to ecosystem change in traceable ways and via specific mechanisms 
should not be dismissed. This linking is perhaps what most strongly marks the appeal of a 
resilience and complex adaptive systems framework. While Galápagos environments have been 
intensely studied for instance, it was once common to note that social science scholarship was 
rare. Such claims no longer hold (e.g., Ospina 2006, Constantino 2007, Grenier 2007, Lu et al. 
2013), but there is still a need to engage this social science with ecological research at the fine 
scale of specific species and populations of concern (e.g., striped marlin), and to trace specific 
mechanisms of connection to ecosystem impacts.   
 
III.  Methods 
I draw heavily from interviews with 18 fishers in San Cristobal and two in Santa Cruz 
involved in Pesca Vivencial via license ownership, vessel ownership, or partnership in business 
operations. As with this entire dissertation project, focus is on the evolution of PV on the island 
of San Cristobal, here of historical prominence because a local island fisherman is often credited 
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with first creating the idea. I ascertained information on occupational dynamics via questions 
from the larger 2012 livelihoods survey and accompanying interviews described in Chapter 1. 
Due to the open-ended nature of research, not all fishers were asked all of the same questions. 
However the data gathered gives various understandings of PV as individually practiced. I 
ascertained attitudes and motives from open-ended interviews and participant observation around 
town, focusing on local fishers and business partners.  Because interviews were anonymous 
unless given express permission to identify people, few interviewed sources are directly named. I 
draw more broadly from interviews with 184 people in total, including 18 on Santa Cruz, and 
also from continuous conversations with fishing and cooperative leadership from 2009 – 2012. I 
trace regulatory changes through document analysis of meeting summaries, reports, and 
published rule sets and statements around them.  
 
IV.  Pesca Vivencial: A Very Brief Social History 
A. Setting the Stage 
Two major dynamics in the 1990s and early 2000s strongly shaped the emergence of PV. 
First, PV was proposed in the midst of a belief in continuing overcapacity31 in the sector, despite 
the departure of many fishers and “opportunists” since the collapse of high sea cucumber 
harvests. A second major ongoing issue has been continuing attempts by fishers to break into 
tourism, the most obvious contender to replace or supplant local fisher livelihoods that have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Overcapacity is defined by the FAO as the existence of “more than the minimum fleet and effort required to 
produce a given output (harvested catch) level.” It is regarded as the primary reason for crises in fisheries because 
“in output terms, overcapacity means that the maximum harvest level that a fisher could produce with given levels 
of inputs, such as fuel, amount of fishing gear, ice, bait, engine horsepower and vessel size would exceed the desired 
level of harvesting” (FAO 2015). As noted in Chapter 2, people previously unassociated with fishing had swelled 
the first official roster of registered fishers, lured to the job by high sea cucumber profits or to simply lay claim on 
future options and potential industry buy-outs (Castrejon and Charles 2012, Bucaram and Hearn 2013, Engie 
unpublished data).	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declined in profitability over the past decade (e.g., Stacey and Fuks 2007). While increasing 
numbers of fishers are indeed leaving the sector for wage labor on tourism vessels, interviews 
noted that this option has been viewed as suboptimal and not providing a living wage equal to a 
fishing livelihood until recently. Even though land-based tourism has been growing at the 
expense of cruise-based tourism (Quiroga 2013) and has wider local participation, fisher 
perception of inaccessibility of the lion’s share of the tourism market is unmistakable32. In part 
due to their failures, Pesca Vivencial’s originators utilized their fishing skill sets, knowledge of 
the ocean and ready possession of boats and aquatic permits (for fishing) to try and break into the 
tourism market in a novel way when they perceived other avenues closed. 	  
 
B. The Stakeholders and Visions of Pesca Vivencial  
An important point to remember in the GMR is that fishers are not the only stakeholders 
affecting fishing. As soon as Pesca Vivencial was proposed, its systematically hybrid character 
across fishing and tourism triggered the involvement of stakeholders in tourism, marine safety 
and others, forcefully illustrating how each marine activity in the GMR must go through various 
jurisdictional layers. Those sharing the overlapping space of the GMR include the Galápagos 
National Park (GNP), the Ecuadorian Navy via the Directorate General of the Merchant Marines 
(DIGMER), the National Association of Tourist Businesses in Galápagos (ASOGAL in 
Spanish), smaller tourism vessels and operators, seafood merchants, scientists and students. The 
first two have direct oversight in fisheries rule making with jurisdiction over managing fisheries 
resources and maritime security and traffic, respectively. The others influence local fisher 
options by indirectly affecting markets or from lobbying influence over zoning or other resource 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Carlos Ricaurte, largely credited as one of pesca vivencial’s creators, viewed breaking into tourism as an 
inherently political process and one in which established routes such as converting his vessel to a tourism operation 
were closed to him, as proven by his unsuccessful application for a bay tour permit in 1997. 
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use rules. In addition as detailed in Chapter 2, Galápagos fishers themselves are not 
homogeneous but have varying political interests and coalitions, sub-fishery participation and 
techniques, and vessel ownership status (e.g., Wilen et al. 2000; Zapata 2006; Murillo et al. 
2007). All of these groups are not always considered when discussing fisheries change. 
Stakeholders held multiple visions of what the activity should and could be from the 
beginning, although commonalities included providing alternate income sources for Galápagos 
fishers, engaging in some kind of cultural exchange, and achieving a more sustainable fishery 
(Table 5.1).  
As originally conceived fishers would not alter their typical fishing practices or 
equipment but simply demonstrate them to interested tourists; the proposed name Pesca 
Artesanal Vivencial (PAV) stressed the continuity with typical artisanal practices. PV was to be 
cultural tourism, a demonstrational and commercial fishing activity that did not focus on giving 
tourists their own recreational fishing experience but offered a glimpse in the world of a fisher, 
although tourists might participate in fishing at times (Reck, interview, 2012). Molina (2005: 2) 
called it “demonstrational artisanal fishing”. In addition, the activity was not necessarily thought 
of as a replacement to commercial fishing but could be a supplement that freed the fisher to catch 
less (Reck, interview, 2012). This idea was discussed during the creation of the GMR’s first set 
of Fisheries Regulations written at the establishment of the GMR in 2000, although PV was not 
ultimately incorporated. It thus predates 2005, when UCOOPEPGAL, the provincial-level 
cooperative of Galápagos fishers, first presented PV largely unchanged to the JMP and AIM 
(Table 5.1). They noted that a vacationing tourist would accompany a fishing vessel for a day 
while “conversing about the life of the fisherman, one’s happiness and difficulties in a true spirit 
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of intercultural exchange” (Table 5.1; UCOOPEPGAL, 2005).33  
Sport fishing on the other hand, long conducted in sporadic and unregulated fashion in 
the Galápagos since the 1950s (Molina 2005; Epler 2007), was immediately suggested instead of 
PAV inside and outside of the fishing community. However supporters of PAV were wary of any 
market labeled and practiced as sport fishing eventually being captured by outside and inside 
elites, as has happened in tourism to some extent (e.g., Epler 2007).  Fishers were far from 
united; some may have been opposed to a recreational fishery outright from the beginning while 
others championed either sport fishing or PV (Reck, pers. comm). Still others have consistently 
advocated sport fishing instead of PV because of its established global market appeal. Finally, 
some opportunity is simply the goal for many fishers who support any development of Pesca 
Vivencial, sport fishing, or some combination.  
 At present, visions of PV continue to evolve in step with the fishing practices that were 
ultimately allowed (details in Section E below), so that many local license holders now associate 
PV with sport fishing, if we define that as being oriented toward giving a tourist their own 
recreational fishing experience. However in 2012 fisher interviewees still differentiated PV from 
sport fishing elsewhere, strongly at times, by the following characteristics: being in the hands of 
local ownership, having a broad base of target species that is always catch and release (after a 50 
lb trip limit) and ability to be conducted on a wide variety of vessels beyond luxury sport fishing 
yachts. In mainland Ecuador in contrast, sport fishing has historically been an elite activity in 
which comfort and luxury vessels were essential (Molina 2005). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  This idea also draws continuity from the 1970s and earlier, before the rise of large cruise ships, when tourists 
commonly paid fishermen to take them around the islands and to participate in fishing activities (Stacey and Fuks 
2007, interviews). 
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C. Regulatory Evolution 
Arguably, legal recognition is a significant marker of the establishment of an activity in 
the GMR, where:  
“there is a long history of officials turning a blind eye toward certain unofficial or non 
sanctioned forms of tourism. If a major controversy does not arise, regulations are often 
then formulated and the activity permitted. Cases in point include the status of land-based 
diving operations, sport fishing that exists but is not legally sanctioned, and large cruise 
ships based elsewhere that sporadically run cruises through the islands.” (Epler 2007: 52) 
 
Historical contingency likely aided PV's uptake in 2005. The speed with which the idea was 
quickly taken up was clearly at least partially due to its potential as a viable economic alternative 
for commercial fishing that could reduce harvests, although stakeholders harbored varied 
reservations (see below).  The fishing sector was placing mounting pressure on governance 
institutions to help find viable economic alternatives after the sea cucumber collapse. In 
December 2004 Pesca Vivencial was included within an official baseline list of acceptable 
alternatives for the fishing sector, of which local cooperatives subsequently decided PV was the 
highest priority (Zapata 2006). Approving Pesca Vivencial may also have been partially a 
political trade-off by decision makers, as our interviews with AIM members reveal. Managers 
saw PV as something that could be a concession to local fishers for accepting the elimination of 
longlining, which many fishers advocate and had been legal prior to the GMR (interviews 2012).  
Despite its extractive impact on fish populations, Pesca Vivencial was seen as an activity with a 
comparatively lower ecological impact than longlining. A subset of international NGOs, 
government, and those in fishing communities thus became united in pushing forward PV as a 
legally sanctioned activity once the idea reached the JMP in 2005 (Table 5.1).   
“Consensus was achieved thanks to the existence of a common objective, where different 
stakeholders reached a win-win solution. The conservation sector (GNP and CDF) win as 
fishing effort is reduced, decreasing pressure on the marine ecosystem, the fishing sector 
(Fishing Cooperatives) win as they have found an alternative economic activity that will 
allow them to gradually abandon extractive activities, the tourism sector (CAPTURGAL 
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and the naturalists guides) win as this mechanism has reduced the level of conflict and 
allows the members to obtain higher incomes.” (Zapata 2006, 47; translated from 
Spanish)   	  
In retrospect it is fair to say that collective efforts to approve Pesca Vivencial were 
achieved not through actors sharing a common vision, but through sets of actors that happened to 
see different needs met through a common action. These diverse reasons may also help to 
explain the protracted negotiations that began as soon as PV was given a legal nod of approval in 
2005, which eroded consensus (see below)34.  
 
D. Governing Boundaries: Tourism & Fisheries  
A dilemma of whether to categorize PV as a fisheries or tourist activity surfaced amidst 
provisional approval, and has been by far the most significant regulatory debate35. To help 
resolve concerns over tourist passenger safety, environmental NGOs helped mediate a trial PV 
trip in Puerto Ayora in 2006 (Zapata 2006).  While considered a success in demonstrating 
feasibility, it also marked a seminal moment - official agreement that Pesca Vivencial vessels 
had to be converted away from basic fishing boats to accommodate tourists safely.  Molina 
(2005) noted the following governance issues: 
• According to Section 40, article 2 of the GMR management plan, fishing vessels cannot 
be used for tourism activities, and tourism vessels are prohibited from fishing.  
• Fisheries monitoring, specifically regulating catch sizes is the responsibility of the GNP, 
and "this should not be done by the Fishermen’s Ecological Organization (EFO) from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  These disputes extended even into the fishing community, where debates over initial exclusion of two of the three 
types of fishing boats as potential PV vessels delayed approval of provisional rules by several months. Beyond this 
many fishers took a “wait and see” approach because of a lack of clarity on PV’s market potential (Zapata 2006). 35	  Objections were raised by ASOGAL and DIGMER during the AIM meeting where PV was introduced in 2005 
(Zapata 2006). ASOGAL’s approval is needed on all marine activities in the GMR, giving added weight to its 
objection.  
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Isabela." (15) 
Regulations and Park-fisher partnerships in 2005 were not well set up to accommodate an 
activity hybridized across fishing and tourism, and trust too thin to allow the fishing sector to 
self-monitor. Molina (2005: 15) also noted "tourists should not be required to sign a document 
freeing a boat owner from liability in the case of accidents (common in fishing)."  
As one AIM participant decidedly put it, the dual concerns raised over safety and 
jurisdiction were “the knife in the back” of PV as it was originally conceived.36 This is because 
(i) as outlined above from a governance standpoint demonstrational fishing was difficult, and (ii) 
economically, these debates fundamentally changed how local fishermen could participate in PV. 
First, the decision triggers regulations under RETANP (Special Regulation for Tourism in 
National Protected Areas, or Reglamento Especial de Turismo en Areas Naturales Protegidas in 
Spanish), the national law that regulates tourism. It states that vessels must have certain 
characteristics of other tourism boats and therefore narrows the accessibility of PV to most 
Galápagos fishers, most of whom do not have the capital to set up their vessels to cater to tourists 
like established Galápagos tour agencies. Traditional boats used for daylong artisanal fishing 
trips are fiberglass or wood-hulled, often uncovered, and contain no restrooms, cabins, or many 
other features comfortable for tourists. While not technically necessary, some license holders 
have bought more luxurious sport fishing boats which comply with safety measures while 
catering to customer comfort at levels competitive with sport fishing ventures elsewhere. 
 In sum, PV gradually became less associated with commercial fishing and is now largely 
perceived as a touristic activity that some fishers engage in (Table 5.1). As a result however, the 
pool of people potentially most likely to succeed in PV, and possibly to apply for licenses in the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  The total lack of knowledge about the economic viability and market potential of PV was also an issue (Zapata 
2006), although the debate over whether to categorize PV as a tourist activity was immediate and overshadowing.	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Table 5.1. Regulatory evolution of Pesca Vivencial, from the proposal as first presented by fishing sector 
representatives (top row), followed by major changes in subsequent legislation.  
Event Goals and 
objectives 
Legal 
Classification 
& Zoning 
Vessel 
requirements 
Manner of 
cultural 
transmission 
Activities Monitoring and 
Implementation 
Presentation by 
UCOOPEPGAL 
to JMP, July 21-
22, 2005 
1. Establish 
income for 
Galápagos 
fishers 
2. Improve 
knowledge of 
the reality of 
Galápagos 
fishing 
3. Foster 
intercultural 
exchange 
A fishing 
activity, called 
Pesca Artesanal 
Vivencial 
(PAV) 
 
No further 
framework yet 
proposed 
1. Fibra with 
fishing license, 
6.5 – 9.5 m 
length 
 
2. Security 
equipment 
required by 
DIGMER 
The fisher: presents 
attractions and 
dangers of the sea, 
demonstrates fishing 
techniques, reminds 
all of targeted 
species, fishing 
spots, security 
norms. Lunch 
onboard as a time 
for sharing histories, 
dinner in the house 
of the fisher with 
their family. 
1. Line 
techniques 
(capture of 
bait fish, 
shore fish 
and tunas 
with hand 
lines and 
lures) 
 
2. Submarine 
fishing 
(diving) 
 
 
↓          MAJOR CHANGES          ↓ 
Provisional 
Regulations,  
July 28, 2005 
The Galápagos 
fisher… uses 
their own work 
infrastructure 
and vessels … to 
sell their fishing 
culture (emphasis 
added) 
Relevant laws:  
 
LOREG1, 
Constitution, 
Special Fishing 
Regulations in 
the GMR  
 
Exclusively in 
fishing zones 
(2.3) 
Additions: 
Emergency 
oxygen 
equipment for 
diving 
 
1. Vessel owners 
present 
cooperative 
membership 
Art. 21: Fishers will 
participate in 
training courses to 
offer good service, 
to be offered by 
various 
organizations. 
Additions:  
Resting site 
for 
snorkeling or 
swimming 
 
While diving, 
tourists can 
only observe, 
not fish. 
Implementation: 
Shared among the 
GNP and fisher 
groups.  
 
Monitoring: Fisher 
groups, with 
support of GNP.  
 
Fisher groups also 
define regulations 
for species not 
currently in the 
Fishing Calendar. 
Feb 23, 2011 
Same as 
Provisional 
Regulations, but 
language omitted 
about fishers’ use 
of their own 
vessels  
 
Additions/changes: 
1. All boats 
allowed except 
wooden, 
between 7.5 - 
12.5 m length 
 
2. Vessel cannot 
have a permit for 
other tourist 
activities 
 
Additions: 
1. Trolling 
(dragging a 
baited lure 
behind the 
boat) 
2. Fishing 
rod, with 
reel or 
without. 
3. Nets 
GNP controls 
monitoring, control 
and registration of 
vessels and fishers. 
 
GNP defines 
regulations for 
species not 
currently in the 
Fishing Calendar 
based on technical 
studies. 
JMP meeting, 
Oct 4, 2012  
A touristic 
activity, called 
PAV 
    
Nov 9, 2012 Reform of Fishing Regulations that eliminates any mention of PAV 
Res. 7, GNP,  
Jan. 18, 2013  
A touristic 
activity, called 
Pesca Vivencial 
(PV) 
 
Inclusion of 
RETANP with 
above statutes. 
Resting sites in 
zones 2.3 and 
2.42  
Additions/changes: 
1. Vessels can be 
used for either 
artisanal fishing 
or PV, but not for 
both. 
  
2. Cabin now 
mandatory.  
Fisher and Naturalist 
Guide. 
 
Guide will relate 
safety at sea, 
development, 
techniques and 
regulations of 
fishing, and conduct 
in the GMR.   
 
Additions: 
PV vessels 
will be able 
to travel 
among ports. 
Monitoring: GNP 
will establish 
participatory 
monitoring. 
       
1: the Special Law for Galápagos, or Ley de Régimen Especial para la Conservación y Desarollo Sustentable de la Provincia de 
Galápagos (LOREG in Spanish) 
2: In the Provisional zonation rules of the GMR, zone 2.3 are the areas where artisanal fishing is allowed, and zone 2.4 is designated for 
special, temporal management.   
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first place, may not be the same pool of commercial fishers who now seek to leave the fishery. 
The implications of these developments remain to be decided - some may worry that PV will not 
help reduce commercial fishing harvests or provide alternate livelihoods to fishers. On the other 
hand, participation in local tourism may increase for Galápagos residents in general, touching 
upon an equally important concern for social equity. In accord with the worries (or hopes) of 
both sides, both things seem to be happening (Table 5.2). 	  
E. Fishing Practices and Participants 
 Because PV has never actually been practiced as a demonstrational, commercial fishing 
activity, some believe “there is no PV in Galápagos” (interviews 2012), meaning that all license 
holders are involved in various types of sport fishing. Putting aside debates over the definition of 
PV for the moment fishing practices under its name have bifurcated into two main styles, the 
nearshore fishery or “pesca chica” and the high seas fishery or “pesca grande” or “pesca de 
altura”. Importantly, on San Cristóbal most operators offer and engage in both styles to 
maximize opportunities in a market many perceive as sluggish, and to expand activity beyond 
the few months of the year when migratory billfish can be found in greatest numbers. The pesca 
chica is closest in vision to the original proposal for tourists to participate in traditional 
Galápagos fisheries.  Multiple species are targeted, with bottom fish such as groupers caught 
around coastal areas using fishing rods as well as traditional empates, consisting of a fishing line 
held in one’s hand with a baited hook at the end37. However, no one makes a living solely based 
on such trips, and observations imply that this trip type is the minority of all PV outings. The 
“pesca de altura” immediately differed from the version first presented by UCOOPEPGAL 
delegates (Table 5.1). More closely resembling sport fishing in other areas, it mainly targets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Empates may also be demonstrated around deeper water seamounts in the high seas fishery.	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larger striped marlin and tunas that swim midwater using the method of trolling fishing poles 
from the boat through deeper waters. Commonly targeted environments are underwater 
seamounts or “bajos” that are scattered around the Galápagos platform where marlins can be 
most reliably found (see Schuhbauer and Koch 2013).  Beyond a profit motive, the high seas 
trips seem to be promoted also because they are popular and familiar to tourists38. Even when 
clients are interested in learning about the empate they want to use familiar rods and reels during 
a costly day trip.   	  
Table 5.2. Summary of select involvement among surveyed fishers involved in Pesca Vivencial in San 
Cristobal. Numbers in each column indicate the frequency of responses. In 2012, these questions were 
posed about pesca artesanal vivencial, in accordance with the name at the time.    
Personal role in PAV* # people  Years since was fishing full-
time~ 
# people 
owner 1  0 3 
owner, operator 1  1-2 1 
owner, fisher (as mate or 
captain) 
3  3-5 1 
all 11  6-10 2 
   > 10 5 
   N/A 2 
     
Days at sea in the PV in 2011 # people  Occupational Diversity # people 
1 1  PAV, commercial fishing 4 
4^ 2  PAV, other jobs 3 
5 2 
 PAV, commercial fishing, 
other jobs 7 
6-7^ 1  PAV, other business owned 4 
8 1    
 >=20 7    
*including 2 not currently operating 
~unclear for 4 respondents 
^trips, instead of days at sea 
 
Inter-actor relations have also been influenced by categorizing PV as a tourist activity. 
Because boats must be outfitted with expensive insurance, safety, and navigation equipment, 
significant start-up capital is needed. This need might contribute incentives to makes certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  The high seas trips being offered in 2011 were around $1200/day, and nearshore trips were only slightly less. 
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types of engagement in the PV industry more likely, such as the “testaferro” phenomenon, where 
some license holders have partnered with outside investors or family members who finance and 
own the vessels in all but name and run PV operations in a variety of partnership arrangements. 
Testaferrismo is made fertile with a constant pressure from non-residents seeking entry into a 
market seen as potentially extremely lucrative. People who are not licensed fishermen have 
entered the activity by partnering with amenable local fishers. This dynamic combines with a 
risk aversion of many local fishers to borrowing money, given negative experiences with falling 
behind on bank loans and losing or nearly losing homes or land in the past (interviews 2012).  
The local fisher is usually a minority partner in the business and profit sharing, which has 
given the “testaferro” term a negative implication, although partnerships vary. One fisher 
described his business arrangements of owning the boat with a partner running an agency. For 
every day the boat was used, he collected around $2000USD and his partner the rest. While other 
details were not disclosed, implied is that his partner also handled and profited from any extras 
such as package deals with hotels and day tours around the archipelago. Other fishers may not 
own the PV boat completely, but may have attained the license. Still others own a boat and have 
partnered with family members who own agencies, getting various cuts or trip-based crew 
payments.  
While unequal, these arrangements are ambiguously negative but also ambiguously 
beneficial for local fishers, some of whom work on the vessels regularly or have aligned with 
several PV license holders in larger tour agencies. Arguably in all cases, fishers have increased 
their income and economic security for the present, while remaining connected to the sea. 
Interviews imply that a significant proportion of all PV license holders in San Cristobal are in 
such arrangements. 
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 The demographics of license holders are highly diverse and reflect how PV is being taken 
up by people who see various opportunities to better their lives. Three out of 18 interviewed 
fishers in San Cristobal were full-time commercial fishers when they began PV activities. Two 
fishers have become passive recently in the past five years, one by choice and one reluctantly for 
family needs. An additional two have transitioned during the last five to ten years to fishing only 
occasionally or on weekends.  When the opportunity arose, both wanted to enter PV and retain 
fishing ties. Some license holders have roots in fishing families but have had full-time careers 
elsewhere, still fishing on weekends and participating in long trips when possible over the years 
(Table 5.2). Pesca Vivencial represents the possibility to stay connected to their fishing culture. 
For all, in an economy where job security is never assured, PV has provided an additional 
activity where they may leverage their property (in vessels and commercial licenses) and fishing 
skills for a safer and more diversified livelihood.  
Within the industry, it is clear that differences in individual capital, skill sets and motives 
all affect how PV has grown and for whom. The number of trips our interviewed operators and 
license holders were involved in ranged widely, between being at sea just 1 day to more than 60 
days in 2011(Table 5.2).39 The subsequent divergence of business growth trajectories may imply 
that after obtaining licenses and eventually outfitting boats, some fishers lack capacity in 
strategic business and social networks, which are vital to staying competitive in the tight 
Galápagos tourism market and which distinguish those with the most PV business from the rest.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Since data is self-reported the accuracy is not guaranteed, but regardless of exact numbers unevenness in the days 
worked in the pesca vivencial is undoubtedly a feature of the social landscape. 
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V. Discussion: Pesca Vivencial’s Complex Feedbacks: Contributions from a Livelihood 
Perspective 
Arguably, the controversies around recreational fishing are part of broad deliberations by 
Galápagos stakeholders over future “alternate stable states” of development. Tourism that relies 
on the draw of big game fishing, if PV continues to develop in this mode, evokes unwanted 
“continentalization” since it markets the appeal of the Galápagos as a generic island destination 
rather than a unique educational destination, the former potentially degrading the high-end, lower 
capacity tourism market that the archipelago has cultivated.  
In the language of resilience, some elements of the transitioning Galápagos fishing 
industry have begun to reorganize into new configurations, laying particular pathways for future 
development. Regulatory debates have markedly changed the nature of Pesca Vivencial since its 
first proposal in 2005. Completing the loop to ecosystem impacts, rule sets now set the stage for 
structuring the nature of participation and target species for the new industry in ways that 
arguably have made PV much more narrowly accessible to the fishing community, benefitted 
non-fishers as much as fishers, and left recreational fishing for coastal species much less targeted 
than for big game billfish.  
What has shaped reorganization to these ends, influencing how and which Galápagos 
fishermen will move out of the industry through PV? A complex systems analytic in some ways 
provides a striking analogy to PV’s history, although offering no evaluation of winners and 
losers. The PV practices taken up arose from actions of non-united, independent individuals on 
their “local” level that, over time, were unpredictable, individualistic, and uncoordinated, just as 
occurs among agents in a complex system (Levin 2005). Historical contingencies (e.g, political 
expediency and declining abundance of commercial fishing stocks) eventually became amplified 
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at local (in terms of individual businesses) and institutional (in terms of regulations) levels in 
different ways. The activity showed no signs of being orchestrated by some “grand plan,” on the 
contrary one could say that as an emergent process, PV continued from the bottom-up despite the 
efforts of government regulators to control and even stop it at various times.  
Livelihoods based, community perspectives on social adaptation contribute to our 
knowledge of these feedbacks and interactions by foregrounding different perceptions of 
“alternate stable states” and their formation, and by giving structure to the resilience 
“reorganization” phase by helping sharpen articulation of what regulatory negotiations are about 
and what influenced their outcomes.  
 
A. Which Roads to Alternate Stable States are Being Paved?  
Resilience scholarship, assuming underlying CAS dynamics at work, often places much 
analytic attention on conditions that might make potential “alternate states” more or less likely, 
(e.g., Cumming et al. 2005; Nelson et al. 2007).  
One of the most pondered alternate states concerning Pesca Vivencial is whether 
commercial fishing effort on coastal fish stocks will decline in part because it is transferred to the 
PV, through either helping commercial fishers diversify incomes or leave commercial fishing 
entirely. This hope has been a prominent reason for institutional support. However while it is 
unknown how commercial harvests have changed because of PV, it appears to have become a 
complementary rather than alternate activity for the three interviewed PV license holders that 
were previously full-time fishers. The other PV license holders interviewed had already 
transitioned away from commercial fishing either partially or completely, so PV represents no 
reduction in effort on their parts. A focus solely on the conditions precipitating alternate states 
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thus might note that present conditions lead to a failure to reduce fishing effort by any significant 
amount.  
Local fishers however have different perspectives on trends, namely a common long-term 
goal to transition from commercial fishing to PV. One interviewee was pursuing strategic 
partnerships with new tour agencies locally and abroad in 2012. Over time this license holder 
aims to quit commercial fishing for the PV full-time as their business expands to support them. 
Other license holders interviewed still hope that PV will one day replace their commercial 
fishing activities, though they did not have active leads on new partners. Out of the seventeen 
asked of their future job preferences in an open-ended question, eight declared a preference to 
work exclusively in the PV if their business supported them. Nine more would prefer to work 
more in PV than they currently do. Therefore fishers view the present pattern of complementarity 
to commercial fishing as a dynamic state that can be either transitory or permanent, depending on 
the business opportunities they find moving forward. 
These perspectives dovetail with the theoretical insistence that not just particular 
properties (i.e., PV as complimentary to commercial fishing) but the trajectories they are on are 
key to determining ecological change moving forward. It must be remembered that in a 
constantly changing system tracing every feedback loop is impossible; however which feedback 
loops to attend to can privilege stressing environmental outcomes but not the market and 
legislative structures that shape individual choices around resource use and environmental 
outcomes. This is certainly the case for PV; much hinges on market possibilities for the pesca 
chica and altura although regulations have focused on the proper conduct of fishermen. 
Ultimately while a useful analytic, conceptualizing alternate states must be conducted 
with an explicit recognition of (a) change over time and (b) historical conditions, or they may 
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arguably reify a focus on trends and away from the diversity of social practices and historical 
legacies that individual actions are situated within. 
 
B. Failures, Opportunities, & Struggles for Social Equity & Access  
Livelihoods attention to access, social difference, and control and authority over resource 
rights helps to note that PV was about much more than letting fishers take tourists out to sea for a 
day. At the heart of regulatory negotiations were struggles over control of private property rights 
to boating on the GMR, and the flexibility these rights imply in economically benefitting, now 
and in the future, from GMR’s rich resources. Pesca Vivencial licenses are highly restricted in 
supply compared to demand akin to licenses to own other tour boat operations, as discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
In the end, regulatory outcomes show that fishers gave ground or were out-negotiated on 
many of their desired points by other sectors. They retained no control over cultural 
transmission, monitoring or enforcement of PV activities as first proposed, and PV boats are 
classified as tourist rather than fishing vessels, triggering much higher start up costs. It could be 
argued that outcomes reflect the minority political positions of fishing representatives in the two 
participatory boards rather than willing concessions, because many PV stakeholders have 
signaled oppositional stances to outcomes (e.g., GALEODAN 2012).  
Whether as concessions or from simply being outvoted against their will however, a 
livelihood interpretation helps make sense of continued fisher support, broadly, for the 
contemporary version of PV that has emerged, far different from the original vision. A key point 
to note about fisher perspectives around Pesca Vivencial is that they represent the desire for 
equity and fairness on top of replacing lost fishing incomes in a 1:1 manner. The ability to 
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improve one’s life and not just maintain it appeals to many local residents and fishermen, 
surrounded by a visibly growing tourism industry that has attracted increasing visitors for several 
decades and bestowed wealth to the tourism business owning class. For these reasons both Pesca 
Vivencial and sport fishing continue to be championed as democratic activities to develop by 
various fishing factions. On the flip side, the desire for equity in sharing tourism benefits found 
among non-fishing residents also may contribute to the difficulty of regulatory negotiations. 
With their accompanying rights to take tourists snorkeling and rest at various beaches, fishers 
argue that some opposition stems from misplaced perceptions of others that fishers will get a 
new, exclusive door to legal rights to many lucrative tour operations. As one license holder 
noted,  
Fisher 71949: The assumption is that we want to create a superpatente40. But if we were 
to have a superpatente then we would be millionaires. Because I’ve already worked 4 
years in this activity, and what we have is, sporadic work. And if we didn’t have the 
freedom to go (commercial) fishing, [which now is] normally what we have – I don’t 
know how I could pay even a minimum debt [on investment].”  
 
The search for equitable opportunities to materially advance from tourism and local 
perceptions of the limited space in charter tourism also play prominently into the sector’s origin 
story of how PV first came to be, since PV’s originator has inferred that charter tourism was his 
original desired route, and only after his applications for two different tourism operator permits 
were denied in the late 1990s that he came up with the PV idea. The social consequence of this 
unavailability was the proposal of a newly repackaged idea of recreational fishing.   
Other non-economic factors also play into Pesca Vivencial’s appeal to the fishing 
community. Pesca Vivencial has been perhaps the only alternate livelihood thus far to offer a 
chance to diversify one’s labor into tourism while simultaneously allowing people to keep links 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  A patente is a local term for a license. The fisher here refers to non-fisher opinions that a PV license would 
represent rights for commercial fishing as well as valuable tourism boat operations. 
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to fishing.  Bebbington (1999) has called this aspect of livelihood value “cultural capital” as it 
helps to maintain important cultural aspects of a livelihood, much like rural residence (more than 
agricultural activities) does in certain Andean communities. 
In other words, PV can be interpreted as one attempt by the Galápagos fishing 
community to not only recover lost fishing income over time, but adapt in new directions 
according to the opportunities they see developing in the archipelago and the multiple ways they 
value fishing.  
Considering social equity also affects the light in which not only PV’s creation but also 
it’s outcomes so far can be seen. Schuhbauer and Kock (2013) conclude that the original pesca 
artesanal vivencial idea of taking tourists to experience an “authentic day at sea” with a fishing 
boat has been a failure (103), one that I concur with here since the original idea was never really 
implemented as proposed. However, pesca vivencial is not entirely void of silver linings in terms 
of broad social benefits. Recognizing fisher perceptions of historical social conditions of 
exclusion (along with other local residents) to the lion’s share of ownership of tour operator 
permits brings to light the social benefit of more fishers (i.e., PV license holders) having gained a 
foothold in the tourism market. Those involved are part of a larger local tourism economic base 
and now well-poised for market growth, and their privileged access over mainlanders for the 
limited number of licenses has given some an edge they may not have been able to begin 
competing without. Such an analysis puts a more tempered spin on the failure of PV to launch as 
originally proposed.  
 
C. Regulatory Feedbacks:  The Negotiation & Creation of Livelihood Alternates  
Related to the above outcomes, while Holling (2001) notes the transitional reorganization 
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phase is theoretically more open to policy experimentation, in the end very little experimentation 
of governance structures in the GMR occurred. By situating the current vision of PV under the 
governance of tourism institutions, many established jurisdictional boundaries remain unchanged 
and in the end no responsibility in these areas was devolved to the fishing community, as they 
first requested. The difficulty of changing established governance boundaries can be understood 
as related to (i) the goals, rights, and structure of participatory management in the GMR and (ii) 
the political heterogeneity of the fishing sector and its (iii) weak organization. 
Firstly, as Brechin et al. (2002) note, “participation is…a necessary but not sufficient 
component of governance” (47). There are different forms and goals of participatory 
conservation governance. The legally mandated participatory management structure of the GMR 
within the 1998 Special Law (see Chapter 2 for greater description) imparted substantial control 
of resource management to local stakeholders, but was also designed to contain contradictory 
goals (e.g., extractive and non-extractive uses) and provide a forum for compromise rather than 
universally help all achieve their desires (Ospina 2006). It arguably falls short of what Robards 
and Lovecraft (2010) suggest as a “deliberative” obligation of co-management, to seek mutually 
beneficial compromise rather than aggregate individual preferences of various stakeholder 
partners, which often imply different outcomes.41   
While aiming for consensus, ultimately the right to craft and approve laws rests only with 
the National Park, making management less than 100% participatory. The social agents in this 
complex system are therefore imbued with different constraints and cannot be assumed to have 
the same abilities and rights in negotiations. These constraints and abilities are brought forth in 
starker contrast when considered in terms of the rights, obligations, and intentions of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  See Ospina 2006 for deeper analysis of the Special Law. He argues that sectors have different projects and 
visions for the GMR that often conflict.	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regulatory system in which policies that shape new livelihood options are debated. As a 
consequence of divergent stakeholder interests, legalization was a negotiated process couched in 
the socio-political and ecological needs of the time and not contingent upon the simple 
innovation of a new idea, as cultural ecologists have long pointed out (Denevan 1983). 
There are numerous examples of policy outcomes reflecting aggregations of stakeholder 
preferences, even during political compromise, among Galápagos stakeholders. The banning of 
industrial fishing involved a “practical alliance between fishers and environmentalists after many 
years of disagreement” (Ospina 2006: 130) that did not however, engender any further closeness 
or trust among the sectors; tensions again returned after the industrial fleet was kicked out. Many 
fishers are disillusioned with the general evolution of GMR regulations that did not go entirely as 
they wanted – for instance to kick out the industrialist fleet in order to be able to fish the waters 
within 40 nm themselves, and to receive help in developing their fishing abilities. Instead, fishers 
have had to negotiate for use, not with industrial vessels but with the tourism and conservation 
users of the GMR. They consider themselves having lost many of battles, over zoning and ability 
to upgrade technology, even while they have been empowered over industrial fishing within the 
GMR for instance (e.g., Ospina 2006, Engie and Quiroga 2014). 
Pesca Vivencial could be seen as the latest temporary compromise among sectors to 
legally approve new regulations, but not alter the manner in which stakeholders view each 
other’s overall actions, motives, and needs – which have suffered from a long-term lack of trust 
and a “volunteerist vision” of disagreements, where if a desired outcome does not occur 
deliberate blockage is assumed and fault is laid on each other’s feet (Ospina 2006).  
Other sectors were not obligated to devolve any authority over their monitoring, 
enforcement, and niche labor rights (in the case of naturalist guides) to the fishing sector, and 
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they did not. While perhaps the most emancipatory proposed livelihood alternate so far, PV also 
asked the most of other sectors, to make space for fishermen in areas that are well established by 
other groups of people with local organizations that also display social cohesion at least as strong 
and often stronger than local fishing cooperatives. 
This short genealogy of regulatory change also opens up further avenues of future 
analysis, including the effect of the political heterogeneity of the fishing sector and its weak 
organization on collective action on San Cristobal, discussed in Chapter 2. Although fishing 
cooperatives were involved in stakeholder meetings, to a large extent individual license holders 
speak for themselves. Cooperation is low, for instance some have formed an association for PV 
license holders and boat owners while others refuse to participate and call it unnecessary 
(interviews 2012). “Grassroots perceptions” of a fear of individual personal and political 
interests trumping the defense of sectoral rights by fishing representatives in negotiations 
(Heylings and Bravo 2007: 188) also exist, part of broader dissatisfaction of local fishers with 
their representatives in cooperative management (Ospina 2006). These concerns for the 
legitimacy of fishing representatives among the fishing community could contribute to fractured 
political interests in the fishing community and lower collective action than among other sectors. 
Whether a lack of social cohesion had any impact on regulatory outcomes is unknown, but it has 
been observed in general that greater community collective action is one of a set of common 
factors often present when social conflicts are minimized in conservation governance, along with 
“…strong governance institutions…stable entitlements, strong self-enforcement mechanisms, 
strong local organizations, and a supportive policy environment” (Brechin et al. 2002: 47). 
Arguably, most of the above are absent in San Cristobal.  
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D. Dynamism in Assets & Policy Implications  
This chapter continues a theme presented in Chapter 4, which argued that opportunities to 
transition from fishing to tourism are narrowing. In the Galápagos as elsewhere, the linkage 
between assets and poverty (Bebbington 1999) is contingent and subject to re-negotiation over 
time. While for a short time a window was open wide to the PV idea, the inability to hand over 
authority in different governing areas greatly narrowed it’s accessibility among the fishing 
community. Pesca Vivencial in many ways illustrates the contrast with the past generations of 
fishers who transitioned to tourism in the 1970s and ‘80s; the regulatory negotiations discussed 
above are part of the greater constraints and opportunities in using their assets (also considering 
access as an asset) to create livelihood strategies away from fishing.  
In addition the PV case study provides a concrete example of several points made in 
previous chapters about the breadth and width of assets that Galápagos “fishermen” draw from, 
with their long history of occupational plurality. Looking to non-fishing components of 
livelihoods such as tourism is essential to understanding the evolution of alternate livelihoods. 
Although PV license holders relied upon certain fishing assets such as licenses and vessels, their 
progression in the PV has hinged upon an overlapping but distinct set of the skills and assets 
compared to commercial fishing. Key to succeeding in the PV are possession of social and 
human capital to access this niche market and institutional knowledge or networks to navigate 
the bureaucracy to get a license. PV has created spaces of opportunity, but only for some. As 
Adger (2006) noted, “adaptive actions often reduce the vulnerability of those best placed to take 
advantage of governance institutions, rather than reduce the vulnerability of the marginalized…” 
(277).  
This analysis can offer further suggestions to the question of possible solutions for 
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helping channel PV to better achieving a reduction in fishing effort and benefit for local fishers. 
Schuhbauer and Koch (2013) suggest a code of conduct for recreational fishing designed and 
implemented specifically for the GMR, more rigorous enforcement of current regulations, and 
aid to local fishers for investing in PV such as micro-financing as an alternative to uneven 
business partnerships. To reforms focusing on the fishing sector should be added consideration 
of how evolving policies may take PV out of the hands of fishers on the low end of the income 
spectrum, such as classification as a tourist activity and the proposed ban on using commercial 
fishing vessels in the PV. Another important influence on PV, although indirect, may be 
consideration of job opportunities elsewhere in tourism for local fishers. A realization that the 
push for PV came partly out of a perceived lack of openings as tour operators begs the logical 
inverse question of whether a greater ease in benefitting from tourism in more “traditional” ways 
from charter tours might alleviate some interest in the PV. Future growth is an issue of concern 
by scientists given the 600 inactive, registered fishers now in the GMR. Therefore continuing to 
attend to the other livelihood alternates that fishers have is critical, along with strengthening 
enforcement and norms. 
Foremost in encouraging transformative change as well as incremental adaptation, by 
fishers as well as more broadly in Galápagos society, is the need to consider how far other 
stakeholders are willing to devolve authority to the fishing sector, a critical element of whether 
hybrid fishing-tourism activities will ever be allowed in the GMR. While certainly complex, in 
order for the most innovative approaches to social-ecological adaptation to take hold there is no 
escaping the role of reconsidering governance structures across not only the fishing sector, but 
tourism and other activities as well. Beyond neat, contained, sector-based reform, for truly 
transformative change and adaptation to occur as Galápagos stakeholders purport is needed and 
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one reason they look to resilience and complex systems frameworks academically, difficult 
issues around control, authority, and trust must be more deeply dealt with.  
Beyond the above, other basic policy implications echo those of past chapters: an 
outward look in terms of focusing on access to various routes out of fishing as well as building 
up capital assets, and the need to look beyond the individual to structural constraints created by 
governing institutions. As noted in Chapter 4, bolstering the weak human capital of the sector 
and assisting fishers in securing financial loans and partnering with local businesses could help 
residents avoid partnerships with outside companies that might have a higher risk of transferring 
privatized rights outside over time. Finally these attempts by fishers to carve new tourism 
livelihoods shows that they see tourism and fisheries reform as joint concerns, necessarily 
considered together. 
 
VI. Conclusions   
By taking seriously community perspectives on social-ecological feedbacks and more 
rigorously analyzing the nature of regulatory negotiations, this analysis draws attention to the 
inevitable relatedness of individual actions, perspectives, livelihood strategies, and 
environmental impacts. Analyses have argued to broaden thinking around (a) the evolution of PV 
and intentions of its practitioners, and (b) the intricacies of social dynamics in Galápagos social-
ecological feedback loops. Scholarship on governance from livelihoods, political ecology, and 
biodiversity literatures informs and takes some mystique out of Holling’s (2001) 
“reorganization” phase, by noting that rights to participation and rule-setting represent 
differential constraints to individual “agents” in complex social-ecologcial systems, as do 
existing power dynamics. In turn, the integrative emphasis of complexity and resilience 
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scholarship helps foreground how not only small, incremental changes to households affect 
livelihood changes over time, but also transformative governance actions must be confronted. 
The evolution of Pesca Vivencial provides a concrete example of the ways that fishers 
intersect with institutions and governing organizations, a major structural constraint shaping 
livelihood adaptation, as mentioned in Chapter 4. The overarching argument made here is that in 
resilience and social-ecological systems terms, the birth of this industry is a “response” and a 
bottom-up adaptation by fishers to changes in not only fishing but also tourism and overall GMR 
management.  From fisher perspectives, while PV and sport fishing both expand the number of 
exploited species in the GMR as currently practiced (notably striped marlin), they are also partial 
reflections of a local desire to participate more substantially in the multimillion-dollar Galápagos 
tourism industry. Because fishers did not view recreational fishing as inevitable, PV and sport 
fishing within it should be understood as byproducts of social struggles as well as of much-
commented environmental declines in commercial fishing. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Concluding Reflections 
I. Introduction  
Reducing the fishing footprint within marine protected areas (PAs) has been a 
longstanding concern of biologists to achieve conservation goals (Carr et al. 2003). Galápagos 
fisheries present a rare case of a fishery with decreasing participation for ten years, largely 
independent of policy directives to do so and in the face of plentiful tuna stocks that would be 
marketable if outside of a marine reserve.  
The Galápagos transition period provides a timely window for studying a broader set of 
issues, including the alignment of human and ecosystem wellbeing within PAs. While one could 
argue that reducing fishing within PAs always benefits humankind broadly and in the long-term, 
it does not necessarily benefit humans on a local and immediate level. If fish stocks become 
depleted from overexploitation and a drop in food and incomes results for local fishers, then 
reducing fishing does become linked to human health and wealth. However, such a causal chain 
is far from inevitable. Fishers have the power to substitute other goods and resources for fish to 
maintain their wellbeing in the face of declining stocks. If they can harness new economic 
opportunities from nature-based tourism, as the Galápagos is famed for, the conservation benefits 
from reducing fishing can build alongside social benefits.  
This project provides an empirical case for evaluating long-term social outcomes of 
protected areas. The fate of former fishers in the Galápagos Marine Reserve effectively reflects 
its long-term social outcomes. Reaching out even more broadly beyond PAs, understanding how 
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to protect ecosystem functions through increasingly stringent regulations while not depressing 
local communities socioeconomically holds a key to relieving many conflicts in the global 
conservation movement related to social justice. 
The social focus of this dissertation does not exclusively serve social goals around equity, 
however. Complex social dynamics could also affect the strength of future environmental 
protection. Underscoring these points is that fact that continuing declines in extraction of marine 
resources is far from inevitable in the Galápagos. Ongoing debates on developing sport fishing, 
more localized forms of tourism, and niche markets for Galápagos seafood all have the potential 
to strain the resource base, but also hold promise in providing biologically sustainable 
livelihoods for local residents. Ensuring human wellbeing within channels that have smaller 
environmental footprints could very well sway their success. In this sense the crossroads of 
Galápagos fishers reflects larger global crossroads in resource use governance. 
This project presents a strongly interdisciplinary approach to understanding social 
outcomes in conservation governance. I have studied job switching and recreational fishing with 
quantification of work decisions, preferences, and outcomes on one hand, and delved into 
historical analyses of the changing ways that fisheries livelihoods have diversified and been 
involved in other areas over time on the other hand, particularly tourism. Qualitative analysis, 
participant observation, and interviews have been linked to quantitative resource use patterns in 
order to effectively analyze how social change in turn affects resource use, and thus 
environmental change. 
This dissertation analyzes the social dimensions of the Galápagos fishing industry 
downturn through a number of different theoretical lenses and methods. In Chapter 3 I ask how 
some individuals are better able than others to leave fishing by analyzing differential household 
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asset bases via a Sustainable Livelihood framework that conceives of various “capitals” as 
capabilities to direct one’s life (e.g., Scoones 1998; Bebbington 1999; Allison and Ellis 2001). I 
surveyed 167 fishers across a spectrum of levels of active and inactive participation. Inactive 
fishers provide an important comparison group with which to analyze the wellbeing of active 
fishers. Since present-day asset bases reflect both the foundation people have to work with as 
they build livelihood strategies and the material outcomes of those strategies, separate but related 
analyses used the survey to partially analyze how people left fishing (Chapter 3), and who was 
better off (Chapter 4). Bivariate statistics and linear discriminant factor analyses parse out the 
differences in the social conditions of active and former fishers. In Chapter 5 I analyze human 
and non-human actions as elements of a complex adaptive system, and conceptualize regulatory 
debates as complex and adaptive feedbacks that worked within and helped produce the multitude 
of styles of recreational fishing that have sprouted in the GMR since 2005. All of these analyses 
have looked outward from fishing activities to the other types of work and family obligations and 
ties that were part of Galápagos fishermen’s lives. 
In the end I have argued that Galápagos fishers’ uneven ability to find alternate work is as 
great an influence on fishing pressure than profit-seeking behavior regarding fish, a more 
conventional focal point. Adaptation to environmental transitions is shaped by diverse issues 
around social mobility and the structures of economic opportunity outside of fishing, as well as 
the economic incentives of fishing itself. In addition I argue that both the social and ecological 
effects of fisheries stagnation are inextricably tied to the structure and management of the 
tourism industry and the jobs it produces, as one of the main economic engines on the islands.  
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II. Summary of Main Findings  
This project was designed, executed, and written with dual theoretical and applied goals, 
to explicitly consider Galápagos policy needs while also speaking to interdisciplinary scholars 
across fisheries social science, an area with a still weak tradition of integrated understandings 
across quantitative and qualitative research.  
Chapter 2 began with a summary of livelihoods as found in 2012, which sharpen and in 
some ways differ from past characterizations. Net labor flows are now decidedly pointed out of 
the sector rather than flooding into it, and full-time participation is declining among new fishers 
(Wave 3 described in Ch. 2). A small but dedicated group of fishers who seek to continue fishing 
attest to the continuation of the sector in some capacity, which managers agree is desirable given 
the cultural history of the islands and ability of the GMR to support some ambiguous level of 
artisanal fishing. The proportion of fishers who can be described as waiting to leave –over half of 
active fishers surveyed (Chapter 2) however attest to an overall sea change in fisher priorities, 
which is driven by declining incomes but also a long-term view of non-extractive activities as the 
future of the archipelago. 
Beyond enriching an historic void in socioeconomic data on the fishing sector, theoretical 
and applied implications are interwoven in the following Sections, which outline the main 
themes and findings around the social dimensions of fisheries change and adaptation (Section A), 
fisher exits (Section B), and how conservation governance intersects with fisher exits (Section 
C). Future directions for research follow (Section III).  
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A. The Political Ecology and Economy of Adaptation: Individuals, Institutions, 
Communities, & Responsibility 
The question of how Galápagos fishermen are adapting to their industry downturn is in 
reality many questions. To adapt is simply to change, but is change beneficial or detrimental, and 
for whom? Borrowing insights from the political economy of adaptation literature around climate 
change and natural hazards work (Bassett and Fogelman 2013), the social-structural creation of 
vulnerability and the indeterminacy of adaptive pathways around the declining Galápagos fishing 
industry are described below. 
 
A1. Responsibility & the Social-Structural Creation of Vulnerability  
While different in their conceptualization of individual behavior, both bioeconomic and 
livelihood framings of fisher exits can share a tendency to focus on the individual: decisions are 
often the analytic focus, and questions revolve around whether they are made based on profit 
seeking, business investments, or changing household needs. After initial analysis however, I 
found that individual motives yield only a partial view of the nature of movement through 
Galápagos fisheries.  
For instance, the “job satisfaction” hypothesis is often invoked as explanation for labor 
immobility in fishing, assuming a reluctance to leave based on attachment to the profession (e.g., 
Pollnac and Poggie 2008). A common viewpoint given by Galápagos scholars is that the 
relatively young age of the Galápagos fishing culture makes people less attached to fishing and 
more willing to leave than in other places (e.g., Ospina 2006; Schuhbauer and Koch 2013, 
Castrejon and Charles 2012), implying a greater potential labor mobility. It is true that many 
active fishers are immigrants, including 40% (67 of 167) of survey respondents in this study.  
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However, if examined rigorously it should be found that new immigrants are less attached to 
fishing than those from older families and are more likely to want to leave or to have left. In fact 
I found that those born on the islands were more likely to have left fishing. The testimonials of 
those who seek to remain in fishing in Chapter 2 attest to a love of fishing as strong as that found 
elsewhere among some, and the reverse “satisfaction bonus” among others described in Chapter 
3 applied equally to people from the oldest fishing families and newer immigrants. Results 
therefore show that Galápagos fishers are more amenable to leaving despite a high job 
satisfaction in fishing. 
We must take care not to attribute too much of labor immobility in fishing to individual-
level traits such as job satisfaction or poverty, or even profit seeking motives. While their effects 
are real, fishing is neither anathema nor a romantic calling for most people. When given the 
opportunity, and with strong family networks and educational opportunities, (details in Section B 
below) Galápagos fishermen diversify their work portfolios, and many do eventually leave 
fishing.  In one sense this is a positive finding for environmental conservation outcomes, since it 
shows that it’s not impossible for fishing effort to decline as fishers leave of their own accord. 
Present-day Galápagos fishers seeking to exit the industry have a number of alternate 
work options, as they always have, but there has been a clear constriction around the highest-
returning tourism occupations with the privatization and capping of tour operator rights in the 
cupo system (Epler et al. 2007). There is a similar constriction around alternate sea-based work 
with which fishing skills match up the most, with the increasing robustness of tourism safety 
standards. Such standards are beneficial in a global sense but leave the least educated in 
increasingly marginal positions as educational standards lag.  
In a sense then, this project has found that Galápagos fishers have newer coping options 
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in terms of alternate work than past generations, but in a narrower range of work types and 
economic return. The changing nature of their vulnerability and adaptability to the “shocks” of 
declining fishing profitability clearly emanate from not only individual and household adaptive 
capacities, but broader structures of conservation governance and a changing tourism market.  
The implications are that not only small, “purposeful” adjustments might help increase 
capacities to exit fishing, but more socially and politically “transformative” adjustments should 
be considered if shrinking overcapacity is a serious policy goal. The former include 
strengthening the educational system of the archipelago and encouraging secondary school 
completion, as well as English skills and better naturalist guide training.  The latter however, 
would require serious thinking around the structure of the tourism industry and specifically, ways 
to spread the distribution of tourism more equitably to the island’s local residents. “Local 
tourism” is a popular rallying cry among island residents and politicians, but much remains to be 
addressed that has so far been avoided, along with the inevitably complex power plays that will 
accompany any reforms of the multimillion-dollar tourism industry. For instance, as described in 
Chapter 4 the GNP conducts a delicate balancing act in allowing boat-based day tours to thrive 
on San Cristobal, filling market demand and providing non-extractive nature-based work to 
many citizens, despite the technical illegality of the vast majority since the GNP has also 
committed to not increasing the number of permits for operating tours. Whether Galápagos 
institutions can delay a day of reckoning indefinitely remains to be seen. 
 
A2. Adaptive Pathways, Uptake, and Indeterminacy 
Collectively, chapters clearly show that most work alternates that round out the present 
occupational diversity of fishers have existed and been known by fishers for many years, with 
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some growing in proportionate use only recently. These include IMO sailor certifications, local 
commerce, transport, farming, and government-based work. Many interviewed fishers had been 
certified to work as professional sailors for years or decades before they decided to seek out such 
jobs. Sport fishing and pesca vivencial were also both practiced or conceived of, respectively, 
before the uptake of recreational fishing in the legal framework of the GMR. Adoption of labor 
pathways therefore does not follow invention and simple diffusion. Instead the trends in 
employment growth that are now apparent –most notably in local transport, semi-skilled tourism 
work, local retail, and pesca vivencial speak to the triggering of several broad mechanisms. 
On the individual level, they show the diversity in individual thresholds for weighing the 
costs of fishing, in terms of finance, time and effort, affected by different attachments to the 
profession. Practices are becoming more strenuous with the need for longer and more offshore 
trips at sea to fill cargo holds (interviews 2012).  One fisher related how filling up a fibra’s hold 
used to take 1 day and now might take 2-3, with travel further offshore needed. Because of this 
he began working as a professional sailor 2 years ago using the certifications he first obtained 20 
years ago. Other friends still prefer fishing to other work. 
Individual-level thresholds intersect with declining marine abundance and changing 
cultural needs and priorities of Galápagos society toward nature-based tourism and away from 
fishing as a more sustainable mode of development (e.g., Gonzalez et al. 2008). Fishers perceive 
that they are seen as the “bad men of the movie” and the “predators of the marine reserve” 
(interviews 2012), a collective societal frowning upon their profession. At the same time, 
stronger enforcement of labor laws has helped raise tourism wages to acceptable levels for more 
fishermen as related by survey respondents, who now split their time between fishing and 
tourism or have transitioned completely. In short, not only declining marine abundance but the 
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confluence of the evolution of the tourism industry and conservation governance has created this 
historical moment of declining fishing participation. 
Finally, my arguments that pesca vivencial and sport fishing practices were not 
predestined but completely avoidable most clearly illustrate the indeterminacy of adaptive 
pathways. It should be recognized that certain labor trends, a.k.a. adaptive pathways, are growing 
in part because others are blocked.  
 
B. Fisher exits  
A classic concern to fisheries management is that of fisher exits from declining fisheries 
to prevent degradation of stocks (Terkla et al. 1988). This study contributes to knowledge of 
fisher exits in several ways: advancing data-driven evaluation of conservation outcomes, here the 
effects of marine reserves on displaced fishers, and advancing an expansive, outward-looking 
interpretation of fisher behavior. 
 
B1. Evidence-Based Evaluation of Conservation Outcomes   
The large global investments in protected areas, which now number over 5000, made 
with little social evaluation has led to calls for evidence-based and data-driven social science to 
more rigorously assess conservation outcomes (Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006). The fate of former 
fishers in the Galápagos Marine Reserve described in this study effectively reflects its long-term 
social outcomes, as translated into employment and economic security. 
One of the major questions central to this project was: What has made some fishers better 
able than others to reduce their dependence on fishing while maintaining their material standard 
of living? The careful empirical detailing of individual work histories and preferences collected 
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in this project provides a valuable case study of how these labor decisions and acts relate to 
various “capitals”, both generally in an inductive way and specifically around two of the most 
theoretically developed hypotheses around fisher exits: their linkages to poverty (e.g., Bene et al. 
2003; Cinner et al. 2009) and job satisfaction (e.g., Pollnac et al. 2001).  
General inductive assessment showed that in San Cristobal, in the short-term individuals 
and households moving into and out of fishing only weakly differed in their asset bases. If their 
“capitals” were also their “capabilities” to be and act in the manner of their choosing (i.e., 
Bebbington 1999), then having friends with power over providing jobs (i.e., vertical social ties), 
owning a fishing boat, and a higher education (part of human capital) gave one a leg up in 
partially or completely leaving fishing as desired. However perhaps the most notable aspects of 
this livelihood-based asset analysis is the degree of social heterogeneity across people who have 
left fishing or remained. 
The rare negative “satisfaction bonus” found here in fishing (Chapter 3), where many 
individuals would leave despite earning less elsewhere, is in direct opposition to most empirical 
studies (e.g., Pollnac et al. 2001; Pollnac and Poggie 2008). I found that while poverty conceived 
of as an inability of people to “satisfy their basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, and health” 
(Yapa 1996:707) was rare, inequality played a parallel role in creating weak “poverty traps” to 
leaving fishing. Displaced workers and the creation of winners and losers in transitioning 
industries are nothing new, including in fishing (e.g., Davis 2000, Smith et al. 2003). However 
this inequality deserves to be recognized. Whether and the extent that it is attended to is up to 
Galápagos stakeholders. The connections that the Galápagos case has to the general issue of 
equity in conservation outcomes are discussed in further detail below. 
The support for both poverty traps and high job satisfaction on the one hand and the 
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qualified ways that they applied to the specific Galápagos case makes visible two dynamics. First 
is the value of empirical studies that go beyond hypothetical questions to track which fishers are 
better able than others to maintain their standard of living, and link their economic trajectories 
with their ecosystem impact: whether they fish more, less, or relatively constantly over time. 
Pollnac et al (2001) note the danger of generalizing even within one country, of what fishers 
actually want, given the variability they found within villages of the same country. 
Second, the answer to the question of why some individuals are better able than others to 
leave fishing in San Cristobal seems to demand a partial reformulation of the original question. 
The individuals most able to leave fishing make up a very small minority of registered and active 
fishers who have tertiary degrees or large family and social networks that make searching for a 
job easier. For the vast majority of active fishers, the ability to leave fishing is largely equal, and 
actions are only partially answered by their different “capitals”. On top of asset bases, both exits 
and social outcomes seem to be influenced by a combination of factors beyond individual 
actions.  
 
B2. Livelihood Contributions to Cross-Sector Analysis of Fisher Behavior  
Scholarly attention to “fisher behavior” is not new (e.g., Hilborn 1985; Robinson and 
Pascoe 1997; Salmi et al. 1998; Salas and Gaertner 2004). While agreement is unanimous on the 
importance of social dynamics however, quantitative fisheries scientists have thus far focused 
predominantly on peoples’ harvesting and investment practices as they pertain to catching fish, 
with named foci including investment, movement, catching power, and discarding (Hilborn 
1985). This scholarship is still thin on how processes outside of fishing rather than internal to it 
affect effort and ultimately harvests.  
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This dissertation directly translates qualitative livelihoods work to recommend ways to 
inform quantitative modeling efforts often focused on catch and short-term seasonal behavior, to 
present an expansion to the literature on fisher behavior to areas outward from the fishing sector 
and through more rigorous social science methods. Methodologically, this was done in two ways. 
First, cataloging complete occupational portfolios allowed for a fuller assessment of livelihood 
strategies and how fishing fit into household activities, as well as quantified individual ties to 
other sectors via work. Secondly, studying the local perspectives and actions of former and 
active fishers gives an empirical narrative of the drivers of labor retention and movement out of 
fishing, not only in the short-term but over ten or more years for some people.   
Significant findings (Chapter 3) include altering the assumption of profit motive and 
income comparisons as a primary proxy for labor mobility in San Cristobal. The long-term 
considerations of fishing’s increasingly restricted and tourism’s bright future make fishers now 
willing to leave the sector with wages comparable to or even less than that found in fishing, as 
illustrated by all who reduced their fishing from 2009-11 without government intervention. In 
addition limited non-fishing work opportunities are non-trivial drivers of fishing effort, and 
therefore can be linked to catch levels. Going by surveyed preferences to fish less, helping all the 
fishers who would rather fish less find alternate work would partially remove the fishing effort of 
31 full-time fishers and 26 part-time fishers (Table 4, Chapter 2). Therefore, continuing alternate 
livelihood programs are critical accompaniments to strengthening monitoring and enforcement of 
fishing regulations. Finally the fact that the factors above were not possible to test statistically 
but in fact highly influential to labor mobility out of fishing is another warning bell against 
relying solely on quantification in fisher behavior. They show the value of merging analytic 
approaches such as livelihoods to study resource use from community perspectives.   
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C. Conservation Governance  
The ways that conservation governance intersects with social change in Galápagos 
fisheries illustrate multiple layers around its influence. On one hand, I argue that broad 
conservation outcomes are reducing the adaptive capacity of the least educated and poorest 
fishers in the form of narrowing their options to diversify. On the other, the global prioritization 
of maintaining the ecosystem integrity of the Galápagos Islands has imparted benefits to 
residents that increase their economic security, and arguably give the Islands the potential to 
negotiate an exemplary human-environment balance in fishing.  
 
C1. Structuring Forces: Conservation Governance and Tourism Markets  
 Galápagos fishers live and work while completely surrounded by a marine reserve and a 
terrestrial national park. Conservation governance permeates and influences every aspect of their 
fishing practices, from the species and harvest levels allowed, to more indirect decisions around 
non-fishing job options. While institutional prioritization of conservation outcomes in a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site is not out of place or in the least surprising, it should be 
acknowledged that this prioritization plays just as pivotal a role in prolonging some fisher exits 
as any profit seeking motive of individual fishers, a common point of focus. The majority of the 
fishing sector in 2012 can be described as waiting to exit – all that is needed is for opportunities 
that will allow them to earn comparable wages and match their skillset. The 2008-09 competition 
for tour operator permits (Chapters 3 and 4) most visibly exemplifies this. Although concern 
over tourism’s unknown environmental capacity is understandable, a way must also be found for 
fishers to find stable occupations outside the sector.  
This project has shown how in both overt and subtle ways conservation governance has 
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created direct and indirect structural blockages to the ability to transition away from fishing that 
individuals have overcome in various ways, but nevertheless leave fishers at a financial 
disadvantage. The need to destroy old fishing vessels, negating their financial value outside of 
fishing described in Chapters 3 and 4 is perhaps the starkest example. Such rules protect the 
proliferation of vessels in the GMR, but transfer the financial cost of this protection to certain 
individuals who are unable to recover or convert the largest sunk cost of fishing into any other 
type of activity. More subtle elements of this dynamic of prioritizing conservation privilege 
include the perceived enforcement of fishing rules more than tourism rules, which continues to 
drive a sense of injustice among fishers and degrade their buy-in to conservation initiatives. 
These perceptions are not completely unfounded. For instance the caps on fishing vessels also 
apply to tourism vessels. While the Galápagos tourism fleet remained at 80 vessels from 2000 – 
2006, total berths in that time grew from 1733 to 1805 as some ships got bigger. In addition, 
while tourism “cupos” cannot be legally sold, “it is common knowledge that they are sold and 
rights to their use transferred” (Epler et al. 2007; 47).   
The influence of conservation governance is also felt on the continually evolving labor 
flows between tourism and fishing, which are historically deep and play a pivotal role in this 
story. In Chapter 4 I showed the historic precedence of transitioning from fishing to tourism-
based livelihoods among San Cristobal fishermen, and how the growing bureaucratization, 
increasingly competitive tourism market, and capacity ceilings on certain tourism occupations 
has synergized to constrain the range of adaptive pathways for fishers to move into tourism over 
time. In the end, this project argues not against prioritizing environmental conservation, but for 
recognition of the inadvertent effects this prioritization has on people looking to leave fishing.  
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C2. Environmental Implications & Fishing For “Win-Win” Solutions” in Conservation 
Interventions  
While this project focuses on human behavior and equity, it is equally driven by the goal 
of informing environmental conservation within the GMR and marine protected areas in general. 
The reduction in Galápagos participants and catch over the past ten years might seem to be 
positive for marine ecosystems; however this assumption should still be investigated. Logical 
questions around the reduction of Galápagos fisheries include whether current declining trends 
are permanent, transitional, market-driven, stable, or unstable, given that market conditions may 
change and the capacity to fish more is still present. In addition Castrejon (2012) notes that 
Galápagos marine resources are unevenly exploited – even with reductions in active 
participation, whitefish and high seas tunas may very well be “under-exploited”, while evidence 
shows that lobster and sea cucumber are likely “over-exploited”, if one’s yardstick is the 
theoretically maximum harvest amount that balances population replenishment rates.  
What I found in the course of this project has both positive and negative implications for 
marine resources. Positive implications include the fact that the decline in fishing does indeed 
seem permanent. Part-time and former fishers are virtually unanimous in not wishing to return to 
full-time fishing (45 of 46 part-time, 49 of 50 occasional/inactive fishers). This preference 
combined with trends in tightening enforcement of rules around obtaining licenses to fish and 
maintaining a cap on fishing boats implies that the days of open access fishing are over in the 
GMR.  Without open access, in the event that a lucrative market for an as-yet-untapped marine 
resource suddenly develops another “gold rush” is highly unlikely.  
While some scholars argue that despite tighter controls, a more restricted “race for fish” 
among registered fishers continues to degrade resources (Castrejon 2012), I argue that 
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collectively, the desire to leave fishing and demonstrated multi-year efforts to find other jobs 
make a lack of alternate work the real culprit behind any race for fish – and its best cure.  
Negative implications to the manner of unfolding of this decline in fishing were also 
found, however. As Chapter 5 notes the saturation of tour operator, guide, and sailor labor 
markets has helped push pesca vivencial into existence, showing how the will to diversify out of 
commercial fishing will spill over into new forms of marine exploitation if other avenues are 
blocked. Patterns of environmental exploitation and resource use develop alongside certain social 
structures, and to ensure desired, non-extractive resource use practices, one must also work on 
amenable ways to direct labor flows.  
As described in Section A2 above (“Adaptive pathways, uptake, and indeterminacy”), if 
the willingness to leave the sector can only be harnessed, then the Galápagos Marine Reserve 
may very well become a rare example of an environmental intervention “win-win” that has 
boosted social as well as fish stock protections. This project advances understanding of how the 
social fallout from decreasing environmental exploitation ultimately affects the strength of 
environmental protection, a necessary counterweight to work on growing exploitation of fishing 
in many places (e.g., Pauly et al. 1998; Daskalov 2002; Acheson 2006; Wilson 2006). Evaluating 
such synergies to be found within PAs is an understudied but increasingly important area. 
 
 
 
III. Future Directions   
 
 This study has made apparent how social changes among fishers have been just as fast 
moving as those of the marine stocks that they harvest, although less documented. One obvious 
research option into the future is to maintain engagement with the fishing community and track 
occupational diversity and preferences. However, such social monitoring is of little use, 
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particularly among a population with clear signs of respondent fatigue to surveys, if not 
accompanied by serious efforts at building alternate livelihood options, particularly in tourism. 
While not a full assessment, the careful accounting of household asset bases and activities 
captured in the 2012 survey has made apparent that policies focused on attending to human 
needs, in other words strengthening the weak human capital of the fishing sector (i.e., 
subsidizing IMO certifications, retraining as naturalist guides), have been highly leveraged by 
fishers to diversify out of the sector, enhancing economic security as well as reducing fishing 
effort. Policies aimed at restricting access and then raising the efficiency of remaining fishers 
(i.e., taking away licenses of occasional fishers, processing plants built) a conventional approach 
to fisheries reform, have had more ambiguous impacts on economic security and reducing 
fishing effort. Policies continuing to bolster the weak human capital of the sector offer clear 
advantages into the future. 
Room also exists to study how climate change and the increasing frequency of El Nino 
events might affect fisher livelihoods. Although El Nino years are known to often correspond to 
poor fishing returns due to rough weather, flooding, and changing spatial distributions of 
nearshore fish, not one interviewee mentioned El Nino disturbances as influential to their labor 
decisions. Reasons may be because one bad fishing year might not be sufficient to sway 
individuals in changing long-term livelihood strategies, or because the last strong El Nino year 
was at the time 15 years ago in 1997-8. However little is known about these relationships.  
I highlight two other fruitful areas that stand out as important themes to look into in the 
future: equity in conservation outcomes, and the ongoing debate around dealing with 
overcapacity, or the presence of a number of people in the sector that can harvest more than the 
resource can support (UCOOPEPGAL 2005; Viteri et al. 2005; Ramirez et al. 2012; 2012 
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interviews; FAO 2015).  
 
 
A. Equity: Conservation Within & Beyond Protected Areas 
The somewhat uncommon circumstances of the social vulnerability of Galápagos fishers 
– part of a society buoyed by the capital markets that conservation governance has created on 
one hand, but (for some) losing adaptive capacity through the slow constriction of adaptive 
pathways out of fishing, particularly into tourism (Chapter 4) - makes visible a wider global 
debate on social equity in conservation outcomes beyond the Galápagos.  
Vulnerability analyses are based on the premise that “some risks are unacceptable and 
should be avoided at all costs” (Leach et al. 2008:5, italics in original); its minimization is 
regarded as a social benefit. Is an increase in social vulnerability in one respect due to 
conservation governance, even if not to engendering any crisis of poverty, food security, or 
migration, acceptable? While debates over the potential inhibition of poverty alleviation efforts 
in protected areas (Adams et al. 2004; Sanderson and Redford 2003), displacement of local 
populations (Agrawal and Redford 2009), and immigration as a threat to environmental 
protection (Scholte 2003) continue, the question should be broached: does the absence of 
absolute poverty, increasingly strict controls on immigration (Nuñez 2007), and higher general 
level of wellbeing within this particular PA (Kerr 2003) sufficiently counterbalance a degrading 
potential to adapt that some fishers face moving forward?  
It could be argued that the GMR and protected areas in general should and could do 
better in attending to the residents and fishers most vulnerable to being marginalized. Galápagos 
fishermen (and all residents) continue to push not only for equitable livelihood alternates, but the 
potential to better their social welfare, and this potential is central to whether people will 
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continue to willingly reduce their environmental dependence on marine resources. Persha et al. 
(2010) note, “substantial increases in the existing global extent of protected areas seem unlikely, 
particularly for stricter categories (IUCN categories I-III), due in part to the vocal reaction 
against them in many parts of the world” (2918). In many ways the conservation movement 
stands at a crossroads; the vast success of the push to set aside protected areas has helped 
strengthen environmental regulations within them. However, many now question the efficacy of 
protected areas in the face of global challenges that cannot be confined to bounded spaces, such 
as climate change and the fishing down of the world’s oceans.  
Arguably and propitiously, the choices that fishers face in the Galápagos are 
exceptionally open compared to other areas where there is often little option but to leave 
stagnating industries or suffer both environmental degradation and worsening incomes (Allison 
and Ellis 2001; Cinner et al. 2009; Fulanda et al. 2009). The GMR therefore provides an 
important vantage point from which to debate the ways that conservation policies balance human 
and ecosystem wellbeing outside of crisis-driven situations, thanks to marine ecosystems’ 
relative health compared to many other places from what is discernible from sparse data 
accounts. Grappling seriously with such issues will enhance understanding of developing 
socially just policy outcomes within and outside of in protected areas globally, ultimately needed 
to achieve important conservation goals. 
 
B. Dealing with Overcapacity: Rights-Based Approaches and Livelihood Diversity 
The need for reform of Galápagos fisheries management is agreed upon by scientists, 
fishing cooperatives and institutions (e.g., UCOOPEPGAL 2005; Viteri et al. 2005; Ramirez et 
al. 2012; 2012 interviews). Among the most pressing issues identified is dealing with 
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overcapacity, or the presence of a number of people in the sector that can harvest more than the 
resource can support (FAO 2015). Narratives of profit seeking and “tragedy of the commons” 
have long driven understandings of overcapacity in the GMR, largely set around the sea 
cucumber “gold rush” in the 1990s that spurred rampant in-migration (Bremner & Perez 2002). 
However, attributing ongoing degradation to individual profit seeking is overly simplistic, and 
may be being transferred over to the issue of current overcapacity in ways that should be 
reexamined. 
A rights-based solution is gathering momentum among fisheries scientists and 
conservation organizations working in the Galápagos who argue that, “an efficient long-term 
management…requires fishermen to have secure property rights over the resource” (Viteri et al. 
2005: 24). The rights-based argument is being advocated by the Worldwide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), who have laid out a proposal for a pilot implementation in the lobster fishery (Ramirez 
et al. 2012). However it must be noted that rights-based management could very well change a 
longstanding characteristic of fishing in the Islands, that of the part-time fisherman. This is 
because rights-based schemes tend to dis-incentivize part-time activity. Privatization of access 
rights to fewer people has the effect of promoting greater full-time participation in fishing 
because it reduces mobility out of the industry if a particular species begins to decline due to the 
deeper sunk economic costs involved in participation (Mansfield 2004; Reedy-Maschner 2007; 
Branch 2009). Those who own costly quotas must fish full-time for it to be worth their while. In 
addition, they necessitate defining a community of fisherman and excluding others, who may 
formerly have fished inconsistently. They would therefore likely have the effect of reducing the 
livelihood diversity of participating fishermen, or excluding a portion of the current community 
of part-time and occasional fishers. As Epler et al. (2007) note for the similar market-based 
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“cupo” mechanism of capping the number of boat berths allowed in the GMR, one of the biggest 
social impacts of “gift[ing] a public resource or property rights to a limited number of private 
enterprises” (46) is that “the system influences the distribution of wealth by limiting who has the 
option of reaping the economic benefits attributed to having access to the National Park and 
Marine Reserve” (48).  
A more outward and holistic understanding of the dynamics that keep people in fishing 
reveals alternate ways to reduce overcapacity with softer social impacts. Fishing acts as a safety 
net in times of job loss for those with PARMAs, and also a pressure valve for labor in the 
Galápagos when a paucity of other jobs exist, as Chapter 3 showed. Understanding the latent 
desire to exit that exists, overcapacity could be reduced tomorrow if broader (but stickier) labor 
issues in San Cristobal were addressed. Regardless of outcomes, I hope that this project brings 
recognition of these issues to policy makers and scholars working in this unique archipelago. 
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APPENDIX	  A:	  SURVEY	  FOR	  ACTIVE	  FISHERS	  ENCUESTA	  PARA	  LOS	  PESCADORES	  ACTIVOS	  EN	  LOS	  GALÁPAGOS	  Fecha	   	  Entrevistador(a)/Asistente	   	  Nombre	  /	  HHID	   	   Pueblo	   	  Tiempo	  de	  inicio	   	  Tiempo	  de	  finalización	   	  	  
I.	  PERFIL	  DEL	  PESCADOR	  	  
A.	  HISTORIA	  	  1.	  ¿En	  qué	  año	  comenzó	  a	  pescar?	  	  	  _______	  2.	  ¿Por	  cuántos	  años	  ha	  sido	  un	  pescador	  artesanal,	  y	  activo?_____	   hasta	  ahora___	  	   ____	  Ocasionalmente	  o	  por	  diversión	   ____	  Pasivo	  	  	  3.	  ¿En	  esta	  temporada	  (2011-­‐12),	  ejerce	  la	  actividad	  a	  por…	  a. Tiempo	  Completo	  (>	  90%	  del	  ingreso)	  b. Medio-­‐tiempo	  (entre	  30-­‐90%	  del	  ingreso	  total)	  
c. Ocasionalmente	  (<	  30%	  del	  ingreso)	  d. Pasivo	  e. Nunca	  estuvo	  activo	  	  4.	  ¿Por	  cuántas	  generaciones,	  en	  total,	  ha	  pescado	  su	  familia?	  ______	  	  5	  .	  ¿Cómo	  usted	  obtuvo	  su	  primer	  trabajo	  en	  la	  pesca?	  a	  través	  de	  amigos	  cercanos,	  conocidos,	  o	  familiares?	  S/	  	  	  N	  (indicar	  cual)	  	  6.	  ¿Si	  pudiera	  elegir	  una	  vez	  más,	  todavía	  elegiría	  pescar?	  	   S	   /	   N	  
(por	  los	  anos	  que	  era	  un	  pescador	  solamente,	  no	  por	  toda	  de	  su	  vida.)	  6a.	  ¿Le	  gustaba	  ser	  un	  pescador,	  por	  los	  años	  que	  se	  pescó?	  	  7.	  En	  que	  sector	  le	  gustaría	  que	  trabajaran	  sus	  hijos?	  ¿Se	  la	  recomendaría	  la	  pesca?	  	  S	  	  	  	  /	  	  N	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
II.	  DEMOGRAFÍA	  (Cabeza	  de	  hogar/Otro)	  _____________________	   	   Género:	  _____	  8.	  ¿En	  qué	  año	  nació?	   	  9.	  ¿Nació	  aquí	  en	  Galápagos?	  
	   NO	  (y	  la	  EDAD	  cuando	  llegó,	  continúe)	  	  	   	   SI	  (va	  a	  #15)	  	  10.	  ¿En	  qué	  año	  vino	  a	  	  vivir	  aquí?	   	   	   	   11.	  ¿De	  qué	  provincia	  vino?	   	  	  12.	  ¿A	  qué	  se	  dedicaba	  antes	  de	  venir	  a	  Galápagos?	   	  1. Agricultura	  2. Pesca	  3. Ganadería	  cría	  de	  animales	   4. Comercio	  5. Servicios	  6.	  	  	  	  	  Otro,	  ¿cuál?	  __________________	  13.	  	  ¿Por	  qué	  decidió	  salir	  de	  su	  lugar	  de	  residencia?	  	  
(si	  más	  de	  uno	  razón,	  orden)	  1. Falta	  de	  tierra	  2. desempleo	  3. bajos	  ingresos	  trabajo	  4. me	  trajeron	  (familia/parientes)	  
5. problemas	  familiares	  6. desastres	  naturales	  7. Otra,¿cuál?	  _____________________	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  14.	  ¿Por	  qué	  selecionó	  Galápagos	  en	  lugar	  de	  ir	  a	  otros	  provincias?	   	  1. Más	  fácil	  conseguir	  tierra	  2. Oportunidades	  para	  trabajo	  3. Tenía	  familiares	   4. Oportunidades	  para	  LA	  PESCA	  5. Otra,	  ¿cuál?_____________________	  	  15.	  ¿Cuál	  es	  su	  estado	  civil?	  (Marque	  con	  una	  X)	  	  	  	  casado______	  viudo_______	  separado	  
________	  divorciado_______	  en	  unión	  libre	  ________	  soltero________	  	   	   (___#	  hijos	  total)	  16.	  	  ¿Cuántas	  personas	  normalmente	  viven	  en	  su	  casa,	  incluyendo	  a	  usted?	  	  	  ____personas,	  ___	  hijos	  	  	  17.	  ¿De	  las	  personas	  que	  viven	  con	  Usted,	  puede	  indicar	  la	  relación	  de	  parentesco,	  edad	  y	  género?	  	   Relación	   Edad	   Género	   I	  año	   3	  años	  1	   	   	   	   	  2	   	   	   	   	  3	   	   	   	   	  4	   	   	   	   	  5	   	   	   	   	  6	   	   	   	   	  7	   	   	   	   	  8	   	   	   	   	  9	   	   	   	   	  10	   	   	   	   	  17a.	  ¿Por	  cuánto	  tiempo	  en	  los	  últimos	  3	  años	  cada	  persona	  ha	  vivido	  en	  su	  casa?	  (en	  meses,	  señale	  en	  la	  tabla	  de	  abajo)	  	  18.	  	  Las	  personas	  que	  viven	  en	  su	  casa,	  ¿dependen	  económicamente	  de	  Usted?	  SI	   /	   NO	   /	   N/a	  19.	  ¿Cuál	  es	  el	  nivel	  de	  instrucción	  educativa	  que	  USTED	  tiene	  aprobado?	  1	  Ninguno	  2	  Primario	  incompleto	  3	  Primario	  completo	   4	  Secundario	  incompleto	  5	  Secundario	  completo	   6	  superior	  o	  postgrado	  	   20.	  …	  lo	  mas	  alto	  EN	  SU	  CASA?	  ____________	  	  21.	  ¿Usted	  vive	  en	  Galápagos	  todo	  el	  tiempo	  a	  temporalmente?	   S	   /	   N	   Donde:_____	  	  
III.	  DIVERSIFICACIÓN	  22.	  ¿Es	  usted	  miembro	  de	  alguna	  cooperativa	  de	  pesca?	  	   22a.	  ¿Ha	  tenido	  un	  posición	  en	  la	  cooperativa?	  ____	  23.	  ¿Es	  usted	  miembro	  de	  algún	  otro	  grupo	  comercial,	  cooperativas	  o	  asociaciones?	  	  24.	  ¿Alguien	  en	  su	  hogar	  es	  miembro	  de	  algún	  grupo	  comercial,	  uniones,	  o	  cooperativas?	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25.	  ¿A	  veces,	  ustedes	  están	  voluntarios	  para	  organizaciones	  aquí?	  S	   /	   N	   Detalles	  :	  _____________	  
	  
A.1.Preferencias	  de	  Diversidad	  (Pollnac	  et	  al.	  2001)	  	  26.	  ¿Hoy,	  le	  preferiría	  tener	  más	  de	  un	  solo	  empleo	  EN	  EL	  HOGAR?	  27.	  ¿Quiere	  que	  continuará	  en	  sus	  actividades	  de	  sustento	  que	  tiene	  hoy,	  por	  el	  resto	  de	  su	  vida?	   S	   /	   N	   /	   Otra__________	  
	  28.	  ¿Si	  hay	  un	  tipo	  de	  empleo	  preferido,	  que	  es	  esto?	  (1er):	  _____________________	  
(Pesca	  vivencial,	  operador	  de	  tours,	  turismo	  en	  general,	  transporte	  (en	  la	  isla	  y	  en	  el	  
mar)	  28a.	  ¿Qué	  necesitaría?	  	  ¿Habría	  algún	  tipo	  de	  problemas?:________________	  	  29.	  ¿Alguna	  vez	  ha	  aplicado	  para	  conseguir	  uno	  permiso	  de	  turismo?	  	  	  
B.	  Redes	  Informales	  en	  la	  ocupación	  	  (Lazos	  Sociales)	  	  	   à	  30.	  ¿Quién	  más	  pesca	  en	  su	  hogar?	   	  31.	  ¿Por	  todos	  los	  anos,	  tiene	  actividades	  afuera	  de	  la	  pesca	  entre	  de	  las	  temporadas	  de	  pesca?	  	  S	  	  	  	  /	  	  	  	  N	  32.	  	  ¿En	  el	  último	  año	  (2011),	  que	  otra	  actividad	  ha	  trabajado	  usted,	  y	  su	  hogar,	  distinto	  de	  la	  pesca?	  	  	   Quien	  a. sector	  público	  (asalariado)	   	  b. sector	  turístico	  (asalariado	  o	  no)	   	  c. comercio-­‐servicios	   	  d. taxista	  -­‐	  transporte	  	   	  e. comerciante	  compra	  –	  venta	  productos	   	  f. Otros	  negocios	  de	  familia	  	   	  g. Otro	  (trabajos	  ocasionales	  etc.)	   	  	  33.	  	  ¿Hay	  otros	  actividades,	  negocios	  o	  trabajos	  en	  los	  años	  recientes	  (y	  desde	  2009)?	  ¿Cómo	  usted	  obtuvo	  esos	  trabajos/actividades?	  	  
	  …a	  través	  de	  amigos	  cercanos,	  conocidos,	  o	  familiares?	  S	   /	   N	   /	   N/A	   (indicate	  which)	  	  34.	  ¿Tuvo	  una	  entrevista	  de	  trabajo	  para	  cada	  uno	  de	  ellos?	  Empleo	   Sí/No	  	   	  	   	  
	  
35.Entonces,	  el	  número/la	  diversidad	  de	  sus	  trabajos	  desde	  el	  2009:	  a. Igual	  #,	  los	  mismos	  empleos:	  b. Igual	  #,	  diferentes	  empleos:	  	  c. Ha	  aumentado	  #:	  d. Ha	  disminuido	  #
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  36.	  ¿Qué	  tal	  este	  AÑO?	  2012	  	  37.	  ¿Hay	  MIEMBROS	  DE	  su	  FAMILIA	  tenían	  un	  empleo	  diferente	  de	  la	  pesca?	  (escribir	  las	  
detalles)	  	  
à	  38.	  (medio-­‐tiempo)	  Antes	  de	  que	  usted	  inicie	  actividades	  de	  trabajo	  fuera	  de	  la	  pesca,	  cuántos	  miembros	  de	  su	  familia	  tenían	  un	  empleo	  afuera	  de	  la	  pesca?	  	  39.¿Tiene	  ud.	  alguna	  familia	  en	  política	  o	  gobierno?	   Si	   /	   No	   Detalles_____	  	  	  
IV.	  PATRONES	  DE	  PESCA	  39.	  ¿Qué	  tipo	  de	  pesquería	  realiza	  Usted?	  
	  	   1	  pepino	  de	  mar	  2	  langosta	  3	  pesca	  blanca	  4	  	  atún	  40.	  (N°	  total	  de	  pesquerías	  participantes	  
en)	   No:	  41.	  	  ¿Qué	  tipo	  de	  ocupación	  desempeña	  en	  la	  pesca?	  	   1	  armador	  (owner)	  2	  Capitán	  3	  Panguero	  4	  Pescador	  5	  Buzo	  6	  	  Cocinero	  42.	  ¿De	  qué	  manera	  le	  pagan?	  ¿Qué	  porción	  de	  la	  pesca	  usted	  recibe?	  	  43.	  En	  el	  ultimo	  año	  (2011)	  cual	  ha	  sido	  su	  actividad	  en	  la	  pesca	  artesanal?	  …vivencial?	  …por	  diversion?	  	  
ESPECI
ES	   ¿Cuál	  es	  el	  arte	  de	  pesca	  que	  utiliza?	  1	  empate	  (draw)	  	  2	  chinchorro	  o	  red	  de	  cerco	  (seine	  or	  circle	  net)	  3	  red	  de	  enmalle	  o	  transmallo	  (gillnet	  or	  trammel)	  	  4	  gancho	  (hook)	  5	  a	  mano	  (Hand)	  	  6	  línea	  con	  anzuelo	  (bait	  hook)	  	  7	  señuelo	  (line,	  lure)	  8	  	  hooka	  o	  compresor	  de	  aire	  	  
¿Cuántas	  MESES	  
al	  año	  realiza	  
esta	  pesquería?	  	  (Durante	  de	  2011-­‐12)	  
¿Cuántas	  (libras)	  saca	  
en	  promedio	  a	  la	  MES	  
durante	  la	  temporada?	  	  (Durante	  de	  2011-­‐12)	  
¿Como	  ha	  
cambiado	  desde	  
2009?	  	  (viajes,	  cantidades,	  especies)	  subía,	  bajaba,	  igual,	  inactividad	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  44.	  (PASIVOS):	  Tiempo	  exacto	  cuando	  dejó	  de	  pescar,	  si	  lo	  recuerda:	  ________________	  
	  
C.	  Comida	  de	  mar	  /	  Consumismo	  45.	  ¿Tiene	  contactos	  para	  vender	  pescado	  con	  negocios	  
del	  turismo	  directamente?	   	  46.	  ¿Tiene	  miembros	  de	  su	  familia	  en	  ese	  negocio?	  (o	  
amigos	  o	  conocidos)	   	  47.	  ¿	  Tiene	  contactos	  para	  vender	  pescado	  con	  negocios	  más	  local	  directamente?	  (tambien	  vecinos,	  familia)	   	  48.	  ¿Contacto	  regular/irregular?	   	  
Contactos	  de	  mariscos:	  Locales_________	  Exportares__________	  Turismo__________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  #____	  
	  
E.	  Preferencias	  	  
à	  49.	  Si	  usted	  vendería	  	  el	  doble	  de	  lo	  que	  vende	  actualmente	  de	  su	  pesca,	  y	  ganado	  el	  doble,	  usted	  haría	  el	  esfuerzo	  para	  pescar	  esa	  cantidad?	  	  …tres	  veces	  la	  cantidad?	  …tanto	  como	  usted	  desearía	  al	  precio	  actual,	  cuál	  sería	  la	  cantidad	  ideal	  para	  cada	  pesca.	  Por	  favor	  sea	  lo	  más	  específico	  que	  pueda.	  Especies	   Cantidad	   Precio	  (revise	  el	  del	  día	  de	  hoy	  y	  anótelo)	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  50.	  Activo:	  ¿Que	  preferiría:	  Vender	  más	  pescado,	  como	  se	  indicó	  anteriormente,	  o	  tener	  un	  trabajo	  de	  medio-­‐tiempo	  que	  no	  sea	  en	  la	  pesca,	  con	  un	  ingreso	  equivalente?	  
Pasivo:	  ¿Hipotéticamente,	  si	  las	  oportunidades	  será	  mejorar	  en	  la	  pesca,	  preferiría	  a	  pescar,	  o	  ya	  no	  volver	  a	  la	  pesca?	  	  
è 51.	  (ACTIVO)	  Si	  hubiera	  una	  nueva	  (o	  más	  grande)	  pesquería	  de	  atún	  en	  el	  RMG,	  ¿estaría	  interesado	  en	  participar?	   S	   /	   N	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52.	  ¿Qué	  influencia	  de	  cuánto	  se	  coge	  pesca?	  En	  otras	  palabras,	  si	  usted	  tendría	  que	  jerarquizar	  los	  siguientes	  factores	  en	  orden	  de	  su	  influencia,	  ¿cuál	  sería	  el	  orden?	  	  (1	  es	  el	  
más	  importante)	  
Ítem	   Grado	  Precio	  en	  el	  Mercado	   	  Promesa	  de	  compra	  de	  comida	  marina	   	  Calidad/Temperatura	  del	  Agua	   	  Abundancia	  en	  la	  pesca	  durante	  un	  viaje	   	  Ingresos	  de	  otros	  miembros	  de	  la	  familia	   	  Deseo	  de	  comer	  comida	  marina	  en	  casa/	  para	  la	  familia/amigos	   	  Oferta	  para	  pescar	  con	  otros	   	  Otras	  oportunidades	  de	  trabajo	  (por	  ejemplo,	  ofrecimiento	  de	  más	  horas	  de	  trabajo)	   	  Otra:	   	  
	  
è 53.	  (PASIVOS)	  Si	  usted	  no	  pescó	  regularmente	  en	  el	  último	  año,	  diga,	  ¿por	  qué	  no?	  	  Razón	   Rango	  Enfermedad/Lesión	   	  Necesita	  dinero	  para	  el	  bote/reparaciones	  de	  la	  maquinaria	   	  Encontró	  otro	  trabajo	   	  Está	  recibiendo	  entrenamiento	  en	  algo	  distinto	   	  No	  es	  rentable	  (por	  los	  precios	  del	  mercado	  o	  las	  ventas)	   	  La	  pesca	  no	  es	  la	  ocupación	  principal	   	  Otra:	   	  
	  
	  
V.	  INGRESOS/BIENES	  	  54.	  Considerando	  sus	  ingresos,	  diría	  su	  nivel	  de	  vida	  es	  a. Bien	  b. Más	  o	  menos	  bien	  c. Mal	  	  55.	  	  Las	  cosas	  que	  usted	  puede	  hacer	  o	  comprar	  con	  dinero	  –	  por	  ejemplo	  vivienda,	  muebles,	  comida,	  carros,	  vacaciones	  –	  son	  parte	  esencial	  de	  nuestro	  estándar	  de	  vida	  material.	  Si	  usted	  piensa	  en	  su	  estándar	  de	  vida	  en	  la	  actualidad,	  considera	  que	  es	  más	  alto,	  más	  bajo,	  o	  aproximadamente	  el	  mismo	  que	  el	  de	  3	  años	  atrás?	  	  56.	  ¿Cuánto	  ingreso	  tuvo	  con	  cada	  empleo	  y	  en	  todo	  el	  transcurso	  del	  año	  (2011)?	  	  	   Temporada	  (o	  anualmente)	   Horas/semanas	   Horas/semanas	   Ingresos	  (unidades)	  1	   	   	   	   	  2	   	   	   	   	  3	   	   	   	   	  57.	  Y	  si	  tuviera	  que	  estimar,	  ¿Cómo	  cree	  compara	  este	  año?	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  58.	  Usted	  diría	  que	  su	  INGRESO	  TOTAL	  DE	  LA	  PESCA	  en	  el	  temporada	  2011-­‐12	  fue	  de:	  	  ¿Más	  de	  $2,000/por	  año?	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $5,500/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $7,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $9,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $12,500/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $16,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  59.	  ¿Es	  aquello	  representativo	  de	  su	  ingreso	  de	  la	  pesca,	  en	  general?	  S	  /	  N	  	  Si	  No,	  ¿por	  qué?	  :	  _______________________________________________	  (incluya	  si	  es	  mayor/menor)	  	  
Solo	  por	  la	  pesca	  vivencial:	  
è 60.	  Usted	  diría	  que	  su	  INGRESO	  TOTAL	  DE	  LA	  PESCA	  VIVENCIAL	  en	  año	  2011	  fue	  de:	  	  ¿Más	  de	  $2,000/por	  año?	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $4,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $6,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $7,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $10,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  	  61.	  ¿Es	  aquello	  representativo	  de	  su	  ingreso	  de	  la	  pesca	  vivencial,	  en	  general?	  S	  /	  N	  	  Si	  N,	  ¿por	  qué?	  :	  ________________________________________________	  (incluya	  si	  es	  
mayor/menor)	  62.	  Si	  tuviera	  que	  estimar,	  ¿Cómo	  cree	  compara	  este	  año?	  (bracket)	  	  63.	  Usted	  diría	  que	  el	  INGRESO	  TOTAL	  EN	  SU	  HOGAR	  en	  el	  2011	  fue	  de:	  (asumiendo	  que	  la	  
pesca	  =	  60%	  del	  total)	  ¿Más	  de	  $3,000/por	  año?	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  	  ¿Más	  de	  $6,500/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $10,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $13,500/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $17,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $20,500/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  	  64.	  ¿Es	  aquello	  representativo	  del	  ingreso	  de	  su	  hogar,	  en	  general?	  S	  /	  N	   	  Si	  N,	  ¿por	  qué?	  :	  ________________________________________________	  (incluya	  si	  es	  mayor/menor)	  65.	  Si	  tuviera	  que	  estimar,	  ¿Cómo	  cree	  compara	  este	  año?	  (bracket)	  	  	  66.	  ¿Usted	  diría	  que	  de	  acuerdo	  con	  el	  INGRESO	  DE	  LA	  PESCA,	  usted	  (SOLAMENTE	  USTED)	  está	  mejor,	  o	  peor,	  o	  más	  o	  menos	  igual	  que	  HACE	  TRES	  AÑOS	  ATRÁS?	  (2008-­‐9)	   	  	  67.	  ¿Usted	  dirías	  que	  de	  acuerdo	  al	  INGRESO	  TOTAL,	  usted	  (SU	  HOGAR)	  está	  mejor,	  peor,	  o	  más	  o	  menos	  lo	  mismo	  que	  HACE	  TRES	  AÑOS	  ATRÁS?	  (2009)	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68.	  ¿Alguna	  persona	  que	  NO	  vive	  con	  usted,	  contribuye	  regularmente	  con	  dinero	  en	  su	  hogar	  durante	  en	  el	  2011?	  (remesas,	  pensiones)	  S/N	   Persona	   Cantidad	  	   	   	  	  
Entonces,	  en	  acuerdo	  de	  las	  preguntas	  antes,	  la	  actividad	  más	  importante	  
económicamente	  para	  su	  hogar	  es…	  	  	  (recap	  of	  order)	  	  Ocupación	   Clasificación	  	   	  	   	  	   	  
	  
B.	  Limitaciones	  en	  los	  Créditos:	  Con	  esta	  investigación	  queremos	  conocer,	  si	  hay	  limitaciones	  en	  
los	  creditos	  para	  la	  gente.	  69.	  ¿Alguna	  vez	  usted	  ha	  prestado	  dinero	  o	  ha	  aplicado	  por	  un	  préstamo	  para	  desempeñar	  una	  actividad	  laboral,	  sea	  para	  la	  pesca	  o	  de	  otro	  tipo?	  	  …	  fue	  a	  través	  de	  (a)	  familia	  o	  amigo(a)s,	  o	  (b)	  del	  banco	  u	  otra	  institución	  financiera.	  
	   70.	  ¿Tiene	  deudas?	  	   S	   /	   N	   /	   Poco	   	   tipo:	  ___________	  
las	  más	  comunes:	  hogares,	  carros,	  negocios,	  motores	  	  71.	  Si	  Ud.	  estuviera	  en	  una	  situación	  donde	  tendría	  que	  conseguir	  $1000	  en	  una	  semana,	  ¿podría	  solucionarlo?	  	  ¿Cómo	  lo	  solucionará?	  -­‐	  ahorros	  propios	  -­‐	  Préstamo	  a	  familiares	  -­‐	  préstamo	  a	  amigos	  -­‐	  préstamo	  al	  banco	  	  -­‐	  ir	  a	  pescar	  -­‐	  otro	  
	  72.	  ¿Usted	  posee	  un	  barco?	  	   1	  lancha	   	   	   2	  fibra	  	   	   	   3	  panga	  73.	  ¿Si	  usted	  compara	  su	  salud	  con	  la	  de	  otros	  de	  su	  misma	  edad,	  cree	  que	  su	  salud	  es,	  mejor,	  peor,	  igual?	  (Encierre	  una)	  	  74.	  ¿Tiene	  alguna	  enfermedad	  crónica	  o	  inhabilidad?	  ___________________	  	  75.	  ¿Cuál	  es	  su	  tenencia	  de	  su	  casa?	  En	  arriendo	  1. Propia	  2. Cedida	  3. Recibida	  por	  servicios	  	  	  76.	  ¿Tiene	  o	  tenía	  hijos,	  o	  miembros	  de	  su	  hogar	  que	  estudian	  afuera,	  o	  en	  otra	  lugar?	   S	  	  	  	  	  /	   N	  	  	  	  /	   N/a	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VI.	  Elecciones	  (e	  Historia)	  	  77.	  Cuando	  piensa	  en	  el	  futuro,	  ¿qué	  es	  lo	  que	  mejor	  describe	  su	  percepción	  de	  la	  pesca	  vivencial?	  [muy	  positiva,	  positiva,	  pesimista,	  muy	  pesimista]	  	  78.	  ¿Podría	  decirme	  si	  usted	  tiene	  fuertes	  relaciones	  de	  amistad	  con	  [todos,	  la	  mayoría,	  algunos,	  casi	  ninguno,	  ninguno]	  de	  sus	  compañero(a)s	  de	  la	  pesca	  vivencial?	  	  	  	  79.	  ¿Cree	  Usted	  que	  durante	  el	  tiempo	  que	  llevó	  pescando,	  la	  pesca	  hubo	  disminuido?	  	   S	   /	   N	  79a.	  ¿Por	  qué?	  (Si	  la	  respuesta	  es	  Sí)	   	  80.	  …hay	  animales	  o	  peces	  que	  han	  crecido?	  ___________	  	  	  81.	  Podría	  usted	  decirme,	  “Yo	  tengo	  [bastante,	  algo,	  mucha,	  no	  mucha,	  ninguna]	  confianza	  en	  el	  Parque	  Nacional	  de	  los	  Galápagos”	  	  82.	  Qué	  tanto	  usted	  estaría	  de	  acuerdo	  con	  la	  siguiente	  afirmación:	  “Los	  pescadores	  pueden	  poner	  en	  prácticas	  nuestros	  ideas,	  en	  al	  Junta	  de	  Manejo	  Participativo”	  	  	  
(encierre	  uno)	  [muy	  fuertemente,	  fuertemente,	  indiferente,	  está	  en	  desacuerdo,	  está	  en	  fuerte	  desacuerdo]	  	  83.	  ¿Ud.	  cree	  que	  es	  necesario	  para	  limitar/reducir	  el	  esfuerzo	  en	  la	  pesca?	  	  ¿Con	  qué	  método	  usted	  está	  más	  de	  acuerdo?	  	  ___	  El	  acceso	  no	  debería	  ser	  limitado	  	   ___	  Temporadas	  de	  veda	  ___	  Licencia	  de	  entrada	  limitada	  (similar	  al	  actual)	  ___	  Cuotas	  individuales	  de	  pesca	  (permisos	  negociables)	  ___	  Recompras	  (el	  GNP	  compra	  los	  PARMAs)	  ___	  Otro	  	  84.	  ¿Cuales	  son	  los	  políticas	  que	  han	  tenido	  mayor	  impacto	  en	  sus	  capacidades	  para	  que	  cambien	  sus	  actividades	  de	  vida?	  	  
-­‐ que	  han	  ayudado	  o	  no	  han	  ayudado	  ¿Cuántas	  veces	  ha	  sido	  entrevistado	  antes?	  ¡Muchas	  gracias	  por	  la	  entrevista!	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APPENDIX	  B:	  SURVEY	  FOR	  INACTIVE	  FISHERS	  ENCUESTA	  PARA	  LOS	  EX	  -­‐	  PESCADORES	  EN	  LOS	  GALÁPAGOS	  Fecha	   	  Entrevistador(a)/Asistente	   	  Nombre	  /	  HHID	   	  Información	  de	  Contacto	   	  
Pueblo	   	  
Tiempo	  de	  inicio	   	  
Tiempo	  de	  finalización	   	  	  
I.	  PERFIL	  DEL	  PESCADOR	  1.	  ¿En	  qué	  año	  comenzó	  a	  pescar?_______	  	   2.	  ¿En	  qué	  año	  SE	  REGISTRÓ	  como	  pescador?	  	  3.	  ¿Durante	  cuántos	  años	  ha	  sido	  un	  pescador	  artesanal,	  solamente?___	  	  	  	  hasta	  ahora	  ___	   ____	  Ocasionalmente	  o	  por	  deportes	   ____	  Pasivo	  	   ___	  Nunca	  fue	  activo	  	  4.	  ¿Por	  cuántas	  generaciones,	  en	  total,	  había	  pescado	  su	  familia?	  ______	  5.¿Usted	  se	  consideraría	  un	  “pescador	  de	  los	  Galápagos”?	   S	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  N	  
	  6.	  ¿Cómo	  usted	  obtuvo	  su	  primer	  trabajo	  en	  la	  pesca?	  a	  través	  de	  amigos	  cercanos,	  conocidos,	  o	  familiares?	  S/	  	  	  N	  (indicar	  cual)	  	  
à	  7.	  ¿Quién	  más	  pesca	  en	  su	  hogar?	  8.	  ¿Si	  pudiera	  elegir	  una	  vez	  más,	  todavía	  elegiría	  pescar?	   S	   /	   N	  
(por	  los	  anos	  que	  era	  un	  pescador	  solamente,	  no	  por	  toda	  de	  su	  vida.)	  	  9.	  ¿Le	  gustaba	  ser	  un	  pescador,	  por	  los	  años	  que	  se	  pescó?	  	  	  10.	  En	  que	  sector	  le	  gustaría	  que	  trabajaran	  sus	  hijos?	  ¿Se	  la	  recomendaría	  la	  pesca?	  S	  	  	  	  /	  	  	  	  N	  	  
II.	  DEMOGRAFÍA	  (Cabeza	  de	  hogar/Otro)	  __________________	   Género:	  ___	  11.	  ¿En	  qué	  año	  nació?	   	  	  12.	  ¿Nació	  aquí	  en	  Galápagos?	  
	   NO	  (escribe	  la	  EDAD	  cuando	  llegó,	  continúe)	  	   	   SI	  (va	  a	  #17)	  	   13.	  ¿En	  qué	  año	  vino	  a	  	  vivir	  aquí?	   	   	   	   14.	  ¿De	  qué	  provincia	  vino?	   	  15.	  ¿A	  qué	  se	  dedicaba	  antes	  de	  venir	  a	  Galápagos?	   	  1. Agricultura	  2. Pesca	  3. Ganadería	  cría	  de	  animales	   4. Comercio	  5. Servicios	  6. Otro,	  ¿cuál?	  __________________	  	  16.	  	  ¿Por	  qué	  decidió	  salir	  de	  su	  lugar	  de	  residencia?	  
(si	  más	  de	  uno	  razón,	  orden)	  1. Falta	  de	  tierra	  2. desempleo	  3. bajos	  ingresos	  trabajo	  4. me	  trajeron	  (familia/parientes)	  
5. problemas	  familiares	  6. desastres	  naturales	  7. Otra,	  ¿cuál?	  _____________________	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  17.	  ¿Por	  qué	  selecionó	  Galápagos	  en	  lugar	  de	  ir	  a	  otros	  provincias?	   	  1. Más	  fácil	  conseguir	  tierra	  2. Oportunidades	  para	  trabajo	  3. Tenía	  familiares	   4. Oportunidades	  para	  LA	  PESCA	  5. Otra,	  ¿cuál?_____________________	  18.	  ¿Cuál	  es	  su	  estado	  civil?	  (Marque	  con	  una	  X)	  casado______	  viudo_______	  separado	  ________	  
divorciado_______	  en	  unión	  libre	  ________	  soltero________	  	  	  (___	  #	  hijos	  total)	  19.	  	  ¿Cuántas	  personas	  normalmente	  viven	  en	  su	  casa,	  incluyendo	  a	  usted?	  	  	  ___personas,	  __	  hijos	  	  	  20.	  ¿De	  las	  personas	  que	  viven	  con	  Usted,	  puede	  indicar	  la	  relación	  de	  parentesco,	  edad	  y	  género?	  	  	   Relación	   Edad	   Género	   I	  año	   3	  años	  1	   	   	   	   	  2	   	   	   	   	  3	   	   	   	   	  4	   	   	   	   	  5	   	   	   	   	  6	   	   	   	   	  7	   	   	   	   	  8	   	   	   	   	  9	   	   	   	   	  10	   	   	   	   	  20a.	  ¿Por	  cuánto	  tiempo	  en	  los	  últimos	  3	  años	  cada	  persona	  ha	  vivido	  en	  su	  casa?	  (en	  meses,	  señale	  en	  la	  tabla	  de	  abajo)	  	  21.	  	  Las	  personas	  que	  viven	  en	  su	  casa,	  ¿dependen	  económicamente	  de	  Usted?	  	  	  	  	  SI	   /	  	  	  	  NO	   /	  	  	  	  	  	  N/a	  	  22.	  ¿Cuál	  es	  el	  nivel	  de	  instrucción	  educativa	  que	  USTED	  tiene	  aprobado?	  1	  Ninguno	  2	  Primario	  incompleto	  3	  Primario	  completo	   4	  Secundario	  incompleto	  5	  Secundario	  completo	   6	  superior	  o	  postgrado	  	   23.	  …	  lo	  mas	  alto	  EN	  SU	  CASA?	  ____________	  	  24.	  ¿Usted	  vive	  en	  Galápagos	  todo	  el	  tiempo	  a	  temporalmente?	   S	   /	   N	   Donde:_____	  	  
	  
III.	  DIVERSIFICACIÓN	  
A.	  Actividades	  diversas	  	  25.	  ¿Es	  usted	  miembro	  de	  alguna	  cooperativa	  de	  pesca?	  	  	  	  S	   /	   N	   	  
Si	  No,	  Fecha	  de	  finalización	  de	  la	  membrecía:	  ______	  ¿Ha	  tenido	  un	  posición	  en	  la	  cooperativa?	  ____	  	  
	  	   214 
26.	  ¿Alguien	  en	  su	  hogar	  es	  miembro	  de	  alguna	  cooperativa	  de	  pesca?	  	  S/	  	  	  	  N	  27.	  ¿Es	  usted,	  o	  alguien	  en	  su	  casa,	  miembro	  de	  algún	  otro	  grupo,	  cooperativas,	  o	  asociaciones?	  	  28.	  ¿A	  veces	  usted,	  o	  alguien	  en	  su	  hogar,	  están	  voluntarios	  para	  organizaciones	  aquí?	  S	   /	   N	   detalles:	  _____________	  
	   29.	  ¿Cuál	  es	  su	  ocupación	  principal?	  ________	  30.	  ¿Hoy,	  le	  preferiría	  tener	  más	  de	  un	  solo	  empleo	  EN	  EL	  HOGAR?	  31.	  ¿Quiere	  que	  continuará	  en	  sus	  actividades	  de	  sustento	  que	  tiene	  hoy,	  por	  el	  resto	  de	  su	  vida?	  ¿hasta	  su	  jubilación?	  	  S	   /	   N	   /	   Otra	  actividad	  preferido__________	  
	  
B.	  Redes	  Informales	  en	  la	  ocupación	  	  (Lazos	  Sociales)	  	  32.	  	  ¿En	  el	  último	  año	  (2011),	  que	  otra	  actividad	  ha	  trabajado	  usted,	  y	  su	  hogar,	  distinto	  de	  la	  pesca?	  	  	   Quien	  h. sector	  público	  (asalariado)	   	  i. sector	  turístico	  (asalariado	  o	  no)	   	  j. comercio-­‐servicios	   	  k. taxista	  -­‐	  transporte	  	   	  l. comerciante	  compra	  –	  venta	  productos	   	  m. Otros	  negocios	  de	  familia	  	   	  n. Otro	  (trabajos	  ocasionales	  etc.)	   	  	  
è 33.	  	  ¿Hay	  otros	  actividades,	  negocios,	  o	  trabajos	  en	  los	  años	  recientes	  (y	  desde	  2009)?	  	  ¿Cómo	  usted	  obtuvo	  esos	  trabajos/actividades?	  	  
	  …a	  través	  de	  amigos	  cercanos,	  conocidos,	  o	  familiares?	  S	   /	   N	   /	   N/A	   (indicate	  which)	  	  34.	  ¿Tuvo	  una	  entrevista	  de	  trabajo	  para	  cada	  uno	  de	  ellos?	  Empleo	   Sí/No	  	   	  	   	  	   	  
	  
35.	  Entonces,	  el	  número/la	  diversidad	  de	  sus	  trabajos	  desde	  el	  2009:	  e. Igual	  #,	  los	  mismos	  empleos:	  f. Igual	  #,	  diferentes	  empleos:	  	  g. Ha	  aumentado	  #:	  h. Ha	  disminuido	  #:	  	  36.	  ¿Qué	  tal	  este	  AÑO?	  2012	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37.	  Alguna	  vez	  ha	  aplicado	  para	  conseguir	  uno	  permiso	  de	  turismo?	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38.	  ¿Tiene	  ud.	  alguna	  familia	  en	  política	  o	  gobierno?	   Si	   /	   No	   Detalles_____	  	  39.	  ¿Cuántos	  MIEMBROS	  DE	  su	  FAMILIA	  tenían	  un	  empleo	  diferente	  de	  la	  pesca,	  antes	  de	  que	  usted	  inicie	  actividades	  de	  trabajo	  fuera	  de	  la	  pesca?	  (escribe	  detalles	  y	  trabajos)	  	  
IV.	  PATRONES	  DE	  PESCA	  
A.	  Actividad/Ingreso	   	   	   	   	   Antes	   	   	   	   2011	  40.	  ¿Qué	  tipo	  de	  pesquería	  realizaba	  Usted?	  	  	   1	  pepino	  de	  mar	  2	  langosta	  3	  pesca	  blanca	  4	  	  otra,	  ¿cuál?	  
	  
40a.(N°	  total	  de	  pesquerías	  participantes	  
en)	   No:	   	  41.	  	  ¿Qué	  tipo	  de	  ocupación	  desempeñaba	  en	  la	  pesca?	  	  	  
1	  armador	  (owner)	  2	  Capitán	  3	  Panguero	  4	  Pescador	  5	  Buzo	  6	  	  Cocinero	  
	  
42.	  ¿De	  qué	  manera	  le	  pagan?	  
Tiempo	  exacto	  cuando	  dejó	  de	  pescar,	  si	  lo	  recuerda:	  ________________	  	  	  43.	  En	  el	  último	  año	  (2011),	  cual	  ha	  sido	  su	  actividad	  en	  la	  pesca	  por	  diversión?	  La	  pesca	  artesanal?	  
ESPECI
ES	   ¿Cuál	  es	  el	  arte	  de	  pesca	  que	  utiliza?	  1	  empate	  (draw)	  	  2	  chinchorro	  o	  red	  de	  cerco	  (seine	  or	  circle	  net)	  3	  red	  de	  enmalle	  o	  transmallo	  (gillnet	  or	  trammel)	  	  4	  gancho	  (hook)	  5	  a	  mano	  (Hand)	  	  6	  línea	  con	  anzuelo	  (bait	  hook)	  	  7	  señuelo	  (line,	  lure)	  8	  	  hooka	  o	  compresor	  de	  aire	  	  
¿Cuántas	  MESES	  
al	  año	  realiza	  
esta	  pesquería?	  	  (Durante	  de	  2011-­‐12)	  
¿Cuántas	  (libras)	  saca	  
en	  promedio	  a	  la	  MES	  
durante	  la	  temporada?	  	  (Durante	  de	  2011-­‐12)	  
¿Como	  ha	  
cambiado	  desde	  
2009?	  	  (viajes,	  cantidades,	  especies)	  subía,	  bajaba,	  igual,	  inactividad	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C.	  Comida	  de	  mar/	  Consumismo	  44.	  ¿Tenía	  contactos	  para	  vender	  pescado	  con	  negocios	  
del	  turismo	  directamente?	   	  45.	  ¿Tenía	  miembros	  de	  su	  familia	  en	  ese	  negocio?(o	  
amigos	  o	  conocidos)	   	  46.	  ¿	  Tenía	  contactos	  para	  vender	  pescado	  con	  negocios	  más	  local	  directamente?	  (tambien	  vecinos,	  familia)	   	  
Contactos	  de	  mariscos:	  Locales_________	  Exportares__________	  Turismo__________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  #____	  	  
E.	  Preferencias	  47.	  ¿Hipotéticamente,	  si	  las	  oportunidades	  será	  mejorar	  en	  la	  pesca,	  preferiría	  a	  pescar,	  o	  ya	  no	  volver?	  	  
è 	  48.	  Si	  hubiera	  una	  nueva	  pesquería	  (o	  más	  grande)	  de	  atún	  en	  el	  RMG,	  y	  tenia	  el	  capital	  inicial,	  ¿estaría	  interesado	  en	  participar?	   Y	   /	   N	  
	  
V.	  INGRESOS/BIENES	  Con	  esta	  investigación	  queremos	  entender,	  y	  comparar	  el	  bienestar	  de	  la	  gente	  con	  actividades	  diferentes.	  	  49.	  Considerando	  sus	  ingresos,	  diría	  su	  nivel	  de	  vida	  es	  d. Bien	   e. Más	  o	  menos	  bien	   f. Mal	  50.	  	  Las	  cosas	  que	  usted	  puede	  hacer	  o	  comprar	  con	  dinero	  –	  por	  ejemplo	  vivienda,	  muebles,	  comida,	  carros,	  vacaciones	  –	  son	  parte	  esencial	  de	  nuestro	  estándar	  de	  vida	  material.	  Si	  usted	  piensa	  en	  su	  estándar	  de	  vida	  en	  la	  actualidad,	  considera	  que	  es	  más	  alto,	  más	  bajo,	  o	  aproximadamente	  el	  mismo	  que	  el	  de	  3	  años	  atrás?	  
	  
A.	  Actividades	  –	  Diversidad	  Ocupacional,	  importancia	  relativa,	  cambios	  recientes	  51.¿Cuánto	  ingreso	  tuvo	  con	  cada	  empleo	  y	  en	  todo	  el	  transcurso	  del	  año	  (2011)?	  	  	   Temporada	  (o	  anualmente)	   Horas/semanas	   Horas/semanas	   Ingresos	  (unidades)	  1	   	   	   	   	  2	   	   	   	   	  3	   	   	   	   	  52.	  Y	  si	  tuviera	  que	  estimar,	  ¿Cómo	  cree	  compara	  este	  año?	  	  	  53.	  Usted	  diría	  que	  el	  INGRESO	  TOTAL	  EN	  SU	  HOGAR	  en	  el	  2011	  fue	  de:	  	  ¿Más	  de	  $3,500/por	  año?	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  	  ¿Más	  de	  $6,500/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $10,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $11,500/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  ¿Más	  de	  $17,000/por	  año?	  	   S	  	  /	  	  N	  	  54.	  ¿Es	  aquello	  representativo	  del	  ingreso	  de	  su	  hogar,	  en	  general?	  S	  /	  N	   	  Si	  N,	  ¿por	  qué?	  :	  ________________________________________________	  (incluya	  si	  es	  mayor/menor)	  55.	  Si	  tuviera	  que	  estimar,	  ¿Cómo	  cree	  compara	  este	  año?	  (bracket)	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  56.	  ¿Usted	  diría	  que	  comparado	  con	  LA	  PESCA	  (durante	  su	  ultimo	  año	  que	  pescó	  solamente),	  su	  ingreso	  (SOLAMENTE	  USTED)	  es	  mejor,	  o	  peor,	  o	  más	  o	  menos	  igual	  ahora?	   	  	  57.	  ¿Usted	  dirías	  que	  de	  acuerdo	  al	  INGRESO	  TOTAL,	  usted	  (SU	  HOGAR)	  está	  mejor,	  peor,	  o	  más	  o	  menos	  lo	  mismo	  que	  HACE	  TRES	  AÑOS	  ATRÁS?(2009)	   	  	  58.	  ¿Alguna	  persona	  que	  NO	  vive	  con	  usted,	  contribuye	  regularmente	  con	  dinero	  en	  su	  hogar	  durante	  en	  el	  2011?	  (remesas,	  pensiones)	  S/N	   Persona	   Cantidad	  	   	   	  	  
Entonces,	  en	  acuerdo	  de	  las	  preguntas	  antes,	  la	  actividad	  más	  importante	  
económicamente	  para	  su	  hogar	  es…	  	  	  (recap	  of	  order)	  	  Ocupación	   Clasificación	  	   	  	   	  	   	  
	  
B.	  Limitaciones	  en	  los	  Créditos:	  Con	  esta	  investigacion	  queremos	  conocer,	  si	  hay	  limitaciones	  en	  los	  creditos	  para	  la	  gente.	  59.	  ¿Alguna	  vez	  usted	  ha	  prestado	  dinero	  o	  ha	  aplicado	  por	  un	  préstamo	  para	  desempeñar	  una	  actividad	  laboral,	  sea	  para	  la	  pesca	  o	  de	  otro	  tipo?	  	  …	  fue	  a	  través	  de	  (a)	  familia	  o	  amigo(a)s,	  o	  (b)	  del	  banco	  u	  otra	  institución	  financiera.	  
	  60.	  ¿Tiene	  deudas?	  (de	  las	  más	  comunes:	  hogares,	  carros,	  negocios,	  motores)	  	   S	   /	   N	   /	   Poco	   	   tipo_____	  	  61.	  Si	  Ud.	  estuviera	  en	  una	  situación	  donde	  tendría	  que	  conseguir	  $1000	  en	  una	  semana,	  ¿podría	  solucionarlo?	  	  ¿Cómo	  lo	  solucionará?	  -­‐	  ahorros	  propios	  -­‐	  Préstamo	  a	  familiares	  -­‐	  préstamo	  a	  amigos	   -­‐	  préstamo	  al	  banco	  	  -­‐	  ir	  a	  pescar	  -­‐	  otro	  	  62.	  ¿Usted	  posee	  un	  barco?	  	   1	  lancha	   2	  fibra	   3	  panga	  63.	  ¿Si	  usted	  compara	  su	  salud	  con	  la	  de	  otros	  de	  su	  misma	  edad,	  cree	  que	  su	  salud	  es,	  mejor,	  peor,	  igual?(Encierre	  una)	  	  64.	  ¿Tiene	  alguna	  enfermedad	  crónica	  o	  inhabilidad?___________________	  	  65.	  ¿Cuál	  es	  su	  tenencia	  de	  su	  casa?	  1. En	  arriendo	  2. Propia	  3. Cedida	   4. Recibida	  por	  servicios
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  66.	  ¿Tiene	  o	  tenía	  hijos,	  o	  miembros	  de	  su	  hogar	  que	  estudian	  afuera,	  o	  en	  otra	  lugar?	   S	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /	   N	  	  	  	  /	   N/a	  	  
VI.	  Preguntas	  sobre	  Políticas	  Específicas	  67.	  ¿Cree	  Usted	  que	  durante	  el	  tiempo	  que	  llevó	  pescando,	  la	  pesca	  hubo	  disminuido?	  	   S	   /	   N	  67a.	  ¿Por	  qué?	  (Si	  la	  respuesta	  es	  Sí)	   	  68.	  …hay	  animales	  o	  peces	  que	  han	  crecido?	  ___________	  	  69.	  Podría	  usted	  decirme,	  “Yo	  tengo	  [bastante,	  algo,	  mucha,	  no	  mucha,	  ninguna]	  confianza	  en	  el	  Parque	  Nacional	  de	  los	  Galápagos”	  	  70.	  Qué	  tanto	  usted	  estaría	  de	  acuerdo	  con	  la	  siguiente	  afirmación:	  “Los	  pescadores	  pueden	  poner	  en	  prácticas	  sus	  ideas,	  en	  al	  Junta	  de	  Manejo	  Participativo”	  	  
(encierre	  uno)	  [muy	  fuertemente,	  fuertemente,	  indiferente,	  está	  en	  desacuerdo,	  está	  en	  fuerte	  desacuerdo]	  	  	  71.	  ¿Cree	  que	  es	  necesario	  para	  limitar/reducir	  el	  esfuerzo	  en	  la	  pesca?	  ¿Con	  qué	  método	  usted	  está	  más	  de	  acuerdo	  para	  limitar/reducir	  el	  esfuerzo	  en	  la	  pesca?	  ___	  El	  acceso	  no	  debería	  ser	  limitado	  ___	  Temporadas	  de	  veda	  	  ___	  Licencia	  de	  entrada	  limitada	  (similar	  al	  actual)	  ___	  Cuotas	  individuales	  de	  pesca	  (permisos	  negociable)	  ___	  Recompras	  (el	  GNP	  compra	  a	  los	  Pescadores	  fuera	  de	  la	  pescadería)	  ___	  Otros	  	  72	  ¿Cuáles	  son	  los	  políticas	  que	  han	  tenido	  mayor	  impacto	  en	  sus	  capacidades	  para	  que	  cambien	  sus	  actividades	  de	  vida?	  	  
-­‐ que	  han	  ayudado	  o	  no	  han	  ayudado	  
	  	  ¿Cuántas	  veces	  ha	  sido	  entrevistado	  antes?	  
	  	   219 
APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF OCCUPATIONAL DIVERSITY 	  
	  
Figure C1. Boat ownership and home ownership among individuals who have diminished, 
intensified, and maintained fishing engagement in the short-term (a and c), and among 
individuals based on their fishing status in the 2011-12 season. Part-time fishers are majority 
boat owners, as are diminishers. Rates of home ownership are similar among groups. 
 
Table C1. Survey respondents’ preference for ways to earn greater incomes. The survey question 
was, “Which would you prefer, to sell more fish or have part-time work that would not be in the 
fishery, with an equivalent income?” 
 do both either other part-time work 
sell more 
fish 
Fishing Strategy     
Intensify~ 1 (14%) 0 3 (43%) 2 (29%) 
Diminish` 1 (7%) 0 4 (27%) 2 (13%) 
Same 1 (0.6%) 2 (1%) 58 (40%) 33 (23%) 
     
Fishing status*     
full-time 0 1 (2%) 26 (53%) 21 (43%) 
part-time 3 (5%) 1 (2%) 32 (55%) 15 (26%) 
~6 out of 7 people who intensified their fishing were asked this question  
`7 out of 15 people who diminished their fishing were asked this question 
*inactive fishers were not asked this question 	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Figure C2. Total jobs in survey households and total held by surveyed fishers in that household. 
All data points are whole numbers, and presented slightly jittered to show overlapping data.  	  
Table C2. Demographic statistics according to fishing strategy and status. 
    Fishing Strategy 
(2009-11) 
  Fishing Status   
  Intensify Diminish Maintain  Full-time Part-time Occasional/Inactive Overall 
Year Born          
 min 1956 1940 1941  1943 1940 1941  1940 
 median 1968 1961 1968  1969 1968.5 1964  1967 
 max 1983 1994 1993  1984 1994 1993  1994 
Years Actively Fishing         
 min 11 6 0  11 2 0  0 
 median 16 30 19  23 22.5 14  20 
 max 44 53 56  56 53 50  56 
# of children          
 min 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 
 median 3 3 2  2 2 2  2 
 max 4 5 8  7 6 8  8 
# in Household          
 min 1 1 1  1 1 1  1 
 median 5 4 4  4 4 4  4 
 max 7 7 11  11 9 10  11 
Civil Status          
 single 1 1 23  9 9 6  25 
 married 5 10 87  32 28 41  102 
 free union 0 1 9  2 6 2  10 
 divorced* 1 3 26  6 15 9  30 
*includes individuals who are separated 
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Figure C3. Metrics of human and social capital, against fishing strategy (left column) and fishing 
status (right column).  
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Figure C4. Individual preference to continue in current work activities across sectors of 
employment.  This graphic helps place job satisfaction in broader context, as it shows that a non-
trivial portion of survey respondents working in many sectors would rather do other things. Thus 
seeking to switch jobs may not be uncommon in the Galápagos in general. 
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